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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

-

3

-

-

-

-

INTRODUCTION

4
5

MR. SCHMIDT:

Good morning.

I think we are

6

going to try to start the program.

Welcome to the FTC's

7

Workshop on Unilateral Effects.

8

Director of the Bureau of Competition, and we are very

9

glad to have you here today.

I am Jeff Schmidt, the

We are really excited

10

about this program.

11

workshop is the brainchild of Chairman Majoras, and it

12

represents the best of the FTC in trying to better

13

understand some of the important competition policy

14

issues that we face.

15

As some of you may know, this

I have the chore of doing a couple housekeeping

16

tasks here, so if you will indulge me as I go through

17

this to make sure that I have covered the requirements.

18

I think the -- let's see, the first thing is I have been

19

asked to remind you that the agenda today is a full one,

20

so that if you can try to be back in your seats by the

21

time lunch is over with and breaks are over with, we can

22

hopefully stay on schedule.

23

And I have also been asked to ask you to use the

24

side doors instead of the center doors, for reasons that

25

are not particularly clear to me.
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Secondly, if you will turn off the ringers on

2

your cell phones, BlackBerries, pagers, and the like,

3

and I will do likewise when I get down from here.

4

And third, the restrooms are out the glass

5

doors, past the security desk, and then behind the

6

elevator bank to the left.

7

restrooms are located there.

8

Both the men's and women's

And then fourth, if you do leave the building

9

during the day, unfortunately, for those of you who are

10

not FTC employees, you will need to go through security

11

again.

12

couple extra minutes to do that.

13

So, if you can be sure to give yourselves a

And then finally, as a federal government

14

agency, we do practice certain safety measures.

15

Probably the most important thing for you to know is --

16

obviously you know the one exit that you came in through

17

-- if you need to leave the building in the event of an

18

emergency.

19

There will be FTC people who will also be obviously here

20

and are on site in the event that we have any problems,

21

but, of course, we are not anticipating that.

There is also an exit immediately behind us.

22

So, with that, I'd like to welcome the Chairman

23

of the Federal Trade Commission, Deborah Platt Majoras,

24

to open our workshop.

25

(Applause.)
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1
2

OPENING REMARKS

3
4

CHAIRMAN MAJORAS:

Well, thank you very much,

5

everyone.

6

the morning in Washington, especially on election day.

7

It is always good to see a robust crowd in

I welcome you to this workshop at the FTC.

As

8

many of you know, the FTC has found that when we are

9

working through particular policy issues, we often find

10

it very valuable to bring in experts from the outside

11

who can then, in a public forum, communicate their views

12

and help us think through the issue.

13

discussions can take whatever form or length is required

14

for the issue.

15

Our public

Just last week, for example, we held a one-day

16

round table with DOJ to explore our Joint Technical

17

Assistance Program in the international arena.

18

about a year ago this week, we had a two-day forum on

19

the broadband access issue, which has been dubbed Net

20

Neutrality.

21

past 18 months, we and DOJ have hosted 29 sessions of

22

experts discussing the appropriate application of

23

Section 2 of the Sherman Act to business conduct.

24
25

Just

And then, as many of you know, over the

So, today, you have been good enough to join us
as we gather to discuss unilateral effects analysis in
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1

merger review and in the litigation context, and I am

2

pleased to say that we have gathered really a highly

3

knowledgeable and thoughtful group of panelists, and I

4

am very grateful to all of you for agreeing to lend your

5

views.

6

Back in February of 2004, the FTC and DOJ held a

7

merger enforcement workshop, which focused on whether

8

the analytical framework set forth in the 1992

9

Guidelines, which, of course, had its roots in the 1982

10

Guidelines, was adequately serving the dual purposes of

11

leading to the correct decisions in horizontal merger

12

review and providing reasonably clear guidance to

13

businesses and their counselors.

14

The workshop participants generally agreed that,

15

in fact, the Guidelines framework was serving those

16

purposes.

17

a reworking of the Guidelines, but rather, the agencies'

18

commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, through

19

which we explained, by reference to specific cases,

20

including cases where we had closed the investigation,

21

how we have applied the Guidelines to actual mergers.

22

So, borne out of that workshop, then, was not

If you reviewed the section on unilateral

23

effects, it shows a large number of enforcement actions,

24

most of which resulted in consent decrees.

25

little doubt, I think, among antitrust practitioners

There can be
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1

that unilateral effects is recognized as a central

2

antitrust concern, and that the Government has a record

3

of success in obtaining relief in these cases.

4

Of course, the record is not perfect.

In

5

litigated matters, both the FTC and DOJ have suffered

6

some losses in differentiated products cases under a

7

unilateral effects theory.

8

in the Whole Foods case, the district court did not

9

grant the preliminary injunction that the FTC sought,

Most recently, for the FTC,

10

and before that, DOJ lost the SunGard and Oracle

11

challenges.

12

cases in which a unilateral effects theory of harm has

13

been alleged, as in Staples, Swedish Match, and Libbey,

14

the courts' decisions have really not expressly

15

discussed the application of unilateral effects theory.

16

Even when the Government has prevailed in

Now, there may, of course, be no meaningful

17

pattern in these losses.

18

likely will lose some cases over time, as only the

19

toughest cases result in litigation; and try as we do,

20

we cannot determine with absolute precision on which

21

side of the line a close case will fall according to a

22

court.

23

if we believe that we have the evidence to support our

24

position that a merger is likely to be anticompetitive.

25

If we are doing our jobs, we

Still, we cannot shy away from the tough cases

Clearly, though, if you look at the cases and

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

10
1

particularly the losses, they do show, I think, what we

2

experience, which is that there are challenges in

3

proving a relevant market in which we allege that the

4

likely harm will arise out of the loss of competition

5

between two competitors that have served as next-best

6

substitutes to one another for a significant number of

7

customers.

8
9

Recall that, for example, in the Oracle case,
the Justice Department sought to bar Oracle's

10

acquisition of PeopleSoft.

11

incumbent manufacturers in a market defined as

12

enterprise resource planning system software that

13

handles human resources management and financial

14

management systems for customers that made minimum

15

purchases of $500,000.

16

of course, argued for a much broader market that

17

included not just those programs, but also other forms

18

of ERP programs, as well as non-ERP software solutions,

19

and would not have limited the market by size of

20

customer sales.

21

proposed market expanded the number of market

22

participants.

23

These were two of the three

By comparison, the defendants,

So, not surprisingly, defendants'

I am obviously simplifying in the interest of

24

time here, but there, the court found that DOJ failed to

25

prove its alleged product market, at least in part
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because it was not consistent with business delineations

2

recognized within the industry.

3

presented testimony from numerous customers that they

4

might prefer defendants' products over some of the

5

alternatives, but, said the court, none testified about

6

how they would respond in actual purchases to a

7

post-merger SSNIP.

8

the Government to rely principally on qualitative

9

materials like market research reports and declarations

10
11

The Government had

Lack of hard, quantitative data led

from customers and industry consultants.
The defendants countered with examples of users

12

that had implemented alternatives to the defendants'

13

products.

14

Government had failed to define the alleged, narrow,

15

relevant market, which meant that the shares that you

16

then calculate to show concentration levels weren't

17

correct and that ultimately, the Government's estimates

18

of competitive effects, based on that market definition,

19

also had to be disregarded.

20

Ultimately, the court found that the

Then you go to the SunGard case.

The district

21

court there rejected DOJ's market definition in refusing

22

to bar SunGard from acquiring the assets of Comdisco.

23

These companies, as well as IBM, were in the business of

24

providing shared hot-site services which are backup

25

computer centers that you use in the event of a
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disaster.

2

shared hot-site services for customers with mainframe

3

and midrange computer processing centers.

4

contended that there were a lot of alternatives to these

5

that customers could and did turn to to safeguard

6

themselves in the event of disasters.

7

The Government alleged a market that was

Defendants

Both sides offered customer testimony to support

8

their contentions, but there the court rejected the

9

customer testimony, finding that both sides were

10

engaging in cherry-picking sampling and that neither

11

side's witnesses were representative of all existing and

12

future customers.

13

relevant market that was neither the narrow market that

14

DOJ had alleged or the broader market that the

15

defendants had alleged.

16

market somewhere in between.

17

Ultimately, the court found a

In fact, the court found a

And finally, if you look at the Commission's

18

challenge to Whole Foods' acquisition of Wild Oats, the

19

court there rejected the contention that the relevant

20

market was the premium natural and organic supermarket.

21

There, the Government presented not only economic

22

evidence but evidence that was taken from the parties

23

themselves that, in fact, showed that the two were

24

uniquely close competitors.

25

Whole Foods and Wild Oats competed at a certain level

There was no doubt that
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with other supermarkets, and we never denied that, but

2

staff presented evidence that the companies believed

3

that the other was a uniquely close competitor, and

4

thus, made decisions on that basis; and as the Whole

5

Foods CEO told his board in justifying the transaction,

6

that the acquisition would eliminate Wild Oats as a

7

platform for conventional supermarkets to get into the

8

organic market segment, and the entry through that

9

avenue would be only a threat to his market position.

10

And in addition, after paying a premium for stores,

11

Whole Foods made clear it had the intention to close

12

dozens of stores and to scrap plans to build new stores.

13

Of course, the district court did not see the

14

evidence there as we did and concluded that we were

15

wrong about what constituted the relevant market, and

16

that case is now on appeal.

17

Don't get me wrong.

The courts play an

18

absolutely critical role in U.S. merger enforcement.

19

Indeed, almost uniquely so if you look at our courts'

20

role in comparison with many courts around the world.

21

And after every litigated case, it is very important

22

that we carefully evaluate the courts' decisions, our

23

own analysis, and our evidentiary presentations.

24
25

You know, the fact that litigated cases happen
so infrequently -- indeed, the three cases litigated by
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1

the FTC over the past year were virtually unprecedented

2

over the past couple of decades.

3

haven't litigated so many cases in a year.

4

makes it all the more important that we learn from each

5

and every court decision.

6

The agencies just
So, that

In addition, because most merger decisions are

7

not litigated, we have a great responsibility to ensure

8

that we are basing those decisions, most of which result

9

in consent decrees, on solid analysis which would be

10

supportable in the courts if litigation were necessary.

11

And if we lose, it is essential that we take a critical

12

look at our legal analysis and presentation to

13

determine, to the extent we can, how and why we were

14

unable to convince the court of our position.

15

In this regard, I am very proud of the

16

debriefing efforts that are being undertaken and have

17

been for the last six months within our agency among the

18

economists and the lawyers to think these things

19

through, and today's workshop is another step in our

20

process.

21

but given the human limitations on objectivity, we may

22

be so close to a case or an approach or a set of

23

strategies that our own introspective evaluation is just

24

simply not enough.

25

We can identify ways to improve internally,

The workshop combines a lot of our thinking,
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1

covering many of the areas that we and others outside

2

have identified as worthy of discussion.

3

has market definition, which has been such an important

4

tool in analysis, become an end in unilateral effects

5

cases rather than a means to determine if the merged

6

entity will have the ability to exercise power?

7

is it because, as Professors Farrell and Shapiro argue

8

and probably will talk about today in a preliminary

9

draft paper, the Guidelines have shoehorned unilateral

For example,

If so,

10

effects analysis into the traditional market definition

11

concentration framework that has its roots in

12

coordinated effects analysis?

13

We will define markets in unilateral effects

14

cases in problematical ways in litigation, because given

15

the nature of the analysis of closeness of substitution,

16

they appear to judges to have been gerrymandered and not

17

always consistent with our views as consumers; and, of

18

course, we are all consumers, including judges.

19

ready to touch the third rail and discuss whether market

20

definition is necessary in a case in which we can

21

present direct evidence of competitive effects?

22

regard, are we just getting tripped up over our own

23

terminology and our step-by-step analysis, and should we

24

do a better job of explaining, as I tried in the

25

Evanston opinion, that in differentiated product

Are we

In that
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unilateral effects cases, market definition and

2

competitive effects are simply two sides of the same

3

coin no matter how we label?

4

might argue, stick to traditional market definition and

5

concentration calculations because, while sometimes

6

imperfect, they provide important disciplines on legal

7

analysis?

8

the fact that a huge percentage of mergers we review

9

have to be analyzed within only 30 days or less,

Or should we, as some

Should our thoughts on this be influenced by

10

necessitating that we have to have some tools to be able

11

to find the right answer quickly?

12

evidence and how we present it?

13

reject customer declarations, customer testimony,

14

parties' unvarnished statements about competition and

15

mergers in favor of litigation declarations and economic

16

evidence at different times, all of which, some of us

17

believe, at least at some points, to be very important

18

evidence in these cases.

19

What about our
We have had judges

Are we moving toward a system where fancy

20

econometrics will win the day, much like we hear about

21

jurors who have seen so much CSI and Law & Order on TV

22

that they insist on fancy DNA or fingerprint evidence in

23

order to find guilt in a case?

24

noneconomic and economic evidence are most probative in

25

these cases, and how does our answer vary by factual

What types of
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conditions, where we have dynamic versus static markets;

2

if we have industrial products cases versus retail

3

cases, direct to consumer?

4

How do we handle new economic learning when we

5

go in to court?

This is very important, because ours is

6

not a static discipline, and we want to learn as the

7

economics develop.

8

litigation standpoint?

9

experts?

So, how do we handle that from a
How important are industry

And how can we best tell the story to a judge,

10

especially if the market definition -- and you heard

11

some of the ones that I mentioned in some of these

12

cases -- are just simply not intuitive to us as

13

consumers?

14

Now, later today, I am very excited that we are

15

going to have a mock closing argument over a

16

hypothetical ice cream merger, and as you will see from

17

the facts there, the Government in that hypothetical

18

case alleged that superpremium ice cream is a separate

19

market from other types, with the defense taking the

20

position that ice cream is ice cream.

21

the economics and facts are not necessarily completely

22

in alignment with what our intuition might be.

23

panel will provide us with really an exceptional

24

opportunity to hear how two experienced judges go about

25

weighing the often complex and contradictory testimony

As we will see,

So, this
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in economics, which is typically presented in an

2

antitrust merger case.

3

So, with that, I would like to thank you all for

4

being here to discuss with us this important topic, and,

5

again, many thanks to our panelists who have agreed to

6

be here with us.

7

introduce to you, to begin the first panel, David Wales,

8

who's the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Competition.

9

I will stop now, and I would like to

(Applause.)

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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PANEL 1:

2

FOUNDATIONS OF UNILATERAL EFFECTS THEORIES:

3

CORE FEATURES, ECONOMIC BASES,

4

AND POTENTIAL GROUNDS FOR ATTACK

5
6

MR. WALES:

Great.

Thanks a lot, Debbie.

7

We are, to reiterate, very excited today about

8

our various panels, and I personally am very excited

9

about this panel.

I think we have some great

10

participants and hopefully we will have some great

11

dialogue.

12

The way we would like to kick it off is just to

13

talk about some of the foundations of unilateral

14

effects, some of its core features, economic bases, and

15

potential grounds for attack, and other general topics

16

to set up some of the additional discussions that we

17

will have.

18

The format is going to work this way:

Each of

19

the three -- now three -- panelists will have brief

20

presentations to talk about some of the issues they

21

think are important, that they want to convey, and then

22

what we would like to do is open it up to discussion,

23

hopefully get an active discussion as to some of these

24

issues and drill down a bit further on some of the key

25

points.
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So, with that I am going to go ahead and give a

2

brief introduction of the panelists, and then I am going

3

to ask them to go ahead and start their presentations.

4

First off, we have, all the way down at the end,

5

Andrew Gavil.

6

University School of Law.

7

Howard faculty since 1989.

8

faculty, he practiced antitrust law and commercial

9

litigation with law firms in Chicago and Denver.

He is

10

the lead author of Antitrust Law in Perspective:

Cases,

11

Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy, and is

12

currently at work with the co-author, Professor Harry

13

First, on Microsoft and the Globalization of Competition

14

Policy:

15

received the Warren Rosmarin Award for Excellence in

16

Teaching and Service at the Law School and serves as a

17

faculty advisor to the Howard Law Journal.

18

Professor Gavil teaches law at Howard
He has been a member of the
Prior to joining the

A Study in Antitrust Institutions.

Next up we have Robert Willig.

In 2004, he

Professor Willig

19

teaches economics at Princeton University.

He's a

20

former supervisor of economics research at Bell

21

Laboratories.

22

of Policies Affecting Prices and Products, and

23

Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry

24

Structure, and co-editor of The Handbook of Industrial

25

Organization and Can Privatization Deliver?

He is the co-author of Welfare Analysis
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Infrastructure for Latin America, and numerous articles.

2

A fellow of the Econometric Society, he has served on

3

the editorial boards of the American Economic Review and

4

the Journal of Industrial Economics.

5

Antitrust Division in the U.S. Department of Justice as

6

Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics.

7

Finally we have Jan McDavid.

He served in the

She is a partner

8

at Hogan & Hartson here in D.C.

She focuses primarily

9

on antitrust and trade regulation litigation and

10

counseling.

She has served in multiple positions of the

11

Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association,

12

including Chair.

13

Council of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and has served

14

on antitrust task forces with the U.S. Department of

15

Defense.

16

and articles involving antitrust, including the

17

Antitrust Evidence Handbook, Mergers & Acquisitions, and

18

Antitrust & Trade Associations Practice Guide.

19

Ms. McDavid's recognition includes The Best of the Best

20

Competition and Antitrust Section; Legal Times of

21

Washington Top Antitrust Lawyers; The International

22

Who's Who of Business Lawyers; and Guide to the World's

23

Leading Competition Lawyers.

She also is a member of the Antitrust

She is the author or co-author of many books

24

We are thrilled to have each of you here today.

25

With that I think what we would like to do is
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start off, Professor Gavil, with your presentation.

2

take it away.

3

PROFESSOR GAVIL:

4

MR. WALES:

5

PROFESSOR GAVIL:

So,

The slides?

Yes.
Good morning, everyone.

I am

6

delighted to be here, and I thank Chairman Majoras and

7

Andrew for inviting me to join you.

8
9

To start off our first panel, I was asked to see
if in about five or seven minutes I could sum up the

10

history of unilateral effects.

11

that.

12

So, I will try and do

I thought that in just a few slides I would talk

13

a little bit about the roots of unilateral effects

14

doctrine, both legal and economic, and how it fits into

15

the larger picture of merger analysis.

16

thinking about various phases we have gone through in

17

terms of merger enforcement analysis.

18

That got me

I start with a hypothesis, and it was really

19

late last night when I typed this, so maybe it should

20

have a question mark at the end.

21

my hypothesis, so I will pose it more so as a

22

question -- a possible hypothesis.

23

I am not sure this is

In a sense, unilateral effects is both the

24

oldest and the newest theory of anticompetitive harm for

25

mergers.

The underlying legal and economic theories are
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neither novel, nor new.

2

theory has certainly been refined; it has been

3

elaborated.

4

will talk a little bit about that, which have clearly

5

been aided by technology and there is increased access

6

to data, which also, aided by technology, has been very

7

significant.

8

mind, and as Chairman Majoras already put it for us, is

9

why has the contemporary theory of unilateral effects

10

What is newer?

Well, the

There are new empirical techniques, and we

But the question, of course, on everyone's

proven to be such a difficult sell in the courts?

11

The basic larger idea of merger to monopoly, of

12

course, is original to the Sherman Act.

13

quotation from Hans B. Thorelli, Federal Antitrust

14

Policy:

15

Here is a

That "Sherman" -- talking here about John

16

Sherman -- "wanted the bill to cover the great

17

industrial trusts proper as well as mergers and other

18

tight combinations when of a monopolistic nature there

19

can be no doubt."

20

So the idea that we should prohibit mergers to

21

monopoly is a very old idea in antitrust.

It was

22

supposed to be covered by the Sherman Act.

23

the early merger cases that came out of the great merger

24

wave, Northern Securities, U.S. Steel, although of

25

varying success in terms of enforcement, the basic

In many of
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theory was merger to monopoly, and the trusts themselves

2

were combines.

They were viewed as mergers to monopoly.

3

The 1950 amendments ushered in the non-

4

monopolistic merger period, somewhat in response to the

5

Columbia Steel case of 1948, although there are other

6

factors as well.

7

these merger challenges from the twenties to the

8

forties.

9

a different set of concerns.

The Government was losing a number of

Congress decided to step in.

They clearly had

They broadened out and

10

altered the focus from a focus on merger to monopoly to

11

what we might call nonmonopolistic mergers.

12

We might also call these the wilderness years,

13

as the anchor, even in early thinking about merger to

14

monopoly, was a little bit more clear than what happened

15

in this period.

16

"trend towards concentration," a concept which is

17

typified by cases like Brown Shoe, Von's, and Pabst, and

18

which we now teach against in casebooks, toward the

19

structural approach, and the general concerns it raised

20

about market shares that were obviously elevating.

21

was the idea of making predictions from market structure

22

that took form in the Philadelphia National Bank

23

presumption, and, of course, was reflected in the first

24

Merger Guidelines in 1968.

25

There was an evolution from emphasis on

Here

From 1968 to 1992, there was an effort to better
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define what the true anticompetitive theory was, and in

2

a sense this period led to a commingling and a fusion of

3

two competing traditions.

4

tradition going back to the 19th Century in economics,

5

and the other was the structural presumption, which had

6

developed in some of the writings on industrial

7

organization economics in the 1950s.

One was the oligolopy

8

If you go back, as I did, looking at Stigler and

9

Posner and Bork and contrast them with Kaysen and Turner

10

(1959), you really see these two very different sets of

11

ideas competing for influence in terms of merger policy.

12

Their first offspring was the coordinated effects theory

13

in the 1982 Guidelines and the way the Guidelines are

14

structured.

15

Shapiro explore in their paper, I will mention that a

16

little later on.

17

that combine pieces of different theories I think is one

18

of the issues that is going to emerge today as

19

important.

20

are reflected in different pieces of the Guidelines, and

21

like a puzzle where the lines between the pieces are

22

still very defined, they do not always quite fit

23

together very well, and sometimes they can even work at

24

cross-purposes.

25

This is a point that Joe Farrell and Carl

The attempt to structure Guidelines

We have different intellectual thoughts that

From the mid-1980s to the present, there was
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something of a reintegration of the pre-1950 and

2

post-1950 models.

3

mergers are reintegrated in the Guidelines.

Coordinated

4

and unilateral effects are both introduced.

Both, of

5

course, have roots in oligopoly theory, but both are

6

still tethered to the structural concepts in the

7

Guidelines.

8
9

Monopolistic and nonmonopolistic

For more sources on this history of unilateral
effects and its roots, I just cited a few of the

10

articles here on the slides, all of the authors being in

11

the room, Baker, Willig, and Denis, all go through some

12

of these issues of the intellectual roots of modern

13

unilateral theory.

14

Well, where do we go from here and what is the

15

discussion about today?

I think one issue that I wanted

16

to put out is, how do we relate developments in

17

unilateral effects to the larger context of modern

18

antitrust?

19

I wanted to put the idea out there.

20

unilateral effects parallels, in a sense, the tension

21

that now exists in Section 1 between actual effects and

22

the quick-look doctrine on the one hand and

23

circumstantial effects under the Sherman Act.

24

Coordinated cases tend still to be structural in some

25

sense, economic, and more sophisticated in others.

And this I am not quite sure I believe, but
Coordinated versus
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to the degree they are relying on creating a

2

circumstantial, predictive case for coordinated effects,

3

they are more like the circumstantial approach to merger

4

analysis.

5

I tried to give a new name -- I don't know if it

6

will work or stick -- but unilateral effects is more

7

akin to "predicting actual effects" based on empirical

8

evidence, and in that sense, it really can be located in

9

the circle with cases like NCAA and Indiana Federation

10

and California Dental and Polygram, cases that try to,

11

as the Chairman was talking about earlier, try to look

12

at actual effects and market definition, market power,

13

as flip sides of an issue.

14

As the court said in NCAA and again in Indiana

15

Federation, traditional market power analysis involved

16

defining a relevant market, calculating market shares,

17

and predicting market power and consequence

18

anticompetitive effects from large and durable shares.

19

The Court has held, however, that doing so was just a

20

surrogate for actual anticompetitive effects.

21

have the actual anticompetitive effects, you shouldn't

22

need to do those things.

When you

23

The tension about that has arisen with respect

24

to such actual effects cases is similar to the tension

25

that exists now around unilateral effects.

Concerns
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about the reliability of actual effects evidence have

2

also caused some push-back in non-merger areas.

3

productive step we could take would be to get merger

4

analysis, instead of in its own pigeonhole, relocated in

5

the larger picture of what is happening in antitrust.

6

So, one

The irony of precision -- last slide here -- why

7

are unilateral effects cases a tough sell in court?

8

economists, there is the appeal of empiricism.

9

very appealing.

10
11

For

They are

They -- based on data -- I pulled this

quotation out of one of Jon Baker's articles:
"[i]f the facts support a unilateral theory, it

12

is clear as a matter of economic logic why the

13

particular merger would likely lead to higher prices."

14

This reminded me a little bit of the language in

15

Polygram where the FTC talked about anticompetitive

16

effects being "intuitively obvious" based on economic

17

analysis.

18

decision-makers?

19

But what is the challenge for
Why the resistance?

Well, in a sense, the models can be more complex

20

than the traditional PNB presumption.

This is somewhat

21

ironic since the models were designed to yield a greater

22

degree of precision, a greater degree of understanding,

23

yet the models themselves are more complex.

24

presumption was by comparison easy, like per se rules,

25

like other burden-shifting devices.

The PNB

It did not require
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a lot of understanding to say:

2

that's a lot!"

3

"40 plus 20 is 60.

Ooh,

Empirical evidence also may be confusing when

4

combined with traditional structural evidence.

It can

5

appear highly dependent on assumptions, and, therefore,

6

subject to manipulation if the assumptions change.

7

can be a little bit more rigorous in theory than

8

practice.

9

And I think there is a larger issue, one that David

It

Sometimes the data do not match the theory.

10

Meyer talked about in a speech last fall.

11

whether we like it or not, at something of a historical

12

moment in antitrust, where courts are proving very

13

skeptical about antitrust cases, and unilateral effects

14

has run into that skepticism as it tries to develop and

15

evolve in the courts.

16

We are,

Those are my opening comments, and I will turn

17

it back over to the panel.

18

MR. WALES:

19

Next we have Professor Willig with some brief

20

Great.

Thanks, Professor Gavil.

remarks.

21

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

Brief?

22

I face an interesting challenge.

I was asked to

23

cover the Merger Guidelines, a short overview to be

24

sure, unilateral effects therein, the history of

25

antitrust, and the economics of unilateral effects, and
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I wasn't given five to seven; I was given three to five.

2

MR. WALES:

3

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

4

I lied.

can talk really fast.

5

With another cup of coffee, I

So, who's got the coffee for me?

Elements of the Guidelines in an historical

6

context:

First and foremost, relevant market.

What is

7

a relevant market?

8

algorithms, those of us who love that kind of thing, but

9

the idea of a relevant market is so simple that I think

I know we talk about all the

10

we should remember its basic concept all day long

11

throughout the discussions.

12

collection of the principal sources of competitive

13

discipline on the products of the merging firms,

14

especially the overlapping products of the merging

15

firms.

16

A relevant market is a

If you collect all the sources of competitive

17

discipline and you put them all under a single source of

18

control, then you should be seeing some elevation of

19

monopoly power, and hence, the hypothetical monopoly

20

test as the way to make sure that you have got all of

21

the principal sources of competitive discipline

22

identified and collected in the relevant market.

23

idea of it is simple.

24

just the way to make sure that you have actually got

25

market power there collected in these various sources of

The

The hypothetical monopoly test is
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competitive discipline.

2

This was the idea of the 1982 Guidelines, along

3

with a way of counting concentration within a relevant

4

market.

5

away from the technocratics, the Herfindahls and the

6

like -- remember when that was a bizarre thing?

7

remember that.

8

feel like it was yesterday and I was already old when

9

these things happened.

The concentration question, again, taking it

I

I mean, I hate to be an historian and

That is sort of a dangerous

10

dream of mine.

Never mind how Jon looks.

He looks

11

great, exactly the way he looked -- God knows when.

12

improvement, but no change.

13

(Laughter.)

14

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

No

So, why do we count

15

concentration and change in concentration?

Well, a

16

relevant market is a place where a hypothetical

17

monopolist could or would exercise monopoly power.

18

change in concentration and the level asks, well, what

19

does the merger do to bring us to the status of that

20

hypothetical monopolist?

21

actually bring us to that hypothetical monopoly?

22

goes hand in glove with the idea of the relevant market.

23

The Herfindahl is a very clever way to measure

24

concentration.

25

collect share data and see how concentrated they are.

The

How close will the merger
It

It is nothing but an arithmetic way to
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Now, everybody keeps saying today -- and I have

2

heard this before as well -- that the 1982 Guidelines

3

are all about collusion, coordinated effects, as we

4

would call it today.

5

there.

6

was being published as coming right out of a Cournot

7

model.

8

Waterson, and, in fact, Ordover and I were asked to

9

write a review of those '82 Guidelines.

Hey, I was there; Larry White was

It turns out that the Herfindahl Index, by 1982,

You all remember this, economists Cowling and

I had done some

10

consulting on the Division on them when they were being

11

written with Larry White, and in '83, Ordover and I

12

wrote, "Why do they keep using the word collusion in the

13

Guidelines?

14

models like Cournot with what we would call today

15

unilateral effects."

16

a lack of language, than a distortion of the ideas.

17

obviously did better a decade later by looking it in the

18

face, but to say that the '82 Guidelines were really

19

about collusion I think is a grave intellectual error if

20

we are doing history, and that was my assignment.

21

They are actually talking about oligopoly

I think it was more a mislabeling,
We

Now we move on to the current Guidelines --

22

hopefully still current -- and we have coordinated

23

effects, which we are not talking about today, and we

24

have unilateral effects, and I'd like to highlight three

25

different cases of unilateral effects that are squarely
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in the Guidelines, and here, too, I am worried that we

2

are losing track about which one it is that we are

3

speaking of.

4

First of all, unilateral effects apply in the

5

Guidelines to the case of "homogeneous products,"

6

commodities in the common parlance.

7

this a market in which firms are distinguished by their

8

capacities rather than by the characteristics of their

9

products, because they are all basically the same;

The Guidelines call

10

hence, homogeneous products.

11

totally good sense in a market of homogeneous products.

12

The economics of it are very simple.

13

Unilateral effects make

The idea is that if a firm gets bigger in a

14

space of homogeneous products, then it has got a bigger

15

base of capacity on which to enjoy a price rise, and so

16

a big merger tends to enhance the incentives of the

17

newly merged firm to cut back on output so as to push

18

the price up, because now, it has got more capacity on

19

which to enjoy the positive profit effects of that price

20

rise.

21

Not elaborate, not fancy, not about merger

22

simulation models, although we have lots of analytics to

23

handle that if we want to, but it is not what we are

24

usually talking about on a day like today, but it is

25

still unilateral effects.

So, I think we need to
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sharpen our language away from just unilateral effects

2

to unilateral effects in markets where the products are

3

importantly differentiated to separate out the case of

4

the commodities.

5

Second of all, within the category of

6

differentiated products, there is a main case really in

7

the Guidelines where the differentiated products are --

8

I am calling it today generally differentiated.

9

Baker and I and Paul Denis debated this stuff for much

Jon

10

of two years together.

Generally differentiated

11

products are ones that compete with others in the

12

relevant market, but kind of generally, without any

13

specific product-to-product relationships.

14

Think about cold remedies.

I mean, does anybody

15

really know what the subcategories are of cold remedies?

16

Everybody's got their favorites, and yet each cold

17

remedy basically competes with all the other ones.

18

Maybe a pharmacologist would know the difference, but we

19

consumers sure don't.

20

are all kind of mushed together in one big pot, no

21

specific competitive relationships.

Or midsize cars, you know, they

22

Well, in a market like that, it makes sense to

23

think that the share of a product is indicative of its

24

competitive significance as an alternative to whatever

25

your favorite product is; that shares really connote
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competitive significance, because the competitive

2

relationships are general throughout the marketplace.

3

That is the lead case of differentiated products under

4

the Guidelines, and there, relevant market makes just as

5

good sense as it does for a homogeneous product industry

6

that collects all these products that interact

7

importantly; concentration makes sense as a measure of

8

significance, and off we go.

9

There is a lot of economics lying behind this.

10

The Logit model of demand handles this.

We all grew up

11

on the CES Utility model of monopolistic competition,

12

and in markets like that, this is exactly the kind of

13

interaction among the products.

14

differentiated products stuff.

This is really classic

15

What we are all getting confused about is the

16

third case where the competition among differentiated

17

products is not general; instead, it is local, and where

18

differentiation is local, market share is not indicative

19

of competitive significance as a matter of substitution

20

for any other product.

21

products, no.

22

Some products yes; other

Think about Toyota Camrys.

They are very

23

successful cars, and yet they are in no way interesting

24

substitutes for the BMW drivers in the crowd.

25

maybe an Audi with a low market share is a much closer

Instead,
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source of substitution for the BMW than would be the

2

best-selling Camry.

3

are discernible; they are different; people recognize

4

them as such; and they drive the importance of different

5

substitution relationships.

6

of unilateral effects.

7

talking about the third one, and I think it would really

8

help to clarify that in our discussions.

9

So, here, product characteristics

So, three different kinds

Today, we are really only

When we have localized effects, we are going to

10

have small, narrow relevant markets.

11

Bimmer-oriented relevant markets instead of all cars or

12

all midsize cars, and what we are hearing is all judges

13

who I guess do not drive Bimmers find it a little bit

14

harder to understand.

15

You know,

A proposal I would make today -- and I am not

16

going to wait for the question, I just want to slip it

17

in -- the proposal is that we accept the idea that

18

markets can be narrow where competition is localized --

19

bite that bullet -- and accept the idea that sometimes

20

the best evidence for what constitutes the true, narrow

21

relevant market is not our normal kind of intuition

22

about, "Oh, a car is a car; a grocery store is a grocery

23

store; a stationery story is a stationery store," but we

24

allow ourselves, where appropriate and where the

25

evidence is there, to deduce market definition from
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evidence about competitive effects; that after we look

2

at the Staples/Office Depot evidence, that where there

3

are only two superstores instead of three, prices are

4

higher, that teaches us that the office superstores are

5

not in the same relevant market as your corner

6

drugstore, which I would have thought intuitively, but

7

the evidence proves that is not true.

8

proves that, indeed, the relevant market is office

9

superstores.

The evidence

I wouldn't have known that through other

10

sources of evidence, but the statistics that show that

11

are our best evidence for market definition.

12

Why shouldn't we allow markets to be defined

13

using best evidence?

14

kinds of data, that would be our best evidence.

15

not that markets are irrelevant.

16

should be willing to test them and to prove them,

17

sometimes using the same kind of information that we use

18

for competitive effects, where we have such solid

19

evidence.

20

And in cases where we have those
It is

It is just that we

It is not wrong in Whole Foods for the judge to

21

be debating what the relevant market is -- all

22

supermarkets or just organically oriented ones.

23

very much the right question, and I think the judge was

24

on the right beam in trying to figure out what the best

25

source of persuasive evidence was.

That is

I don't know what
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the right answer is either.

2

would have been all over the lot just like the judge

3

was.

4

hard question.

5

aware of those data, but, I mean, maybe you are right.

6

But I think the judge was grappling with the right

7

question, and why not allow competitive effects and

8

natural experiments to be part of the evidence that does

9

drive a determination of the relevant market, along with

I don't know if it was a wrong process.
Maybe the FTC knows better.

10

competitive effects?

11

with that.

12

So, if I were the judge, I

It is a
I am not

I think there is nothing wrong

I think there is a danger in eliminating the

13

idea of a relevant market, because not forcing ourselves

14

to actually enumerate, out loud, all the sources of

15

important competitive discipline creates the danger that

16

in our weaker moments, when we are not absolutely on our

17

game -- and I know mostly we are in this room, but

18

sometimes we are off our game -- when you are on the

19

other side of me, for example -- that under those

20

circumstances, you should be impelled by the process to

21

enumerate all of what you think are the important

22

sources of competitive discipline, and the process of

23

relevant market is the force that makes us do that.

24

Just saying, "Oh, it is obvious that these two products

25

are the closest substitutes, end of story," is a
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dangerous way to lead our process as far as the law is

2

concerned.

3

Thank you.

4

MR. WALES:

5

We are now going to turn to Jan McDavid with her

6

Thank you, Professor.

opening statement.

7

Jan?

8

MS. McDAVID:

9

In recent years, as we have been talking about,

Thanks, David.

10

the agencies have increasingly relied on unilateral

11

effects theories.

12

economists in the room, can tell us whether the

13

techniques underlying these theories are appropriate and

14

debate which theory is appropriate in a particular case.

15

I am not an economist; I don't play one on television.

16

I hire people like Bobby for that.

17

Other panelists, and especially the

Instead, I'd like to discuss these issues from

18

the perspective of an antitrust practitioner who has to

19

explain them to business people who are making decisions

20

about potential transactions and who interact with the

21

staff of the agency about particular transactions.

22

Now, it has always seemed logical to me to

23

consider whether a merger that eliminates direct

24

competition between the merging parties substantially

25

reduces overall competition within the meaning of
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Section 7.

2

very common sense notion that a merger is likely to have

3

more a harmful competitive effect if the merging parties

4

are particularly close competitors.

5

Unilateral effects analysis is based on the

The most obvious example, of course, is a merger

6

to monopoly in which there is no competition remaining

7

following a transaction.

8

transactions in which some rivals remain could produce

9

those competitive effects.

But it also seems logical that

In other circumstances, they

10

won't.

11

before the courts, is how do you distinguish between all

12

of these different formulations?

13

The question before us, before the agencies and

I have always found that the easiest way to

14

explain these concepts to business people is the next

15

best substitutes formulation, and so that is basically

16

what I have done.

17

Now, as a Colorado skier, I often use the Vail

18

case as the paradigm that I walk my clients through in

19

trying to have them understand competitive effects.

20

About ten years ago, Vail resorts, which operates both

21

Vail and Beaver Creek, proposed to acquire the Ralston

22

resort ski properties in Colorado.

23

thought Ralston only made dog food will be surprised to

24

know that they actually operated Breckinridge, Arapahoe

25

Basin, and Keystone, and did not do so especially well.

Those of you who
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The Division concluded that there were two kinds

2

of skiers:

There were destination skiers, like me, who

3

get on an airplane and fly somewhere to ski, and if

4

prices go up for us, we could go somewhere else.

5

could get on an airplane to Salt Lake rather than to

6

Denver if I wanted to go skiing.

7

what they called the front-range skiers, the folks who

8

get in their cars somewhere in the Denver metropolitan

9

area and drive about two-and-a-half hours to a ski area,

I

And then there were

10

and they concluded that that was the market in which

11

they needed to analyze the effects of the proposed

12

Vail-Ralston transaction.

13

The competitive impact statement made it clear

14

that the Division was applying a unilateral effects

15

theory to the case.

16

deterred from increasing its prices at Vail and Beaver

17

Creek by the fact that skiers could go to Keystone

18

instead, if prices were to be increased at Vail and

19

Beaver Creek, or Breckinridge or Arapahoe Basin.

20

Vail also owned Keystone, Breckinridge, and A-Basin,

21

they would also pick up the revenues on the sales of

22

those tickets, and therefore, a price increase might

23

become profitable.

24
25

Before the merger, Vail was

But if

Based on an econometric analysis, using largely
survey data -- and that is a point I really do want to
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come back to -- and data on margins, the Division

2

concluded that a price increase of a dollar per ticket

3

was likely in the event that Vail owned Vail, Beaver

4

Creek, and Keystone, because Keystone was the next best

5

substitute.

6

would fix this problem.

7

They also concluded that divesting A-Basin

Now, the antitrust agencies' ability to engage

8

in the type of analysis that they used in the Vail case

9

or in the other cases we have been talking about has

10

been made possible by the kinds of rich data sources

11

that are available, as well as computers.

12

involving branded food products, for example, IRI and

13

Nielsen data permit very elaborate econometric models in

14

which we can actually use transaction data to test these

15

propositions.

16

in branded food products are not available most of the

17

time, and even in branded food product transactions,

18

they actually focus on competition at the wrong level,

19

because they are focusing on the prices set by

20

retailers, not the prices set by the manufacturers of

21

the food products who are actually engaged in the

22

merger.

23

In cases

But the retail scanner data that we have

So, what substitutes for these kind of data are

24

available and how does the quality of the data affect

25

the quality of the analysis in which we are engaging?
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It seems logical to me that differences in the quality

2

of the data are very likely to lead to differences in

3

the quality of the economic analysis that is being done

4

and that use of data that is not reliable may lead to

5

skewed and unreliable results.

6

An awful lot of the debate is also about the

7

kinds of assumptions that are being used, and if you

8

vary the assumptions, you vary the outcome.

9

possible, under the Guidelines and under the Commentary,

It is very

10

to find unilateral effects at even low market shares.

11

Many of us believed there was a 35 percent safe harbor

12

in the Guidelines, but the Commentary says there isn't.

13

Where is the right line?

14

effects predicts some kind of a price increase absent

15

some significant efficiencies.

16

the efficiency estimates are.

17

outcome in ways that may render the results at least

18

suspicious and make people skeptical.

19

Every model of unilateral

We all know how reliable
All of this can skew the

Now, I bring to this process the skepticism that

20

I also bring to the HHI analysis.

The HHIs lead to a

21

mathematical result which looks precise on its face, but

22

we all know that it varies entirely based on market

23

definition and market shares, neither of which are very

24

reliable, and then you just square it and add it up.

25

So, it all depends on where you start as to where you
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end up.

2

For that reason, I rarely try to define markets

3

in the transactions I am working on.

I always zero in,

4

almost immediately, on competitive effects analysis,

5

because that is where I have always thought the game was

6

going to be played.

7

are a very useful first screen for thinking about the

8

transactions into which we should start conducting that

9

kind of elaborate analysis, but they create an

I have always thought that the HHIs

10

artificial sense of precision where no real precision is

11

possible, and I am concerned that some of the same

12

things happen with respect to the kinds of unilateral

13

effects analyses that we have been undertaking.

14

Let's go back to the Vail case as an example.

15

People who ski in Colorado who probably agree that

16

Keystone was the most likely next best substitute for

17

Vail and Beaver Creek, with Breckinridge being a close

18

second.

19

survey data would allow you to conclude that prices

20

would go up one dollar or we would be especially

21

skeptical that divesting Arapahoe Basin was going to fix

22

that problem.

23

I think we would have been very skeptical that

I have never skied at Arapahoe Basin.

It is way

24

too hard for me.

There are people there who sleep with

25

their dogs in their Volkswagen buses in the parking lot.
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It is not a substitute for Vail.

2

an economic model that suggests that it is.

3

So why should we trust

So, I think where all of this takes me is that

4

we have to bring some common sense to these kinds of

5

analyses, and that is where I am concerned that the

6

agencies are running into resistance.

7

they've been doing appears to be gerrymandered or

8

jury-rigged and doesn't pass the common sense test.

9

When your judge is someone who's been sentencing drug

Some of what

10

offenders in the morning and is handling unilateral

11

effects analysis in the afternoon, you have to be

12

conscious of the limitations of your audience.

13

don't do the math either.

14

They

Judge Wood, who handled the cereals transaction,

15

brought Fred Kahn in to advise her as effectively her

16

law clerk when she tried that case, even though she was

17

a very experienced antitrust lawyer and very good at the

18

economics.

19

sorts of problems that we have to be conscious of.

20

And that is, I think, an illustration of the

So, I would like to use the unilateral effects

21

analysis as part of a holistic analysis of all of the

22

evidence.

23

results with the more traditional models, considering

24

the company's strategic planning documents; who do they

25

think are their most significant rivals; what do the

I have always thought we get to pretty good
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customers say; what is the evidence about entry; is one

2

of the companies failing; is one of the company's

3

ability to compete on an ongoing basis impaired in the

4

future.

5

the evidence consistent?

6

place?

Does this tell us an overall story?

Is all of

Does it take you to the same

7

If that is the case, I think you can be

8

reasonably confident about the kind of decision you are

9

reaching.

If it does not, then the agencies should be

10

skeptical, and the agencies will encounter a skeptical

11

audience in a federal judge.

12

lessons are things we have to keep in mind as we do

13

these sorts of analyses.

I think those kinds of

14

MR. WALES:

Thanks, Jan.

15

We will kick things off a little bit.

I thought

16

I would ask some questions and hopefully get the

17

dialogue going.

18

It seems that there is not a lot of dispute that

19

unilateral effects is a valid theory and one that we

20

think should be applied in the appropriate cases,

21

especially in differentiated product merger cases, but

22

the reality is it has been a tough sell to judges, and I

23

guess the question is, what do we take from that?

24

are the reasons why we think that judges are having a

25

hard time?

Is it the fact that perhaps unilateral
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effects is not a sound theory?

2

the sense that there are assumptions, intuitive

3

problems?

4

think the problems are?

5

Is it more practical in

Are the Guidelines to blame?

PROFESSOR GAVIL:

What do you

Well, the Guidelines are a

6

product of a long history and tradition, and again, I

7

would say that you need to look at it in the larger

8

context of antitrust.

9

relevant markets and market definition and market shares

We have been thinking about

10

and assumptions that you draw from that, connections

11

between that and the possibilities of anticompetitive

12

effects, for a long time.

13

going to be an easy process, and the evidence is going

14

to have to be especially compelling.

15

So, shaking that loose is not

I think if something does differentiate Staples,

16

it is that the evidence was especially compelling.

17

is difficult from the outside to evaluate how compelling

18

the evidence is in cases still pending, like Whole

19

Foods, where we just don't know all of the evidence that

20

was introduced.

21

It

And I think a second part of it is Bobby's

22

comment that maybe we shouldn't be trying to persuade

23

anyone to totally let go of that structural tradition.

24

I combine that with Jan's comment -- this has been true

25

in nonmerger cases -- when the two kinds of evidence are
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pointing in the same direction, you are going to have

2

the strongest case.

3

Now, that means a lot of work maybe, but when

4

the direct and circumstantial evidence in non- merger

5

cases is pointing towards market power, those cases are

6

pretty hard to rebut.

7

combination of thoughts here that lead to that

8

conclusion.

9

MS. McDAVID:

So, maybe there is this sort of

I think one of the things about

10

Staples we should remember is that although we had very

11

complicated economic analysis by Professor Ashenfelter,

12

there was also some really simple stuff.

13

higher where there was one firm and prices were higher

14

where there were two firms than they were when there

15

were three.

16

people who don't do the math.

17

Prices were

That was a pretty simple paradigm for even

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

It seems to me that the basic

18

thought behind differentiated products or local

19

competitive effects, the basic thought is totally

20

intuitive.

21

breakfast table test at home, which is to say that,

22

look, it turns out that when my favorite car is being

23

priced by the marketing people, the first thing they

24

look to is this closely competing car, and maybe we

25

actually have evidence from the companies of that or

I mean, it passes my dinner table, even my
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maybe we can readily deduce that, but as an expert, that

2

would be my opening line if I am talking to my family or

3

to a common lay judge, is to say, look, what is keeping

4

prices where they are today is largely and importantly

5

competition with this other product, and guess what,

6

after the merger, that product will be in the same

7

executive suite, the margin will be just going into the

8

same pocket as the margin on the BMW, my favorite car,

9

and so that source of price competition will be gone.

10

Now, Your Honor, believe me, I have looked at

11

other possible sources of competition, and there are

12

other ones, but they are just nowhere near as important

13

to the pricing of the BMW as that Audi car, and now Audi

14

and BMW are threatening to merge.

15

a broader relevant market, I have tabulated all the

16

other possible sources of competition, and they do have

17

some effect, but not nearly as important as the effect

18

that would be lost because of this merger.

19

about that?

20

Jan?

21

MS. McDAVID:

So, I have looked at

What is hard

No, I think that is pretty simple,

22

Bobby.

By the way, I have always thought that the

23

Division's case in Oracle made a great deal of sense.

24

The problem was that the market, as defined, was not

25

really a product the company sold.

It, therefore,
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looked jury-rigged, and I think that is just part of the

2

problem.

3

It failed the common sense test.
MR. WALES:

What about one of the -- I guess in

4

the merger commentaries it talks about the fact that you

5

can have both quantitative and qualitative evidence that

6

may be probative of the closeness of substitution of the

7

various products and, of course, the potential

8

competitive effect.

9

Is it the case now that you must have

10

quantitative evidence, despite the fact that the

11

commentaries talk about how you can have either

12

quantitative or qualitative information, like business

13

documents?

14

judge was more focused on the quantitative as opposed to

15

the qualitative evidence, where there was some pretty

16

good qualitative evidence in the business documents.

17

Obviously in Whole Foods, it seemed like the

MS. McDAVID:

We have to do both.

The reality

18

is when we are proposing a transaction, we have to do

19

both.

20

the matters that I handle before the agencies, I

21

encourage my economists to share all of their data, all

22

of their analyses, almost sit in a room with the agency

23

economist and be as cooperative as possible.

24

get to the right kinds of outcomes.

25

what we did in the cruise lines case, and many people

There is no alternative, and, you know, in all of

We will

That is absolutely
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hold that out as the model.

2

agency's going to do it.

3

destruction circumstance.

4

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

We have to do it.

The

It is a mutually assured

I mean, to me, the

5

quantification, aside from our satisfaction in using

6

professional standards as economists, but the

7

substantive question that has to be addressed -- and

8

this brings us back to relevant market, I think -- is

9

suppose that we can all agree, intuitively, that B is

10

the closest substitute for A, and A would be the sellers

11

are threatening to merge, but that really is not the end

12

of the story, nor is it even the end of the story to say

13

how closely substitutable A and B are, because in many,

14

many local or bigger markets, there is a C, D, and E

15

lurking behind A and B.

16

Those of you who know Princeton, if you get off

17

Route 1 to make a right turn to come to the campus down

18

Washington Road, there is a little traffic circle, and

19

on that traffic circle there is two gas stations, and

20

they are head-to-head competitors.

21

literally head to head on the traffic circle.

22

always use this in class.

23

stations merge?

24

they are close substitutes, so wouldn't you bust the

25

merger right away?

I mean, they are
So, I

What if those two gas

What do you say, class?

You can see
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So, anybody who says yes never makes it to the

2

midterm as far as I am concerned.

3

Half a mile down Route 1, there are five other gas

4

stations.

5

merge, we would lose that head-to-head competition, but

6

it would not be a substantial or it might not be a

7

substantial change in the state of competition, because

8

there is all these other gas stations just a half a mile

9

down the road.

10

But you know what?

Now, it is true if those two gas stations

This is what scares me about getting rid of

11

relevant market when it comes to localized competition

12

among differentiated products.

13

say, right away, "No, no, we have got to stop that

14

merger," without asking what else is there right behind

15

that pair of closest substitutes?

16

question that the relevant market forces us to answer,

17

to pick it up, saying, "Well, yeah, there are other

18

sources of competition, but you know what, they are not

19

nearly as important."

20

Half of my class will

And that is the

But we need some quantification to get us to the

21

ability to conclude whether or not those other gas

22

stations are closely enough competitive to these two

23

that are head-on to see whether their merger will

24

significantly tend to raise price, or whether, instead,

25

C, D, and E will provide ample competitive discipline to
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stop there from being a significant price increase

2

because of the merger.

3

quantification is necessary.

4

That means some kind of

When I tell you half a mile, you know the

5

answer, but when we are talking about cold remedies or

6

supermarkets of different kinds, we have no ready such

7

quantification, and now we are into a real debate that

8

is frustrating a lot of people.

9

MS. McDAVID:

I do not think it matters what you

10

call it -- or whether you focus on relevant market or

11

market shares, what you have to determine are what are

12

the -- as Bobby put it -- the sources of competitive

13

discipline post-transaction on the merging parties?

14

you are going to have to identify them and talk about

15

how significant they are.

16

MR. WALES:

And

It seems that judges have had a hard

17

time, though, in terms of applying the Guidelines and

18

understanding the difference between identifying that

19

localized competition that we think matters in terms of

20

the unique constraint on the merging, differentiated

21

products, and defining a broader market that might

22

contain more distant competitive constraints.

23

need to rethink how the Guidelines work in

24

differentiated product cases?

25

MS. McDAVID:

Do we

Well, the Commentary made an
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effort to do that, but we are regularly reminded that

2

the Guidelines are not law.

3

reminded us of that in his Whole Foods opinion.

4

Guidelines are sources of explanation and an

5

extraordinarily useful framework for us to use before

6

the agencies, but fundamentally, they are not going to

7

bind a court.

8

think is what you really need.

9
10
11

I think Judge Friedman
So, the

Some explanation, in whatever format, I

MR. WALES:

Would anyone support amending the

Guidelines?
PROFESSOR GAVIL:

The Guidelines have become

12

kind of a two-edged sword I think for the agencies.

13

Yes, formally, they are not law.

14

all state -- not only the Merger Guidelines, but all of

15

the enforcement agency guidelines -- that they are not

16

intended to establish a litigation format; they do not

17

specify burdens of proof.

18

agencies use them in courts, the degree to which parties

19

use them and hold the agencies to them, means that they

20

have become very influential documents in court.

21

are looked to as demarking lines for burden-shifting

22

when you look at the steps of the Guidelines.

23

Guidelines, on their face, would seem to suggest that

24

you always start by defining a relevant market and

25

calculating market shares.

Yes, formally, they

But the degree to which the

They

And the
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So, when you say change the Guidelines, ask

2

should we change the Guidelines, well, to what end and

3

with what consequences?

4

difficult challenge for the agencies to articulate

5

enforcement standards to two communities.

6

articulating to the business community their intentions

7

with respect to enforcement efforts, but then when they

8

go to court, in part, given the Supreme Court's absence

9

from mergers for so long, when they go to court, they

I think it has become a

They are

10

are kind of trying to use the cases that are available,

11

that are the best cases.

12

Guidelines as if it were law, as if it were their own

13

law.

14

Yet they have to live with the

So, it is a challenging question, what to do

15

with the Guidelines, and can you fix the problem in

16

court by changing the Guidelines, by further developing

17

the theories?

18

said, when those first '82 Guidelines came out with HHIs

19

and SSNIP, you know, there was giggling in the room at

20

the ABA meeting -- "what could this be and what court

21

would ever do this?"

22

changed.

23

Maybe.

Coming back to something Bobby

And with time, that has clearly

So, maybe part of the answer is that changing

24

the Guidelines could change things, but it may not

25

change things in the next case or it may take some time
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until those ideas filter through and gain the confidence

2

of lawyers and judges as well.

3

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

Well, let me ask, just to

4

pose my own question, if you were to think with me that

5

the best way to go is to deliver the message that the

6

way to determine relevant market is through best

7

evidence, which sometimes may be consumer survey -- God

8

help us -- sometimes through your own stomach as a

9

consumer, but sometimes through real consideration of

10

marketing data or natural experiments, like in office

11

products case, get the message out that we do need to

12

determine relevant markets, but we can sometimes do it

13

backwards.

14

we would do for competitive effects but use that as the

15

source of best evidence for relevant market.

16

Sometimes we can do the same analysis that

What is the best way to get that message out?

17

Is it a revision of the Guidelines?

18

it next time there is a document that talks about best

19

practices, that that becomes a prominent example?

20

in court explicitly that way?

21

courts better than I, what is the best way to deliver a

22

message of that kind?

23

MR. WALES:

Is it a speech?

Is

Do it

Those of you who know

One additional point, is the 35

24

percent threshold in the Guidelines.

We have seen some

25

courts reject that, actually in Oracle, there were some
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pretty negative comments on it; other courts were

2

willing to accept it as another proxy in the attempt to

3

measure the closeness of substitution between the

4

merging products.

5

The Merger Commentaries talk about it as merely

6

a screen and not a safe harbor.

7

place in antitrust cases?

8

that something we should consider changing?

9

MS. McDAVID:

Does it still have a

Should we be using it?

Is

Well, if you go back to my common

10

sense notion, when the agencies challenge a transaction

11

where the market shares are below 35 percent, it

12

suggests that there are a number of rivals that really

13

matter out there.

14

lot of skepticism about a challenge under those

15

circumstances.

16

compelling case about why the other 65 percent is not

17

sufficient to constrain the exercise of market power in

18

that circumstance.

19

I think that you are going to find a

You are going to have to have a pretty

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

I think it is a form of

20

prosecutorial discipline, because it does force the

21

agency to articulate a narrow enough relevant market to

22

get past the 35 percent threshold and to confess that,

23

indeed, we are talking about localized competition, that

24

is the theory of the case.

25

is articulated, that is what is driving the bringing of

No matter how explicitly it
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the case -- maybe appropriately, there is no doubt about

2

it -- but then the relevant market has to be articulated

3

as a narrow one, and then the 35 percent threshold will

4

be met easily.

5

The question is, will the court find that narrow

6

market to be credible?

7

be credible.

8

court is weighing in from a lay point of view.

9

And if not, maybe it shouldn't

It really is a matter of judgment, and the

MS. McDAVID:

Think back to the Grinnell case

10

where the Court talked about the market definition as a

11

red-haired, green-eyed man with the limp.

12

that the kind of thing you want to argue to a judge who

13

is going to be viewing this through his or her prism,

14

which may or may not include an economics background?

15
16

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

I mean, is

Or maybe the judge will like

to sleep in a van with the dogs and go skiing.

17

MS. McDAVID:

Exactly.

18

PROFESSOR GAVIL:

One thought just to add here

19

is I think safe harbors are important.

And I think that

20

not all market definition is going to be rocket science.

21

And the challenge is, if you have got a market

22

definition that does require more data, that is one that

23

is a little bit more complex, stating safe harbors can

24

suggest a false level of certainty -- using a safe

25

harbor that is based on a numerical threshold suggests a
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degree of precision that may not be there with more

2

ambiguous markets.

3

terms of the less rocket science market definition, so

4

transactions can be identified that just are not going

5

to be on the table.

6

do not know, but the concept of having some easily

7

discernible area of safe behavior is an important one in

8

enforcement.

9

of antitrust enforcement.

10

But it does give some guidance in

Whether that is the right number, I

We talk about it again in all other areas

MS. McDAVID:

The cruise lines case is an

11

interesting example of market definition, because the

12

Commission's statement defined a market limited to

13

cruise lines, but then it became really clear that in a

14

competitive effects analysis, the exercise of market

15

power would be constrained by other vacation choices.

16

Therefore, we focused on competitive effects, which is

17

where I think the game really needs to be played.

18

MR. WALES:

Okay, put your agency hats on.

You

19

are back at the agencies.

What types of matters should

20

the agency be looking for in terms of good unilateral

21

effects cases?

22

circumstances you think necessary, perhaps even

23

including some of the most recent cases -- were they

24

ones we should have brought?

25

agency be focusing on?

What are the specific factual

Which ones should the

Obviously merger to monopoly is
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the easiest, but I do not think anyone's going to say

2

that is all we should be looking at.

3

MS. McDAVID:

I would go back to circumstances

4

in which the evidence aligns, where the economic

5

evidence is consistent with the parties' internal

6

strategic planning documents.

7

strategic planning documents as a first screen.

8

particularly focus on one another, that may be an

9

indication of next best substitutes, and, therefore, a

You can almost use their
If they

10

transaction should be subject to additional analysis.

11

But I'd use a combination of all of the evidence and be

12

sure it points in the same direction.

13

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

Yeah, Jan, we have both seen

14

an awful lot of collections of business documents where

15

a company is very fond of naming one competitor over and

16

over again strategically and where the sum total of the

17

competitive forces from all the others, on analysis,

18

turns out to be every bit as important.

19

MS. McDAVID:

I said first screen.

20

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

21

MS. McDAVID:

22

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

23

MS. McDAVID:

Yeah.

First screen.
But caution to that.

Of course.

It has got to be the

24

whole collection of all evidence, not just the strategic

25

planning documents, but including the views of the
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customers, evidence of recent entry, the competitive

2

problems the particular firms face, the whole array of

3

evidence.

4

PROFESSOR GAVIL:

I think we have come to a

5

point where there is something of a paradox that makes

6

the question hard to answer.

7

need to bring the best case; the Government needs a win.

8

It is easy to say that.

9

to say that, well, all the evidence ought to be pointing

10

It is easy to say they

And it is relatively easy, too,

in the same direction.

11

Here is the reason I think it is somewhat

12

paradoxical.

13

blatant cartel, is not going to happen, presumably, very

14

often.

15

going to be harder cases.

16

to be represented by people like Jan, who are making the

17

best possible arguments with the best possible

18

economists about why a particular transaction should be

19

permitted.

20

the general skepticism of the courts about antitrust

21

now, means there are not going to be any easy cases.

22

is going to be hard to choose the best case.

23

The blatant merger to monopoly, like the

The cases that are going to be presented are
The merging firms are going

So, I think, in a sense, that, combined with

It

It's not to say that people do not still propose

24

extreme things and that that may come along and you may

25

get lucky and have a fish in the barrel to shoot, but I
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think that we are more likely to be facing complex fact

2

patterns, complex economics, and close calls, and it may

3

have more to do, in terms of winning, with the luck of

4

the draw in which judge you get and how that judge

5

reacts to the package of evidence than all that much

6

that the agency can do or the parties can do.

7

going to be tough cases.

8

of areas of antitrust.

9

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

Those are

That is where we are in a lot

And, of course, don't forget

10

that how tough the cases are is, in a way, a testament

11

to the remaining credibility of the agencies, because

12

the cases that would be easy do not get to court.

13

the ones that are left to go to court are the really

14

hard ones, inevitably, and that is still true, despite

15

the somewhat checkered record of the agencies in courts

16

lately, and that is a testament to the lasting view of

17

this marketplace of the skills and the abilities of the

18

agencies.

19

So,

So, look on the bright side.

MR. WALES:

I think there has been a lot of talk

20

lately about the general skepticism about antitrust.

21

That skepticism is something that we feel more generally

22

in terms of talking to judges and others.

23

How do we deal with that?

How do we reduce that

24

skepticism and somehow renew the interest in strong

25

antitrust enforcement?
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MS. McDAVID:

It is a forensic exercise.

It's

2

got to be.

3

educated about the concepts that underlie some of this.

4

The Antitrust Bar tries to do a good bit of that, and we

5

do supply copies of Antitrust Law Developments.

6

And I think the bench is becoming better

PROFESSOR GAVIL:

The only thing I would add

7

here is, again, I think context is important.

We tend

8

to get narrowly focused on our little corner of the

9

world in antitrust.

Judges are not skeptical just about

10

antitrust cases.

11

expensive process.

12

our antitrust case -- I am working on a symposium at

13

Howard on the history of Conley and Twombly -- and

14

Conley, in 1957, 50 years ago, was a civil rights case.

15

The five lawyers working on the case were all

16

African-American.

17

the nut of getting at intent to discriminate by a union

18

that was complicit in employer discrimination, and in

19

that context, at that moment in time, the court said,

20

"lower the pleading barrier, these cases have to go

21

forward."

22

civil litigation for 50 years.

23

Litigation has become a costly and
Twombly, which we think of as

They were basically trying to crack

That became the standard that we used in all

And then if you had to imagine what would be the

24

antithesis of that case, Twombly was potentially the

25

antithesis of that case -- a nationwide class action
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involving potentially hundreds of millions of consumers

2

against all of the leading telecommunications companies,

3

and the court recoiled from Conley in that case.

4

Now, partly, that is a challenge of using the

5

same procedural standards in every kind of case that we

6

do, but what does that mean?

7

litigation system today with over a quarter of a million

8

cases filed each year in the federal courts.

9

of cases; a lot of them are complex; habeus can be just

It means that we have a

It's a lot

10

as complex for a judge as antitrust; and there is

11

generally resistance to litigation.

12

looking outside antitrust is helpful in locating

13

ourselves in the larger world of federal court

14

litigation.

15

PROFESSOR WILLIG:

So, again, I think

Do you think the public who

16

forms these troubling views, including the judges,

17

distinguishes adequately enough between cases brought by

18

the United States, by the FTC, and cases brought by the

19

adventuresome private bar?

20

I mean, maybe some of the bad rap that antitrust

21

has is because of the activist plaintiff's bar.

22

could be.

23

variable in their superficial and end validity than are

24

the cases brought by the agencies.

25

It

I think on average those cases are far more

PROFESSOR GAVIL:

Bobby, I think it is a good
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point.

2

extent the agencies have fed the fires of hostility to

3

private actions, the courts' hostility to antitrust is

4

coming back and constraining the agencies as well.

5

One of the ironies, though, is that to the

But yes, clearly, if you look at the Supreme

6

Court decisions of the last two terms, there is a lot of

7

anti-private action rhetoric going on, and some of it

8

was coming from the government agencies that were

9

encouraging that view, and it came back to bite them in

10

a case like Credit Suisse, for example.

11

MS. McDAVID:

12

truth in that.

13

Trinko.

14
15

Certainly it was driving Twombly and

MR. WALES:
today.

Okay, I'd like to thank our panel

We had an excellent discussion.

16

(Applause.)

17

MR. WALES:

18

break.

19

very much.

20

I think there is a good bit of

The plan is to take a 15-minute

So, let's be back at 10:35, if we could.

(A brief recess was taken.)

21
22
23
24
25
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PANEL 2:

2

THE ROLE OF MARKET DEFINITION IN

3

UNILATERAL EFFECTS ANALYSIS AND

4

IN THE LITIGATION OF UNILATERAL EFFECTS CASES

5
6

MR. SCHMIDT:

The next panel is going to focus

7

on the role of market definition in unilateral effects

8

analysis.

9

panel that it is difficult to separate these panel

I think you have already seen from the first

10

discussions so that they do not overlap at all, but our

11

focus is going to be on the requirement or the lack of

12

requirement to prove a relevant product market and the

13

various implications of that.

14

We have a terrific panel to focus on that issue

15

with us today, and let me just take a minute to go

16

through the introductions, and then we will start right

17

in.

18

To my far left, Jon Baker.

Jon is a Professor

19

of Law at American University's Washington College of

20

Law, where he teaches courses primarily in the areas of

21

antitrust and economic regulation.

22

senior consultant with CRA International.

23

experience includes being the Director of the Bureau of

24

Economics -- we won't hold that against him -- at the

25

Federal Trade Commission, Senior Economist -- sorry,

Professor Baker is a
His previous
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Mike, wherever Mike is -- Senior Economist at the

2

President's Council of Economic Advisors, Special

3

Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in

4

the Antitrust Division, and Assistant Professor at

5

Dartmouth's School of Business Administration.

6

sure you know, Jon is co-author of an antitrust case

7

book and past editorial chair of the Antitrust Law

8

Journal and a past member of the Council of the ABA

9

Antitrust Section, and in 2004, he received American

As I am

10

University's Faculty Award for Outstanding Scholarship,

11

Research, and Other Professional Accomplishments, and in

12

1998, he received the FTC's Award for Distinguished

13

Service.

14

To my immediate left is Kathy Fenton.

Kathy is

15

a partner at Jones Day.

She's practiced antitrust law

16

for more than 25 years.

She is currently the Chair of

17

the Antitrust Section of the ABA and has served in

18

numerous positions, including editorial chair, of the

19

Antitrust Law Journal.

20

professional service committee and served as chair of

21

the ethics subcommittee.

22

on issues of professional responsibility, conflicts of

23

interest, and legal ethics, including serving as an

24

instructor on legal ethics for the D.C. Bar's new

25

admittees course.

She is a member of Jones Day's

She has written and lectured

Her recognitions include Who's Who in
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American Law, The Best Lawyers in America, 2007.

2

previously served as an Attorney Advisor to the Chairman

3

of the FTC and was a law clerk here in the District of

4

Columbia, the District Court.

5

She

To my far right is Dan Wall, partner at Latham &

6

Watkins.

Dan is Chair of Latham's Global Antitrust and

7

Competition Practice Group.

8

has been active in the Antitrust Section of the ABA,

9

also.

Throughout his career, Dan

Dan was a founder and served four years as editor

10

of the Antitrust magazine; was chair of both the

11

Computer Industry Committee and Sports and Entertainment

12

Industry Committee; organized and chaired The Stanford

13

Conference on Antitrust in the Technology Economy.

14

has also authored numerous articles on application of

15

economic theory to antitrust issues and on high

16

technology antitrust.

17

lawyer in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department

18

of Justice, and his recognitions include Chambers USA,

19

America's Leading Business Lawyers, The Best Lawyers in

20

America, Legal Media Group's Expert Guide to Competition

21

and Antitrust Lawyers, and Global Competition Review's

22

GCR 100.

23

He

He began his career as a trial

Then to my immediate right is Rich Parker, a

24

partner at O'Melveny & Myers.

Rich is Co-Chair of that

25

firm's Antitrust/Competition Practice.

He returned to
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O'Melveny in February 2001 after serving three years at

2

the FTC, as first Senior Deputy Director and then

3

Director of the Bureau of Competition.

4

recognized as a Leading Lawyer in Antitrust by the Legal

5

Times; named by the Global Competition Review as one of

6

the best antitrust defense lawyers in the United States;

7

and recognized as a leading antitrust practitioner by

8

Global Competition Review, Chambers Global, Chambers

9

USA, and Super Lawyers Magazine, and probably others.

10

He received the Distinguished Service Award also from

11

the FTC.

12

Rich has been

So, with that, I think we are going to try to

13

follow the same format that the first panel used, which

14

is to ask each of the panelists to give a short

15

presentation, and then we will go right into questions

16

and hopefully have a lively discussion.

17

going to start with Jon.

18

PROFESSOR BAKER:

I think we are

Good morning, everyone.

I am

19

delighted to have been asked to be here, and I see some

20

old friends.

21

for future reference, Bobby and Andy, I prefer to be

22

discussed for my ideas, not for how I look, okay?

23

It is also very nice to be discussed, but

My assignment is to talk about -- is to be a law

24

professor and to talk about the -- I can't help it, I

25

will be an economist, too -- talk about the pros and
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cons of using market definition in unilateral effects

2

cases to set up the panel.

3

into three categories, so I am going to talk about legal

4

arguments, economic arguments, and litigation tactic

5

pros and cons.

6

The arguments neatly divide

So, on the legal side, we have to start with the

7

words of the statute, of Clayton Act Section 7, which

8

objects to acquisitions that substantially lessen

9

competition, and now I will quote, "in any line of

10

commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any

11

section of the country," and that language, that

12

statutory language, arguably, makes proof of a market an

13

element of the offense.

14

On the other hand, if the Government can prove

15

harm to competition directly, there has to be some

16

market within which competition takes place, and, why

17

isn't that inference good enough to satisfy the statute?

18

I once wrote an article where I called that kind of

19

approach a res ipsa loquitur market definition.

20

words of the statute is one legal issue.

21

So

Another legal issue is the Oracle decision.

22

Judge Walker held that the Government must prove that

23

the merger must -- in a unilateral effects case, that

24

the merger must -- would create a monopoly or near

25

monopoly.

Monopoly is almost always demonstrated by
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high market share, so the Government essentially has to

2

define a market to satisfy this element of what Judge

3

Walker sees as part of the offense.

4

that Judge Walker's holding in that decision is based on

5

a clear error in economic reasoning.

6

believe that other courts will follow it.

7

commonly used horizontal differentiation model that

8

Judge Walker seems to have in mind, unilateral effects

9

can arise in mergers that involve firms that are not the

The con here is

So, I don't
Even in the

10

largest in the market and that do not create a dominant

11

firm, just as a matter of economics.

12

legal pros and cons.

13

So, that is the

Now, economic pros and cons of defining a

14

market.

I think here I am going to start with the cons

15

and not the pros.

16

among sellers of differentiated products does not turn

17

on market shares.

18

as arising because the merger lets the firm recapture

19

profits that previously it would have lost were it to

20

have raised price, and so it now has, after the merger,

21

an incentive to raise price.

The economics of unilateral effects

You can think of unilateral effects

That is one intuition.

22

Another way of thinking about unilateral effects

23

is that they arise because the merger allows the firm to

24

remove the competitive response of an important rival,

25

and that makes the initial firm's residual demand less
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elastic.

2

incentive to raise its price.

3

about unilateral effects among sellers of differentiated

4

products, the market shares do not directly matter to

5

the economic analysis.

6

Again, you can see how that would give it an
Either way you think

Now the other side of the story.

The market

7

shares would be a good indicator of pressure to raise

8

price if the diversion ratios or the demand elasticities

9

are related to them.

That could occur if the customer's

10

second choices are distributed similarly to customer

11

first choices, which is what Bobby was getting at this

12

morning when he talked about generally differentiated

13

products.

14

Also, high market shares likely indicate that

15

the diversion ratios are so high or that they are high

16

enough that they will generate some sort of unilateral

17

effects, unless the merging firms' products appeal to

18

very different groups of customers.

19

a 50 percent market share merges with a firm with a 20

20

percent market share, the two would have to be in very

21

different niches in order to not have a unilateral

22

effects problem.

23

burden.

24
25

So, if a firm with

The high shares almost shift the

Also on the pro side of using market definition
in the economics category, if the way you collect the
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evidence relies on econometric evidence of diversion

2

ratios or demand elasticities, then, some sort of an at

3

least informal market definition is required to specify

4

the list of potential rivals that you have to include in

5

order to avoid bias in your analysis.

6

So, if you leave out an important rival when you

7

conduct the estimation, then the elasticity estimates

8

are most likely biased in the direction of overstating

9

the unilateral effects.

This is something that I think

10

Bobby was also getting at this morning when he talked

11

about collecting the important sources of competitive

12

discipline.

13

in this context, as biasing the estimate of unilateral

14

effects because you left out the others down the road,

15

in Bobby's theory.

16

The gas station example could be understood

The third area where I want to talk about pros

17

and cons of defining markets and proving unilateral

18

effects cases has to do with litigation tactics.

19

the pros and cons depend on whether the Government would

20

define a narrow market or a broad market or not one at

21

all.

22

market.

23

through superstores rather than all office supplies, or

24

superpremium ice cream rather than ice cream, the kind

25

of things that we talk about in our professional world.

Here,

Let's suppose the Government defines a narrow
Here we have in mind, office supplies sold
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The pro of defining a narrow market is that it

2

allows the Government to portray the case as a merger to

3

monopoly or near monopoly, and it also creates a causal

4

inference of unilateral effects when the market shares

5

are high, as with the 50 percent firm merging with a 20

6

percent firm, as we said before.

7

On the other hand, a narrow market may not be

8

persuasive if it looks gerrymandered.

That could be a

9

particular problem if some of Bobby's Audi drivers would

10

go to BMW and some would go to Lexus.

11

is harder for him to sell his Audi/BMW market to a

12

court, particularly if more of the Audi customers would

13

go to Lexus than to BMW.

14

It may be that it

Also, this approach potentially focuses

15

attention on the wrong issue.

16

primary attention to the extent of buyer substitution to

17

the third firms, the rivals outside the market, rather

18

than to the extent of the buyer substitution between the

19

merging firms, which is the source of the unilateral

20

effects.

21

substitution between the merging firms, but you are busy

22

worrying about, in market definition, the substitution

23

to the third firms.

24
25

That is, it directs your

The first thing you want to know is the

Now, let's suppose the Government defines a
broad market.

The pro here is that the market may seem
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more intuitive, like Jan suggested this morning, unless

2

gerrymandered in its appearance.

3

allows the competitive effects case to take primary

4

place in telling the competitive effects story in

5

litigation for the Government and focus attention on the

6

way that the merger lets the firm recapture lost profits

7

or alter the competitive response of an important rival,

8

consistent with the economic theory.

9

on the theory, the economic theory.

10

The broad market

You are focusing

On the other hand, if you define a broad market,

11

you may essentially admit that a large number of firms

12

are rivals to the merging firms, that merging firms'

13

shares are small and that competitive effects are not

14

uniform, because they are concentrated in a small part

15

of the market.

16

trying the case, and they make the competitive effects

17

look small.

18

Government embroiled in this question of whether there

19

is a 35 percent safe harbor for unilateral effects or

20

not in the Merger Guidelines that was alluded to in the

21

last panel.

22

All those things are bad optics for

And there is also the danger of getting the

The final litigation choice would be not to

23

define a market at all.

Again, the benefit of that is

24

it focuses the case on the way the merger lets the firm

25

recapture the lost profits or removes the competitive
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response of an important rival, consistent with the

2

economic theory.

3

avoid litigation problems with defining a broad market

4

when market shares are low, but the con is that may be

5

illusory, because the defendant would presumably define

6

a broad market, and so the Government may not actually

7

avoid the problems arising from defining a broad market.

8
9
10

It would seem the Government could

So, there you have it, an even-handed view of
pros and cons of proving markets in unilateral effects
cases.

11

MR. SCHMIDT:

Thanks, Jon.

12

Kathy?

13

MS. FENTON:

14

I was asked to share some thoughts on the legal

Thank you, Jeff.

15

need to prove market definition in unilateral effects

16

cases, and as Jon Baker already indicated, the reason we

17

are having this discussion goes back to the basic

18

language of Section 7, the requirement to show effects

19

"in any line of commerce in any section of the country,"

20

a mandate that some -- you may call them a strict

21

constructionist -- have identified as being the source

22

for any obligation to prove markets as part of your

23

affirmative showing of a Section 7 violation.

24
25

But I think the more interesting issue to focus
on in this area is the fact that much of the current
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debate can be directly traced to the lack of recent

2

and/or relevant Supreme Court opinions on this subject.

3

I am sure there is a great analogy to children's

4

literature that is possible here, whether it is Rip Van

5

Winkle or The Sleeping Princesses, but your last

6

substantive merger case goes back to 1975, and the last

7

time the court spoke on this issue was a year earlier,

8

in 1974, in the Marine Bancorp case, where it set forth

9

a fairly traditional three-part analysis that says:

10

"The analysis of likely competitive effects from

11

a merger requires determinations of, one, a line of

12

commerce, a product market in which to assess the

13

transaction; two, the section of the country or

14

geographic market in which to assess the transaction;

15

and three, the transaction's probable effects on

16

competition in the relevant product and geographic

17

market."

18

Now, judges, tending to be relatively

19

conventional creatures, look at that language and see,

20

not surprisingly, a mandate to define a relevant market.

21

The silence on the subject for the ensuing years from

22

the Supreme Court has simply added to the proliferation

23

of approaches we see at the district court.

24

those approaches have been responding to other

25

developments occurring at the Supreme Court level

Some of
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outside of Section 7, outside of the merger context, in

2

areas involving either collusion or monopoly claims,

3

because you have a whole series of cases, some of which

4

were briefly touched on by the opening panel, NCAA, Cal.

5

Dental, Polygram, and perhaps, most dramatically,

6

Indiana Federation of Dentists, that seem to eliminate

7

the need for formal market definition if there is actual

8

proof of anticompetitive effects.

9

And I think the quote from Indiana Dentists

10

probably captures this line of development outside the

11

merger area most dramatically, because there the Supreme

12

Court said:

13

"Since the purpose of the inquiries into market

14

definition and market power is to determine whether an

15

arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse

16

effects on competition, 'proof of actual detrimental

17

effects, such as a reduction of output,' can obviate the

18

need for inquiry into market power, which is but a

19

'surrogate for detrimental effects.'"

20

Needless to say, that precedent from the Supreme

21

Court has surfaced in numerous briefs, often by the

22

private plaintiffs or government agencies prosecuting a

23

unilateral effects merger, seeking to argue that the

24

formalities of market definition are not essential as an

25

element of proof, and the argument in that regard, I
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think, is perhaps very nicely captured in a recent

2

article by Katz & Shelanski in the Antitrust Law

3

Journal, called "Mergers and Innovation," that takes a

4

slight detour through unilateral effects analysis and

5

says:

6

"If the formalities of market definition can be

7

skipped in favor of direct analysis of harm in

8

monopolization and collusion cases, there is no reason

9

why the same should not hold true for merger analysis

10
11

where the issue, likely competitive harm, is similar."
They go on to recognize that merger analysis has

12

some limitations.

13

prospective and predictive than other kinds of antitrust

14

cases where the conduct at issue frequently has been

15

ongoing for some time," but this simply means that

16

direct effects may be easier to show in nonmerger cases

17

and not that direct evidence of market power should not

18

have the same priority in merger cases where such

19

evidence is available.

20

They say it is "more often

I would suggest that economists probably have

21

more flexibility than district court judges in offering

22

that alternative as a way of resolving these cases, but

23

the debate continues, and as you look at the recent

24

district court opinions involving unilateral effects,

25

you know, Oracle, Whole Foods, Arch Coal, you really
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could go down the litany, you see judges struggling with

2

this question of what is their obligation to formally

3

make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the

4

relevant market question, and they tend to engage in

5

activities that could be characterized as a market

6

definition exercise without necessarily acknowledging

7

their obligation to do so.

8

can identify for resolving this question is the

9

possibility of further Supreme Court statements on this

10

And I think the only hope I

question.

11

Now, in the world post Hart-Scott-Rodino

12

notification, that is going to be a difficult

13

proposition, just because most mergers that are

14

challenged by a government enforcement agency do not

15

hold together long enough to ever reach the point of

16

Supreme Court review, but I think there is one possible

17

candidate on the horizon that I offer for your

18

consideration.

19

definition not with respect to a product market but a

20

geographic market, and the case, of course, is the

21

Commission decision in Evanston, which is still

22

awaiting, as far as I know -- and I will bow to more

23

superior information sources -- a determination by the

24

parties to file an appeal with one of the U.S. circuit

25

courts.

It poses the question of role of market
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But in that case, the Commission opinion dealing

2

with a post-closing challenge to a hospital merger

3

concluded:

4

"It is not necessary to define the relevant

5

geographic market, because it is possible to show,

6

through direct evidence, that the merger enabled the

7

merged parties to exercise market power unilaterally."

8

Thus, the Commission concluded, because the merger

9

enabled the parties to raise prices by a substantial

10

amount, at least equal to a SSNIP, through a unilateral

11

exercise of market power, the geographic area alleged by

12

the FTC to constitute a relevant market constituted a

13

well-defined antitrust geographic market under Section

14

7.

15

Now, if that issue were preserved through the

16

appellate process, we certainly have the prospect of a

17

court of appeals chiming in on the need for relevant

18

market definition and, as I said, a possibility for

19

Supreme Court review since a concluded merger, a

20

divestiture challenge essentially, is sufficiently high

21

stakes that the parties might be incented to take that

22

step.

23

But in the absence of that, I think we are going

24

to continue to see a struggle at the district court

25

level as they look back to precedents, and it is not
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just Marine Bancorp.

2

it is DuPont, that all contain the language about

3

defining relevant markets, as well as what I would

4

suggest are some practical limitations imposed by the

5

Merger Guidelines themselves and the Merger Guidelines

6

structure, because there, the five-part organization

7

embodied in the Guidelines has, in a sense, provided a

8

road map for a lot of subsequent district court

9

analysis.

10

It is Philadelphia National Bank,

You start with market definition and

11

concentration; you consider potential adverse effects;

12

you do an entry analysis; you consider efficiencies; you

13

deal with failing or exiting assets.

14

sounds like a mandate for relevant market definition,

15

and as a result, to borrow Andy's phrase from the

16

initial panel, it is probably a very hard sell for the

17

courts to try and avoid or escape that exercise, and in

18

particular, this combines with a number of other

19

practical aspects, including judicial skepticism of

20

economic analysis.

That, again,

21

And I was reminded in preparing for this

22

exercise of a fascinating quote from Ken Auletta's book,

23

World War 3.0, which, of course, is on the Microsoft

24

case, but he had, you might recall, conducted fairly

25

extensive interviews as part of the process for that
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book.

2

of the district court here in the District of Columbia,

3

who some might view as one of the godfathers or patron

4

saints of unilateral effects analysis since he is the

5

author of the opinion not just in Staples, but also

6

Swedish Match a few years earlier.

7

One of the people he interviewed was Judge Hogan

They somehow got off the topic of Microsoft in

8

the discussion for Auletta's book and started talking

9

about the Staples/Office Depot case, and Auletta reports

10

in his book:

11

"When Judge Hogan presided over the Government's

12

antitrust action to block the proposed merger of Staples

13

and Office Depot, Hogan reported, 'We had a lot of

14

economic evidence, we had a lot of documentary evidence,

15

although in that case, the economic evidence that the

16

Government had was not at all convincing to me.

17

the internal company documents were more convincing.

18

That is why I stopped the merger.'"

I think

19

And that reality, I think, is something that you

20

are going to see reflected in perhaps less overt fashion

21

in many of the judicial decisions dealing with that

22

question.

23

MR. SCHMIDT:

24

Rich?

25

MR. PARKER:

Thanks, Kathy.

I am supposed to give the
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government perspective on trying these cases, and as you

2

know, I am now playing on the other team, so it would

3

really be unfair if you quote this stuff back to me when

4

I am sitting next to a client.

5

trying to convince you to go away.

6

down as a rule.

7

When I'm down here
So, let's get that

What I want to talk about is how to put a case

8

like this together.

We have people who understand the

9

law and economics better than I do.

You do not need to

10

hear that from me.

So, here is my own personal view,

11

and trying cases is an art, and everybody has a

12

different style, but here is the way I think about it.

13

I was privileged, my first job out of law

14

school, to clerk for Judge William Matthew Byrne,

15

Junior, in Los Angeles, who passed away a year ago, who

16

was one of the best trial lawyers in Southern California

17

before he went on the bench.

18

And was a great trial judge and was a great teacher.

19

And I remember, when I was down there, we had this

20

really boring patent case.

21

dry than listen to this testimony in this chemical

22

patent case, but that was my job and my co-clerk's.

23

He won a lot of big cases.

I would rather watch paint

And the trial ended, and we went back to

24

chambers, and the judge said, "Well, "Justice West of

25

the Pecos" says that the plaintiffs ought to win here."
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I said just looked at him.

He said, "By that I mean,

2

common sense, logic, my gut sense of what is fair and

3

reasonable," and then he went through and told a story

4

about what happened here, which is exactly the way

5

counsel probably should have tried the case, and said,

6

"Now, that is what my opinion ought to say, and you tell

7

me if we can get to a plaintiff victory under the case

8

law, and if we cannot, then we better have a meeting

9

and, figure something else out."

"Justice West of the

10

Pecos" has always been in the back of my mind.

11

stopped being a mentor to me, and that is the way I view

12

these cases.

13

He never

In my opinion, the Government ought to try these

14

cases with effects, and I do not think what I am saying

15

is anything inconsistent with what was said in the first

16

panel.

17

have an advantage in being the Government, and the

18

advantage is inherent judicial conservatism.

19

market that is working.

20

coming in with their fancy economists saying, "Well, we

21

are going to change this structure radically, but don't

22

worry, our efficiencies are going to do this, that, and

23

the other thing."

24

skepticism with a judge or with most judges about

25

radical changes in a functioning market, and you are

You start with effects.

Remember this.

You

You have a

And now you have these guys

And so I think you have an inherent
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trying to stop that from happening.

2

advantage.

That is an

3

So, you play on that, and you build it by

4

showing what is going to happen that is bad here.

5

are people going to get hurt?

6

and others said this morning, there is an inherent

7

dinner table logic to unilateral effects.

8

not care about Bimmers and Audis, but Whoppers and Big

9

Macs or something like that they do.

How

And as Dr. Willig said

Judges may

Sure there is

10

competition from other burgers and maybe from Taco Bell,

11

but those two are unique competitors, and they look at

12

each other when they price their products, and if one

13

buys the other, that constraint is gone.

14

logic that makes a lot of "Justice West of the Pecos"

15

sense.

16

That is a

In my opinion, the most important support for

17

that case is the company's business documents.

18

they look at?

19

board?

Do they look at this fringe or do they look at

20

tacos?

Do they look at whatever?

21

each other?

22

build on that.

23

What do

What do they look at when they go to the

Or do they look at

That is the number one point.

And you

And the second thing you build on are customers.

24

Customers.

The Government cannot try, effectively, a

25

case without strong customer support, and by "customer
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support," I don't mean just, "I hate the merger."

2

mean, "I have dealt with these people day-in and

3

day-out, for year after year, and I play them off each

4

other, and this, that, and the other thing, and I have

5

detailed knowledge, and in my opinion, I have benefited

6

from that competition, and let's not let it go away."

7

I

You cannot put on the stand a lot of people who

8

simply don't like the merger because they don't like the

9

merger but do not have any real experience in dealing

10

with the entity being purchased.

11

Arch Coal, where at least -- and this is Monday morning

12

quarterbacking -- but at least some of the witnesses in

13

that case had that problem.

14

Now, relevant market.

I am going back to

You have to prove a

15

relevant market.

Every case says that.

You can't

16

pretend like they do not say that, including your

17

favorite cases, starting with Chicago Bridge, your

18

latest victory, Swedish Match, every one of them, Baker

19

Hughes, Staples, Drug Wholesalers, you name it, they all

20

say it.

You have to do that.

21

But I suggest that the first tactic is to back

22

into the market from the effects.

At least in Judge

23

Hogan's court, you can do that.

24

could be that that is where the market came from in

25

Staples.

It is plain as plain

It is equally plain that that is where the
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market came from in Swedish Match.

2

fight the last war, and this is a long time ago, and

3

Rick Liebeskind and I and Jon Baker were heavily

4

involved in Drug Wholesalers, and Judge Sporkin

5

believed, at the end of the day, that hospitals and

6

independent pharmacies could not protect themselves

7

against the merging parties, and that is how we ended up

8

both with effects and with the market.

9

from effects.

10

And generals always

You back into it

You try effects -- remember, things are working

11

great.

12

to happen if you change it.

13

say.

14

economists say.

15

competition or their efficiencies?

16

consumers' money on their efficiency study or whatever

17

other study they may have.

18

They want to change it.

Here is what is going

This is what the customers

This is what the documents say.

This is what the

What are you going to trust, existing
Don't bet the

All right, the government has run into some

19

trouble in some cases, and I wasn't in these cases, in,

20

say, Oracle and in Whole Foods, so I don't know every --

21

you know, Dan will talk about Oracle, and we are lucky

22

to have him here to talk about that perspective, but I

23

suspect that what happened in both cases is that the

24

government didn't prove effects, and everything got

25

bollixed up on market, but frankly, at the end of the
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day, I will bet if you psychoanalyze the judge, you did

2

not prove effects in Whole Foods and that is how the

3

market ended up so broad.

4

And by the way, I want to compliment Paul Denis,

5

who I see back here, on that case, because my litigation

6

instinct on Whole Foods is that it looks like the

7

evidence was very strong in that case, and I am not sure

8

what happened.

9

I was not in the courtroom.

In Oracle, and Dan will go into this more, it

10

looks like the judge didn't believe the customers.

11

customers have to have real knowledge about the market,

12

and I think, by the way, that is what happened in Arch

13

Coal as well.

14

some of the customers really knew what they were talking

15

about, and it is clear in Oracle that that is what

16

happened.

17

what happened in those cases, is that you didn't prove

18

effects.

19

The

I do not think the judge thought that

So, those are the -- my best projection as to

Now, let's assume you are in the next case, and

20

you have a situation where you have a unilateral effect,

21

where you have something like the Whole Foods case,

22

where you have a problem in that intuitive logic may

23

suggest that Safeway ought to be in the market, and I

24

was driving in the car with my wife, who said, "How can

25

they bring that case, because Safeway has organic food?"
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That was a problem that you faced in that case.

2

Here is what I do:

My colleague, Tim Muris, who

3

is an antitrust purist, would probably throw something

4

at me if I said this, but how about a submarket?

5

not analytically the greatest concept in the world, but

6

after all, this is about winning and you are a law

7

enforcement agency.

8

win, and submarkets are all over the case law,

9

undeniable.

It is

Law enforcement agencies have to

It is not just Brown Shoe, but submarkets

10

are in all these cases, including the cases I just cited

11

to.

12

It is there.
Number two, credibility is the key.

That is

13

what you have got in front of a judge, is credibility.

14

So, another alternative is to say, "You know, I will

15

tell you -- I will give them their supermarket

16

market" -- and again, I am doing Monday morning

17

quarterbacking here, but I am speaking hypothetically.

18

"I will give them their market.

19

Safeway, Giant, Food Lion, and everything else, and,

20

Your Honor, in most cases, we rely on the Philadelphia

21

National Bank presumption, but, you know, I do not need

22

any presumption.

23

need it, because I have got hard and fast evidence that

24

will show you that in 22 markets, 15 markets, or

25

whatever it is, what drives price are these two, and if

I will give them

I don't want a presumption.

I don't
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you let this merger go through, those prices are going

2

up.

3

that, but I am also going to prove effects to you and I

4

do not need Philadelphia."

5

case, I would take that -- I would take that step.

I will give them their market.

I will give them

And I would -- in the right

6

Those are my thoughts, and I hope these most

7

certainly have been helpful to you, and I know it is

8

tough to lose these cases, it is very tough, because

9

anybody who tries cases who loses them, it is not a good

10

thing.

The key point here is that I think it is very

11

admirable for this agency to get all these people in

12

here and to look at what they've done and to be

13

self-critical and try to come up with some new concepts

14

and some ideas, and I really commend you for doing that.

15

I will turn it over to you, Dan.

16

MR. SCHMIDT:

17

Dan?

18

MR. WALL:

19

Thanks, Rich.

Good morning.

Let me pull something

up here.

20

So, thank you for the introduction, but we all

21

really know why I am here, and it is because of Oracle,

22

which Rich did mention, and that is okay, you know, he

23

got --

24

MR. PARKER:

25

MR. WALL:

I mentioned it, Dan.
Yeah.

You know, you have got to have
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the villain in order to have an interesting plot, and I

2

will gladly be the villain here and give you some

3

defense perspectives.

4

In keeping with Commission policy, I will have

5

to ask all of my competitors to leave the room at this

6

point, just because I am going to be talking about some

7

strategy points in here, but I think that the issues

8

that are raised by this really are profound in the arena

9

that is much more my home than the law and economics as

10

well, which is the arena of trial, and it is a different

11

environment than any FTC or ABA Antitrust Section

12

conference.

13

It is a trial that is conducted before someone

14

who rarely is particularly expert.

In the Oracle case,

15

we actually had someone who had practiced antitrust law

16

professionally.

17

than the rule.

18

used to resolving contested facts in a wide variety of

19

cases based upon that kind of "West of the Pecos"

20

intuition that Rich was talking about, and if you do not

21

try your case, if you do not build your case with that

22

always in mind and with a firm understanding of what

23

people like me are going to do to try to deconstruct

24

your case and to break it down in the particular dynamic

25

of a trial, then I think that the odds of winning in

That is definitely the exception rather
And it is an arena in which somebody is
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these cases go way down.

2

I am going to draw a lot on the Oracle

3

experience here, you know, because I had a lot of trial

4

materials that I could pull into my presentation and

5

demonstrate some of these things, but it is just -- you

6

know, it is just one case.

7

But I will say this, that even though I know very well

8

that the agencies all say that they'd bring the Oracle

9

case again if they had a chance, and if I were the head

This will always be true.

10

of the Antitrust Division, I'd say that probably about

11

any case I lost, so I respect that.

12

I will tell you that I felt very strongly, and

13

Commissioner Tom Rosch, who was my partner at the time

14

and tried that case with me, felt very strongly, before

15

that trial began, that we were going to win that case,

16

because the case that the Department of Justice had put

17

together was not sustainable in the arena of trial.

18

was going to get cut down by trial dynamics.

19

case is not resilient in the arena of trial, through

20

trial -- the dynamics, it doesn't matter how good it is,

21

because that is the arena that counts at the end of the

22

day.

It

If your

23

So, a few observations, and this is all about

24

the idea of do you use market definition or not or do

25

you put on a case without it.

The first one, don't --
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don't think about it.

2

Guidelines, which we will use viciously against you,

3

this is a recipe for disaster, okay?

4

already heard some of the reasons, but it comes from the

5

fact that, as Kathy discussed, this just -- market

6

definition as an essential element of the analysis just

7

couldn't be more entrenched in the case law.

8
9

Under current case law and the

And you have

I bet you that on a dare for a beer, I could
cite you a hundred cases that in mergers and

10

monopolization and other market power kinds of offenses

11

say that this is a threshold requirement, and yes, there

12

is this little thread out there that talks about the

13

ability to prove effects, and I fear that as a defense

14

lawyer in a monopolization case in which the conduct has

15

occurred and the effects might be presently observable,

16

and I might fear that in a post-merger challenge, like

17

Evanston, where you have some ability to look at what's

18

happened.

19

But honestly, I don't fear that very much -- I

20

don't fear it very much at all in a typical merger case

21

where the analysis is prospective, because I know that,

22

by definition, the plaintiff, the Government, is not

23

going to have tangible prove of adverse effects.

24

are only going to have some documents that maybe they

25

can make a prediction from, and I can fight the
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prediction game based upon market structure and market

2

definition arguments, and I will probably win that most

3

times.

4

The second point, you know, the Merger

5

Guidelines are your own worst enemy about this.

6

want to pursue cases in which the unilateral effects

7

market definition is not part of the equation, amend the

8

Guidelines.

9

an imperative, because what we do is we use the

Not a suggestion.

If you

I am telling you it is

10

Guidelines against you to impeach you, to say to the

11

judge, "Look, they are not even following their own

12

Guidelines."

13

position, and some of you will someday when you are in

14

our position.

15

argument; it is a "gotcha."

16

going to be able to run from the Merger Guidelines.

17

you know, it is been a long time since the Merger

18

Guidelines came out.

19

I think that would be an essential step for you to have

20

any credible program of trying to bring unilateral

21

effects cases without market definition.

22

You would do it, too, if you were in our

It is a natural argument; it is a great
You know, you are never
So,

Maybe it is time to revise them.

You know, the third point, there is this -- it

23

is not just that you have all this case law that says

24

that you have to have a defined relevant market.

25

is another body of case law that questions whether you
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can show the substantial adverse effect on competition

2

if it is only on just some piece of the relevant market,

3

and we thought we were going to get into this in Oracle,

4

and then there was some change in DOJ strategy, and so

5

we didn't really have to do it as much, but having

6

looked into this, we were in a position to make a pretty

7

good argument that the effect had to be generalized or

8

that it at least had to -- you know, that there was some

9

quantitative sort of threshold that the percentage of

10

the consumers in the relevant market that would be

11

affected, and so that you couldn't just make an argument

12

that was about a very, very small group of consumers.

13

You know, I think that unilateral effects has a

14

tremendous danger of taking the economics too far.

15

know, in Oracle, which was based largely on this sort of

16

auction bidding theory, the Department of Justice's

17

position, taking it from its expert reports, at face

18

value, was that the adverse competitive effect would

19

only -- that only about 20 percent of the customers were

20

vulnerable to suffering this effect.

21

a big number in absolute terms, but query whether an

22

adverse effect that only hits one in five customers in

23

the market would survive as a matter of law.

24
25

You

Now, 20 percent is

But that's not really as far as this goes.

You

know, Carl Shapiro and Joe Farrell just published a very
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provocative new article on this in which they have an

2

analysis that is basically -- that is driven by

3

diversion ratios and gross margins, and they have a

4

statement in there that you could show a unilateral

5

price elevation in an industry with high gross margins

6

where the diversion ratio between the firms is as low as

7

5 or 10 percent, and, you know, I have no doubt that

8

Carl's math is right, but I have got to tell you, bring

9

it on.

10

I mean, if you are going to bring a case and you

11

are going to try to say that this merger should be

12

stopped essentially because there are high gross margins

13

and one in ten losses of the merging parties are to each

14

other, I am going to come back with a very powerful

15

argument that that is just too de minimis, insubstantial

16

an effect to meet the substantiality requirements of

17

Section 7.

18

about doing this, and I think that that market

19

definition is what judges find as an intuitive governor

20

on this thing, on this whole process, of saying, "Show

21

me an effect that is substantial in a market."

22

So, I think you have got to be very careful

I want to -- this is a slide -- this was

23

actually from my opening statement in the Oracle case,

24

and it -- I bring this up just to -- just to show you

25

how cynical and mean we really are on the defense side,
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because this is a -- I mean, this is what we do if a

2

plaintiff has a flakey market definition or if they are

3

running from market definition.

4

pretty credible theory that DOJ had developed during the

5

Hart-Scott-Rodino process, which was actually before I

6

got involved, that said that in these procurements for

7

these software systems, that essentially every bid was

8

akin to a relevant market, and then the Government

9

decided not to bring that case, to make that their

There was actually a

10

argument, when they filed it, saying that actually they

11

were bringing a "traditional case."

12

And I have no doubt that the reason was is

13

because they knew that they were going to get attacked

14

by us for having come in with a novel theory that

15

nullified the importance of market definition.

16

brought it up to make that point, you know, we brought

17

it up, and it is because there is nothing more valuable

18

to us than trying to convince the court that the

19

Government is cheating, because the Government comes in

20

with a tremendous reputation and sort of a presumption

21

of being right, and we have got to crack that.

22

this instance, you know, we will bring it up.

23

So, we

So, in

So, what I am telling you is there is no running

24

from market definition.

You are going to have to build

25

your cases around traditional markets, and you are not
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going to -- you can't leave us any room to argue that

2

you are doing something else.

3

My second point about the approach of not having

4

market definition is to say good-bye to Philadelphia

5

National Bank, okay?

6

sharp and a little bit critical of the Government, but

7

the fact of the matter is that one of the reasons you

8

get yourselves into this mess on market definition is

9

you want your Philadelphia National Bank presumption,

Now, this may sound a little bit

10

and you are willing to do whatever it takes to get it,

11

okay?

12

Well, I would tell you that I do not actually

13

believe that the Philadelphia National Bank presumption

14

should apply to a unilateral effects case, because it

15

actually came out of the structure-conduct paradigm for

16

coordinated effects, and the Supreme Court has really

17

never addressed it in a unilateral effects context.

18

the thing is, what the Government is doing is they want

19

to make this estimate up here, which is from the

20

Government's brief in Oracle, where they say:

But

21

"Plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of a

22

Section 7 violation by demonstrating 'that the merger

23

would produce 'a firm controlling an undue percentage

24

share of the relevant market,'" et cetera, all very

25

familiar, tactically I get it, I understand it, but you
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are actually taking a big risk if you gerrymander the

2

market in some way to get that when, if your economics

3

effect -- proof is very strong, you probably do not need

4

it to begin with.

5

So, what is the alternative?

Well, you actually

6

end up with the Whole Foods briefs that the Commission

7

has just filed, which contain exactly one reference to

8

Philadelphia National Bank and do not try to win the

9

case and leave the defendant in an essentially

10

unwinnable position through the presumption, but rather,

11

cut to the effects.

12

have to live in if you eschewed market definition.

This is the world that you would

13

Now, my third point is don't kid yourself that

14

the alternatives to market definition are practical or

15

persuasive, because they usually aren't, and this goes

16

to the point that a couple others have already made

17

about just the relative persuasiveness of different

18

kinds of proof.

19

court, rather than in university seminars,

20

persuasiveness is about intuition to the layperson, to

21

common sense, to very simple things like that.

And remember, you know, in district

22

And the thing that you have got to understand is

23

that the intuition that we rely on is the intuition that

24

mergers of firms that face a lot of competition won't

25

harm anybody.

That is a strong intuition, okay?
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is a very simple intuition.

2

of drive the half mile, fool, you know, get the gas down

3

the street.

4

in any merger case, regardless of the theory, that the

5

merging parties have a lot of competition, I am feeling

6

pretty good about it.

7

economists, but if I have shown that we have got a lot

8

of competition, we are feeling pretty good about it.

9

That is Bobby's intuition

Everything will be fine.

And if we show,

You can come in with your

Now, in contrast, I mean, the economics of

10

unilateral effects are really, really complicated and

11

difficult to understand.

12

this, I see visually, because he recognizes that what I

13

have done is I have put up here on the slide what he

14

calls a simple, practical test for identifying

15

unilateral effects in his recent article, and, you know,

16

I won't go into it, because I am sure he'll be

17

discussing it, but, you know, it is got math, it has got

18

those things where you have to use the different font to

19

bring it down below the line, and it has got Greek in

20

it, you know, and my point is that regardless of how

21

good that is, I can do a pretty good job of making the

22

judge not think about it, okay?

Carl has already reacted to

23

Carl may remember this story from a case we

24

worked on together, and everybody has heard of this

25

case, it is the trial of the Eastman Kodak and Image
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Technical Services case, where we were up against Max

2

Blecher, one of the best plaintiff's lawyers in the

3

United States, and his expert, the plaintiff's expert,

4

is Jeffrey MacKie-Mason, and he's being put on the

5

stand, and the first question that the plaintiff's

6

lawyer asks his own expert is, "Dr. MacKie-Mason, isn't

7

it true that if you ask two economists the same

8

question, you get three answers?"

9

the economic testimony, because we were coming on with

He started nullifying

10

Carl Shapiro and Janusz Ordover, and we had a lot to

11

say, and he didn't want the jury to care about it, and

12

so with his own expert, his first question is nullifying

13

the value of the economic testimony.

14

unilateral effects stuff is very, very complicated, and

15

it is something that you take a great risk as to whether

16

you are ever going to be able to get the judge to

17

understand and want to apply this.

18

Now, there is other cases.

Well, this

I mean, I mentioned

19

Staples, and this is actually an exhibit from Staples,

20

which Jan McDavid was essentially referring to earlier,

21

and this -- you know, this was the evidence that they

22

had, and in -- and, you know, this is the mother lode

23

here.

24

were substantially higher in markets in which there was

25

Staples only and that the only real significant thing

This was realtime proof that the Staples prices
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that brought their prices down was competition from

2

their merger partner.

3

stuff.

4

intuitive unilateral effects case.

5

I mean, that was really good

If you have that, you are going to make an

Let me contrast that with the merger simulation

6

in Oracle.

The merger simulation in Oracle was

7

essentially an auction model that Preston McAfee came up

8

with.

9

these Logit models, which ironically demands market

It had no real world data on it.

It was one of

10

shares in order to run the model.

11

function from market share.

12

use it as an alternative to market shares, but it was a

13

model in which assumptions about market shares were then

14

coupled with an assumption about how much surplus

15

sellers were currently capturing from their customers.

16

You know, that was so ivory tower-ish and so unreal and

17

so untethered to actual data that I don't think it ever

18

had a chance, but because it was also grounded in market

19

shares, it was DOA as soon as the market definition

20

shifted at all.

21

It implies a demand

So, first of all, you can't

You know, Jonathan and Carl wrote an article

22

criticizing Judge Walker's decision in which they make

23

the point that he was unfair to this model in demanding

24

more real world data, because they say that in their

25

experience, that real world data on prices, costs, and
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output are invariably imperfect for a variety of

2

reasons.

3

responses.

4

You know, I can't help but offer a couple

First of all, it is not actually a valid

5

criticism of Judge Walker in Oracle, because Professor

6

McAfee had no data.

7

was running a market share-driven model, not a

8

data-driven model.

9

It was not an imperfect data.

He

But second, I'm sorry, but pervasive data

10

problems are a reason not to rely on merger simulations.

11

They don't -- they don't excuse it.

12

you are actually adding risk to your case, not cutting

13

it back.

14

If it's bad data,

So, fourth and finally, and I really -- I say

15

this with great sincerity, is that you have got to stop

16

taking the amount of trial risk that you are by arguing

17

for markets that are narrower than they have to be.

18

you believe in your competitive effects case, argue it

19

within a defensible market, and by that I mean a market

20

that is not going to get cut to ribbons.

21

Look, we know it is not working, okay?

If

We all

22

know it is not working, and that is having a market

23

definition that allows people like me to just gather up

24

the evidence that inevitably will be there of

25

competition from the firms that you have eliminated from
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2

the market.
These were just a couple of slides, I could have

3

done a zillion of these, and I could take them from any

4

other case, but they were just some of the slides that

5

we used to identify firms that in Oracle the Government

6

said were not in the relevant market, and then we just

7

went to call reports and invoices and discovery

8

documents and all sorts of stuff, and we created long,

9

long, long lists of procurements in which these

10

customers who were not in the relevant market were, in

11

fact, competing with the merging firms or SAP, the third

12

firm, in the market.

13

And when we do that, there is nothing you can do

14

to stop us from having great days in court.

15

because we have that evidence, and we can walk up to a

16

witness and say, "Are you saying that you don't compete

17

with Lawson?

18

You can't,

Are you?"

And first the guy looks like a deer in the

19

headlights for a minute, and then he says something

20

like, "Well, we don't see them very often."

21
22

Then I will say, "Isn't it a fact you saw them
at Safeway?"

23

"I don't remember."

24

"Let me show you the document.

25

Isn't it a fact

you saw them at Food Lion?"
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"I don't remember."

2

"Let me show you the document."

3

This is shooting fish in a barrel.
Honestly, it really is.

This is so

4

easy.

It takes very little

5

talent to do that, because you have got the documents

6

right in front of you, you know?

7

it will probably, you know, reduce the -- change the

8

slope of my demand curve by saying that, but it is

9

not that difficult to gather that stuff up, and you have

I shouldn't say that,

10

got to anticipate that.

11

and plan for it and don't let me do it.

12

bring your case by conceding me those people, do it.

13

You take away all my good stuff.

14

what you want to do.

15

You have got to anticipate that
And if you can

I mean, that's really

And that leads kind of to my sort of final point

16

here, which is, you know, if you believe in the

17

unilateral effects model, do it.

18

is -- you know, this is -- this is another quote --

19

sorry to keep picking on Jon and Carl, but this is a

20

positive one here.

21

an economic matter, unilateral effects don't turn on

22

market definition.

23

regardless of whether the case is framed as a merger

24

generating high concentration within a narrow market or

25

is the loss of direct competition between the merging

I mean -- now, this

They make the point here that, "As

The economic analysis is the same
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firms within a broader market."

2

Okay, do you believe it?

If you believe it, do

3

the latter.

4

linchpin of the case.

5

lose that case in the district court, you might have to

6

appeal it, and you might have to establish good law, but

7

that's how you are going to get to a place where this

8

unilateral effects theory is more powerful, and it has

9

the foundation that you are going to need to go forward

10

Don't let me make market definition the
Take it away from me.

You might

and win your cases.

11

Thanks.

12

MR. SCHMIDT:

13

Jon, do you have any response to any of that?

14

Thanks, Dan.
I

assume you are in almost complete agreement.

15

PROFESSOR BAKER:

That was terrific, Dan and

16

Rich.

I think I have to switch now from being the

17

even-handed law professor to actually take a point of

18

view here.

19

Dan wants to put the agency in a box.

He says,

20

"If you define a narrow market, I am going to say it's

21

gerrymandered to evade market definition and avoid

22

recognizing the plain fact of competition from Lawson

23

and whoever all these other guys are, so you are going

24

to lose."

25

I am going to explain to the court that you are talking

Then he says, "If you define a broad market,
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about effects that are only in 20 percent of this broad

2

market.

3

don't meet the substantiality test of Section 7."

4

Therefore, Dan says, "I am going to win either way.

5

Don't bring these cases."

6

that was the implication --

They're too small, they're de minimis, they

7
8

MR. WALL:

Clearly I would never say that.

Give

me a break.

9

PROFESSOR BAKER:

10
11

He didn't quite say that, but

Only against Dan's clients.

That is not a happy box to be in, so let's see
what we can do to kind of get ourselves out of it.

12

Now, Rich says, you basically have two choices.

13

You take the broad market or the narrow market, and work

14

with it.

15

you define.

16

were getting at -- and Bobby, too, earlier in the

17

conversation.

18

unilateral effects to the judge?

19

But the important question isn't what market
That it is really what both Dan and Rich

It is what is intuitive in explaining

What Dan wants to do, either way, in the box

20

that he puts you in, is to be able to say, "There are

21

lots of rivals, so the merger partner can't be an

22

important competitive constraint."

23

the box for Dan.

24

Government is that your eye isn't on the ball.

25

to say, "Wait a minute, the key issue here is that the

That is the point of

And the answer to that for the
You have
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merging firm didn't price higher before because of

2

competition from the merger partner."

3

Sure, there was some competitive constraint from

4

all the other rivals, but what you are losing with the

5

merger is an important competitive constraint that will

6

make a difference.

7

customers also, like Mercedes-Benz and Lexus, but look

8

at their documents.

9

they care about, BMW, and when you look at the diversion

10

ratios and the margins that our expert, Dr. Shapiro, has

11

computed, they show you the same thing.

12

of getting out of the box by changing the focus from who

13

all these other rivals are to the fact that there is a

14

competitive constraint from the merger partner, which is

15

the essence of the unilateral effects case in the first

16

place.

Yes, I concede that, what, Audi

When they are pricing, they also --

It's a matter

17

Whether you articulate it as a submarket or, in

18

the economic analysis in the broader market, that's the

19

story that the Government needs to tell.

20

MR. WALL:

Look, the box exists.

This is the problem.

I didn't

21

create it.

The box exists.

What

22

you have now is choices for what is the optimal strategy

23

in a world of boxes.

24

is -- in a trial dynamic, that it is a good idea to

25

fight any issue, any issue at all, where there is going

You know, I don't think that it
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to be a lot of evidence on the other person's side, and

2

they are going to be able to marshal it up and bash you

3

with it day after day.

And we make strategic retreats

4

all the time in trials.

We make strategic retreats.

5

And, you know, I do think that there are going

6

to be cases in which the -- while the box is there,

7

there is a very credible way of going, of saying,

8

"Sure" -- I mean, just take Oracle.

9

companies compete, no doubt about it.

"Sure, these
We don't -- we

10

would never -- far be it from us, for the Government, to

11

suggest that they don't compete, but we still believe

12

that we can establish that the rivalry between the

13

merging firms has substantial effects that are distinct

14

from the rest of the rivalry in the market."

15

the approach that I am saying that I think would

16

probably be more effective.

17

MR. PARKER:

And that's

I think Dan and I are in total

18

agreement on that, and as I have said, to go into a case

19

and simply say I am not relying on Philly Bank, I don't

20

need it, don't need a presumption, because I have got

21

the goods on these folks, I don't need it, I think that

22

can be extremely effective and would certainly mesh well

23

within the current case law.

24

MS. FENTON:

25

Yes, but, Dan and Rich, doesn't

that necessarily get you pretty close to an analysis
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that will focus on, because of the uniqueness you just

2

emphasized, the disturber in the marketplace, the

3

maverick, that you sort of go down that line of analysis

4

as a necessary consequence of the approach you're

5

advocating?

6

MR. WALL:

Well, I mean, it doesn't have to

7

necessarily be a maverick.

8

one possibility here, that the merger is taking on a

9

maverick or something like that, but, you know, just in

It could be, I guess that's

10

the standard differentiated product model, you know,

11

spatial competition or something like that, there's

12

nothing -- it's completely coherent to say that I am

13

going to draw the big circle around a bunch of

14

competitors, but that in this particular, you know,

15

sector of that circle, by the way, which is $100 million

16

of commerce a year, so it's a lot that you -- you know,

17

you shouldn't just be indifferent to it, that most of

18

the competitive interaction is between these two brands.

19

To me, that is a perfectly coherent case that I

20

personally would not muck up by trying to say that they

21

didn't have competition from the rest of the people in

22

the box.

23

MS. FENTON:

But you almost seem to be

24

suggesting that the district court judge will know it

25

when he sees it.

I'm wondering what's the criteria that
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you would offer him for identifying that particular

2

unique competition.

3

MR. WALL:

Oh, I offer nothing special other

4

than the unilateral effects analysis as it is

5

articulated in the Guidelines.

6

mean, from everything I have heard and read, there

7

appears to be no one who can actually explain where the

8

35 percent threshold comes from in the Guidelines.

9

got put in there somewhere along the way and without a

10

I just would not -- I

It

specific economic rationale.

11

The real intuition is that if a large group of

12

customers find the merging firms to be their next best

13

substitutes, that you could have a problem that won't be

14

addressed by other firms.

15

that theoretically.

16

I'd have no problem putting on a case under that theory.

17

MR. PARKER:

I don't have a problem with

It makes perfect sense to me, and

And it turns on what the company's

18

documents say, as I said, and it turns on what the

19

customers say, importantly.

20

I think the 35 percent threshold, by the way, is

21

a lose-lose situation for the Government.

If you do

22

find effects below 35 percent, then, you know, Dan

23

quotes the 35 percent against you, and if you are in 55

24

or 60 percent, which the Government usually is, it

25

doesn't matter.

So, I don't see -- I think the
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Guidelines' 35 percent not only has a -- has no real

2

rationale that I've ever seen, but more importantly,

3

from your point of view, and since I am taking the

4

government position, I think it's bad for the

5

Government.

6

MR. WALL:

Again, there is a comment I want to

7

make about Judge Walker's opinion in Oracle and what he

8

was saying about this notion that you have to have a

9

monopoly or something like that.

10
11

This is actually the

line that people are talking about.

He says:

"In a unilateral effects case, a plaintiff is

12

attempting to prove that the merging parties could

13

unilaterally increase prices.

14

must demonstrate that the merging parties would enjoy a

15

post-merger monopoly or dominant position at least in a

16

localized competition space."

17

Accordingly, a plaintiff

As a participant in that battle, I would urge

18

you to consider that the emphasis is on the last clause,

19

the "at least in a localized competition space."

20

certainly weren't arguing that a unilateral effects case

21

required a merger to monopoly, never made that argument;

22

never said anything close to that argument.

23

said is that the concept required that there be some

24

identifiable space -- you know, group of customers -- in

25

which there were not good substitutes to the merging

We

What we
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parties.

That's not terribly far off than what the

2

Guidelines say themselves.

3

We were contesting factually whether that

4

existed in the case, not to get too much into the

5

details.

6

identifiable space like that in which SAP, which is far

7

and away the largest business applications provider, was

8

not a good substitute for Oracle or PeopleSoft.

9

contesting that.

10
11

The Government was saying that there was an

We were

We said that that didn't exist.

We

were saying that factually.
And I believe that what Judge Walker was saying

12

there -- and I know, you know, it has been

13

interpreted -- and frankly, not unreasonably given the

14

language he used -- to say something grander -- but what

15

I think what he was saying is that you at least have got

16

to demonstrate that there is that space where there is

17

this -- some kind of dominance by the merging parties.

18

I wouldn't -- you know, I wouldn't read it as being a

19

whole lot more than that.

20

He does go on to worry about whether this is a

21

backdoor way of creating submarkets, and that's a

22

legitimate worry.

23

lot of people have raised that, whether unilateral

24

effects is a backdoor way of getting into submarkets,

25

but rather than decrying this as setting up a standard

He's not the first to raise that.
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which is impossible to meet, if I were litigating on

2

behalf of the Government, I would argue to reconcile it

3

with the Guidelines rather than create a conflict.

4

PROFESSOR BAKER:

5

MR. SCHMIDT:

6

PROFESSOR BAKER:

May I add something on that?

Sure.
Which is -- I don't have the

7

Oracle opinion in front of me.

My recollection is there

8

is another place -- a second place in the opinion where

9

he doesn't use that localized competition language,

10

where he says something that sounds a lot stronger about

11

the merger to monopoly.

12

maybe it's a different point, but on the same general

13

issue -- that comes up when I hear, you know, "throw out

14

the Merger Guidelines" or "revise them dramatically"

15

kind of questions, which is I think it would be easy to

16

overreact here to some merger decisions that are

17

probably, in large measure, just bad luck.

18

But I have a related comment --

If you sort of throw out the hospital mergers,

19

which seem to be on a different planet than the rest of

20

the merger decisions, and you throw out Oracle, because

21

that is, you know, a judge who, unlike most, was an

22

antitrust expert who had a strong point of view before

23

he took the case, and you think about the other cases,

24

there really aren't that many, and they are all tough.

25

You know, when we took -- when I was at the FTC
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and the FTC challenged Staples, I was always 100 percent

2

sure that there was -- that the merger was going to harm

3

competition, but I never thought it was anything but a

4

close case in going to court, that -- you know, and had

5

that -- many people thought it should have been an easy

6

case for the defense.

7

intuitive, broad market definition in which the merging

8

firms had tiny shares, and if the judge saw the case

9

that way, you know -- and he could easily have -- and if

I mean, there was a strong,

10

the judge had liked the efficiencies story, which was,

11

you know, quite plausible sounding on the part of the

12

merging firms, about the virtuous circle that they were

13

getting into, that could easily have been a defense

14

victory.

15

And the Cardinal Health, the drug wholesaling

16

case that Rich talked about, which was -- you could

17

argue about whether that was a unilateral or coordinated

18

case.

19

unilateral case.

20

thought it was, but, you know, that was a really hard

21

case, too.

22

easily have been 0 and 2 instead of 2 and 0.

23

Our expert, Professor Shapiro, treated it as a
I am not clear on what the judge

You know, the FTC, when I was there, could

And you come to Whole Foods, and it seems like,

24

you know, that one just -- you know, just listening to

25

the -- you know, seeing it from the outside, although I
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guess I did work 1.8 hours on that case, I guess, for

2

the defense, so technically, I had a client, but, you

3

know, I was essentially not really involved in that case

4

at all.

5

should have been a hard case, too, for both sides, it

6

would seem to me, and it is easy to take one or two

7

losses and read too much into them.

8

just caution against overreaction.

9

Looking at it from the outside, you know, it

MR. SCHMIDT:

So, I am going to

Dan, I wanted to ask you a

10

question.

11

light of the complexity that's involved in some of the

12

economics relating to unilateral effects, is the logical

13

conclusion of that that from the agency's perspective,

14

as a policy matter, that we are relying too much on an

15

economic analysis?

16

In light of -- from your perspective, in

That's sort of what I heard you saying, and if

17

that's the case, what is more realistic to rely on from

18

a policy perspective, perhaps putting, as a secondary

19

matter, whether we can win in litigation?

20

particularly thinking of the situation, as is the case I

21

think in most of the markets we look at, there isn't a

22

great deal of pricing data available.

23

MR. WALL:

24

MR. SCHMIDT:

25

And I am

Right.
So, in that circumstance, ought we

just to look at the way the company executives, for
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example, the internal documents describe the -- you

2

know, their market?

3

And then, just as a final thought on that, I can

4

tell you that in many instances, part of the difficulty

5

for us of doing that is we have some pretty stark

6

comments from executives that we ultimately conclude are

7

puffing --

8

MR. WALL:

Sure.

9

MR. SCHMIDT:

-- and we don't challenge

10

transactions as a result of what we think is a much more

11

thorough economic analysis.

12

thought is on that rambling question.

13

MR. WALL:

Okay.

So, I am curious what your

Well, you know, in my -- what

14

is the antitrust equivalent of a fantasy baseball league

15

where I run the Antitrust Division or the FTC?

16

do is I make policy decisions based upon my Guidelines.

17

That is what they are there for.

18

consider the -- I would have no compunction whatsoever

19

of walking into a room with a bunch of people like --

20

well, now, Rich Parker and Dan Wall, and saying, "I am

21

going to sue you because of my conclusion that under the

22

Guidelines and under the unilateral effects analysis,

23

there is a valid case here."

24
25

What I

And, again, I will

But when they were out of the room and I was
just talking to staff, I would say, "How are we going to
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win this case, guys?"

2

different analysis at that point, which is a very

3

practical analysis, and it is one about saying what are

4

the defense arguments and how are we going to negate

5

them?

6

say, in all candor, that I think that some of the market

7

definitions that have been proposed took on too much

8

trial risk to think that it was done very vigorously.

9

And I would apply a fundamentally

And I am sure that this is done, but I've got to

There is just too much trial risk in the kind of

10

market that we had in Oracle.

11

I was not involved at all, but it seems to me that in

12

Whole Foods, you just had to have a very powerful

13

argument in the can about how you were going to say that

14

it doesn't matter that Safeway sells organic tomatoes

15

and things like that, because you can see that one

16

coming so clearly.

17

I mean, it seems to me --

I think we have the same wife.

My wife said the

18

same thing when she heard about that case.

19

everybody did --

20

MR. PARKER:

21

MR. WALL:

I think,

We'll have to talk about that.
-- everybody did, had the same kind

22

of feeling, that there was something screwy about the

23

notion that Safeway, you know, which at least where I

24

live is really dominant, wouldn't be competitive with

25

Whole Foods.
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MR. PARKER:

Jeff, I think you have got to look

2

at both the documents and the economics, I think both

3

from a policy point of view and from a litigation point

4

of view.

5

think there is a lot of people who try antitrust cases

6

who say, "Well, look, you know, all I have to do is have

7

my Ph.D." -- I am talking about trial now, not policy --

8

"my Ph.D. has to cancel out their Ph.D., and then we

9

will win it on the documents and the customers," and I

I think you have to have both -- I mean, I

10

think that in some cases, there is something to that.

11

But from a policy point of view, I think -- I

12

think you definitely -- I don't think it's responsible

13

to, you know, bring a case just on documents, and I also

14

wouldn't bring a case just on economics without some

15

support from what the parties say.

16

MR. WALL:

Let me -- can I make a comment, and I

17

would love to get your reaction to this, Rich, about

18

what makes a good document, okay?

19

smallish issue, but it's an important issue.

20

with it all the time in antitrust litigation.

21

This is a -- maybe a
We deal

There is a tendency for people to think that --

22

so, a company has a selling aid that is directed --

23

Oracle had selling aids against PeopleSoft and SAP and a

24

bunch of other people, but people -- you know, there was

25

a tendency to think those were good documents, because
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it shows that there is sort of head-to-head competition

2

going on there.

3

I have a pet saying that you shouldn't let

4

ubiquitous phenomenon prove rare facts, and if you are

5

trying to prove market power, you shouldn't be able to

6

rely on evidence that would be found with or without

7

market power, and the existence of selling aids like

8

that is so common that it doesn't really shock you at

9

all, that, "A-ha, Oracle is looking at PeopleSoft."

10

Okay, great, wonderful.

They do.

11

A great document is something that actually

12

proves one of the particular facts that drives your

13

antitrust analysis, your competitive effect analysis, or

14

something like that.

15

that says, "We don't have to meet that discount, because

16

I don't really fear competition from this firm."

17

know, a great document is, "We're going to have to give

18

the usual ridiculous PeopleSoft discount," you know,

19

something like that.

20

A great document is a document

You

You have to be very detailed and very critical

21

about what those documents prove, because you will be

22

met with the defense argument of, "Oh, this is just so

23

much noise, you would find this in any company, and you

24

can't make anything of it."

25

MR. PARKER:

To me, the best documents -- and
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like I said, generals like the last word.

In Cardinal

2

Health, I thought the best documents were the documents

3

where plaintiffs were saying -- I mean, the defense was

4

saying we compete with everybody, all these little

5

fringe, and we compete with direct delivery, all this

6

other stuff, but every time they went to the board, so

7

the board would understand the competitive situation and

8

how they were doing, all they looked at was each other,

9

and when people had to make serious business decisions

10

as managers and as board members representing the

11

shareholders, that's all they looked at.

12

That is a serious document, and you have to be

13

careful of the marketing aids, because salespeople tend

14

to -- that's why they can sell things.

15

kinds of stuff that's probably not analytically true at

16

the end of the day.

17

MR. WALL:

Yeah.

They say all

A classic one is the DOJ used

18

in Oracle a lot of documents that we had that actually

19

were selling aids against the people who were excluded

20

from the market in which we trash them, right?

21

all these terrible things.

22

do we have to go to the trouble of trashing them?

23

because they are competing with us.

24

you do not trash people who aren't competing with you."

25

So, it's at least ambiguous to rely on that kind of

We say

Well, my response was, "Why
It's

That's -- you know,
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2

evidence.
MR. SCHMIDT:

Kathy, let me throw one to you.

3

Should the standard be any different in what we are

4

talking about for a preliminary injunction versus a

5

permanent injunction?

6

MS. FENTON:

Well, I think this is another area

7

where the existing cases are not particularly helpful,

8

because the issue tends to be litigated in the PI

9

context, and one of the questions that I struggled with

10

in thinking about this is what would you do with the

11

traditional assignments of burden of proof, burden of

12

persuasion, in a full-blown trial on the merits if you

13

were doing a true effects analysis and not starting with

14

market definition as your starting point, what would be

15

the trigger for shifting the burden of proof?

16

And I will confess, my own thinking broke down

17

fairly rapidly there, because I don't know, if you're

18

doing the back-end analysis, what do you do in terms of

19

those assignments of burden of proof and burden of

20

persuasion?

21

is much more of a civil procedurist, up here to help us,

22

but I think that is the real practical difficulty you

23

are going to encounter in the area, Jeff.

24
25

It's too bad we don't have Andy Gavil, who

PROFESSOR BAKER:

Well, I can add that Carl and

I proposed that you could essentially -- effectively get
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the equivalent of the -- the plaintiff could meet its

2

initial burden, instead of by showing high, increasing

3

market shares, with some evidence of -- based on

4

diversion issues and margins or some evidence to show

5

that these are -- there is a -- the merging partner --

6

one of the merging firms would lose sales to the -- a

7

significant amount of sales to the other one now and

8

that -- after the merger that that constraint would be

9

lost, that kind of thing.

10

The essence of the unilateral effects theory

11

gives you a simple showing that you could use to create

12

the same presumption, although I guess you would need

13

the FTC to hold this in a case in order to get it into

14

the case law.

15

MS. FENTON:

I was going to say, isn't that part

16

of your problem, particularly in the PI context, is that

17

you are making inherently predictive judgments without

18

any kind of actual data?

19

PROFESSOR BAKER:

Well, yeah, but it's the same

20

formal structure as what we do now with the market

21

shares.

22

MR. PARKER:

Jeff, I have a view on 13(b), and

23

that is you ought to put it in all your briefs but don't

24

ever really think that's what's going on.

25

go in and say, "Judge, if you enjoin this, this deal is

The parties
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over."
This is important.

You can't run the economy

3

without really -- you know, by coming in and talking

4

about whether there's issues going to the merits or

5

whatever.

6

to end a multibillion transaction if you do this."

7

Judge Bates didn't need 90 pages to do a 13(b) analysis,

8

and all these other -- Staples and all these other

9

opinions, when you read them, they are deciding the

The parties come in and say, "You are going
And

10

case, period, no matter what the standard they say they

11

are applying, and you ought to assume you are trying the

12

case when you go in for a preliminary injunction no

13

matter what the law is, because I think that's what

14

somebody in black robes is going to do.

15

MR. WALL:

I also -- I always wondered myself

16

about whether -- what the actual value of burdens of

17

proof are after the third day of trial, something like

18

that, you know?

19

things like summary judgment motions.

20

are definitely important in, I think, criminal cases

21

where you have the beyond a reasonable doubt kind of

22

standard.

Burdens of proof are important in
They are - they

23

When you get into a two-week/three-week kind of

24

trial, the judge has been so immersed with the argument

25

at this point that what happens is what Rich described
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in his talk when he was talking about Judge Byrne, who

2

came back there and just told the clerks, "I think the

3

plaintiffs should win."

4

wouldn't get too hung up on how you get there.

5

MS. FENTON:

That's what happens.

And so I

Yes, though Dan, isn't the flip

6

side of that the concern where you don't have the

7

two-week trial?

8

had a day of live testimony.

9
10

I think in Whole Foods, you essentially

MR. WALL:

Okay, so one other practical point

that I will give you-all, don't do that.

11

MR. PARKER:

12

MR. WALL:

Never.
Don't do that.

Don't ever, ever,

13

ever agree to have a merger try to get enjoined based

14

upon a one-day or two-day hearing.

15

convince the judge.

16

Rich said about how the status quo is the market with

17

these people competing.

18

you know, we do not have a merger clearance regime in

19

this country.

20

the only advantage that the Government has at trial is

21

you don't have to pay the filing fee like private

22

parties do, okay?

23

the merger.

You can't do it in a day.

24

never work.

You've got to build your case up.

25

You just have got to

I really don't agree with one thing

The status quo -- this is --

We have a merger notification regime, and

You have got to convince them to stop

MR. PARKER:

That will almost

I am not backing off my previous
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statement, but I will tell you, you have got to take --

2

you know, these judges, judges are basically -- and I am

3

not being critical -- they are basically clueless about

4

antitrust.

5

have got to take them through it, and you have got to

6

bring in customers, and you have got to bring in a -- I

7

mean, I remember one time during Drug Wholesalers, there

8

was an hour in which we never asked Carl Shapiro a

9

question.

They know it's an important case, and so you

Why?

Because the judge was asking the

10

questions.

11

after customer after customer.

12

got to do.

13

And we had the same situation with customer
And that's what you've

Now, sometimes, you know, if the judge wants to

14

do it that way and that's the ruling, then there is

15

nothing you can do about it, but I would sure never

16

agree to it.

17

wouldn't agree to it either, the reason being I want to

18

bring in my CEO.

19

this person in and talk about how the company was built

20

and this, that, and the other thing.

21

And by the way, for the defense, I

MR. WALL:

I want to bring in my CEO and bring

Well, I might -- you know, I might

22

want to do it if I could say, "Excuse me, they forgot

23

Safeway."

24

make that a one-day, one-sound-bite trial.

25

If that were my argument, I might want to

MR. SCHMIDT:

All right.

Well, I'd like to
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thank the panel for a terrific discussion.

2

(Applause.)

3

MR. SCHMIDT:

We are going to take a lunch break

4

until 1:15, and then we have another great panel on

5

judicial perspectives scheduled for that time.

6
7

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., a lunch recess was
taken.)

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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AFTERNOON SESSION

2

(1:17 p.m.)

3

PANEL 3:

4

JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON UNILATERAL EFFECTS

5
6

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

We'd like to welcome

7

everyone back to the afternoon of our program on

8

unilateral effects analysis.

9

going to have a moot court exercise in which Judges

For the next hour, we are

10

Diane Wood and Douglas Ginsburg query two advocates who

11

will be working with a set of stylized facts, based

12

loosely on an ice cream merger of the relatively recent

13

past, and some somewhat stylized arguments to sharpen

14

and focus our attention on some of the underlying

15

issues.

16

First, our advocates.

Speaking for the

17

Government will be Michael Bloom who's our very capable

18

Director of Litigation within the Bureau of Competition.

19

He'll be joined on the other side by Rick Liebeskind

20

from Pillsbury Winthrop.

21

of our alumni.

22

We proudly claim Rick as one

Welcome home, Rick.

By way of a joint introduction, Judges Wood and

23

Ginsburg share some striking and impressive credentials.

24

Not only are they former enforcement officials, both at

25

the Department of Justice, not only have they written a
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number of influential antitrust opinions as members of

2

their courts, they are also teachers, they are scholars,

3

and influential in that role in the competition policy

4

area.

5

work in the international field, they are seen by their

6

judicial colleagues and former enforcement colleagues in

7

the international community as being exemplars of the

8

way in which one goes about thinking about and judging

9

antitrust matters.

10
11

Most striking to those of us who have done some

We are delighted to have them

serving as trial judges for our panel today.
Our format will be for Michael and Rick to offer

12

their arguments with questioning by the members of the

13

trial court, and then we'll have some time for

14

discussion at the close of the presentations.

15

Michael, would you like to begin for us?

16

MR. BLOOM:

17

Good afternoon, Your Honors.

18

Three companies produce superpremium ice cream

Thank you.

19

for sale to retail outlets throughout the country.

20

Unless this court decides otherwise, there soon will be

21

just two.

22

the superpremium ice cream market.

23

enjoys an approximately 45 percent market share based on

24

dollar sales.

25

of the market.

Incline Corp. and Tressel Company pioneered
Incline Corp. now

Tressel Company now holds some 39 percent
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JUDGE WOOD:

Mr. Bloom, aren't you assuming the

2

answer to the most important question before us, which

3

is whether there really is a superpremium ice cream

4

market in an antitrust sense?

5

MR. BLOOM:

I am, from the moment that I began

6

calculating shares, Your Honor.

And I will spend a good

7

deal of time in my presentation explaining why

8

superpremium ice cream is the correct relevant market

9

based both on documents and testimony of industry

10

participants and empirical evidence.

11

the moment, to set up the context as to how to view the

12

proposed acquisition.

13
14
15

JUDGE WOOD:

I just wanted, at

So, you do concede that there is no

case if there is no superpremium market.
MR. BLOOM:

Your Honor, in fact, the market

16

definition exercise is a surrogate for a direct

17

determination of whether competitive effects are likely

18

in a nontrivial portion of the economy.

19

demonstrate, by empirical evidence, that that is the

20

case here.

21

the same time, makes the formal market definition

22

exercise of lesser importance than it might be had we

23

not the ability to do the kind of empirical work that we

24

had the ability to do here.

25

We will

That makes out the relevant market, but at

Tressel wants to eliminate an independent Higbee
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1

through acquisition.

2

market in which the combined Tressel/Higbee would have a

3

55 percent share.

4
5

This would result in a two-firm

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Higbee is a relatively new

entrant, is it?

6

MR. BLOOM:

Yes, it is, Your Honor.

It entered

7

approximately four years ago, and in that four-year

8

period, it has been able to garner a roughly 16 percent

9

share of a superpremium ice cream market.

10
11

JUDGE GINSBURG:

And it stepped up from the next

tier, the premium ice cream tier?

12

MR. BLOOM:

It did.

It had some advantages that

13

others may not have.

The point that I'd like to make

14

with respect to that, Your Honor, is that there was a

15

duopoly prior to the entry of Higbee that functioned

16

here for a number of years.

17

and the superb margins earned there relative to the

18

premium ice cream segment -- superpremium ice cream

19

sells for three times the price of ice cream in the

20

premium market segment, there was no sufficient entry in

21

fact, there was no material entry at all that succeeded

22

prior to the advent of Higbee's.

23

JUDGE GINSBURG:

In response to that duopoly

And do you have information on

24

the effect of that entry on prices in the superpremium

25

market?
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MR. BLOOM:

Yes.

I can tell you that Higbee

2

Corporation itself came in at a price 5 percent below

3

the other firms in the superpremium market, and

4

consumers benefited directly and immediately from the

5

availability of that price.

6
7

JUDGE GINSBURG:

And it is your contention that

if they were to leave, that 5 percent would re-appear?

8

MR. BLOOM:

Certainly, Your Honor.

That 5

9

percent, perhaps a little more or less depending on the

10

combined firm's assessment of what its profit-maximizing

11

price is, but assuredly, an appreciable portion, if not

12

all of that.

13

JUDGE WOOD:

You know, along a related line, the

14

2007 Ice Cream Institute Fact Book outlines the

15

difference among these three levels, if you will, of ice

16

cream:

value, premium, and superpremium.

17

MR. BLOOM:

18

JUDGE WOOD:

Yes.
And as I look at these differences,

19

they don't seem to be all that huge, and that's what

20

makes me wonder what you have in the record to show that

21

even if Higbee were acquired, you know, a new Higbee

22

might come along and challenge the superpremium sector

23

of this market.

24
25

MR. BLOOM:

Your Honor, the question of product

differentiation is one that economists tell us is
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1

properly viewed from the point of view of consumers, not

2

producers.

3

question in this case is, therefore, are these

4

differences material to consumers and ought we expect

5

some entry or repositioning that would take up the space

6

of the lost Higbee from the point of view, again, of

7

consumers?

8

I would submit to you that the relevant

Notwithstanding your assessment that the Fact

9

Book doesn't suggest dramatic differences, consumers of

10

superpremium ice cream are paying three times the price

11

that they would pay for premium ice cream for the

12

advantage of significantly higher butterfat content,

13

significantly lesser injected air content, and the

14

variety of imaginative flavors and combinations and

15

inclusions of fruits and nuts and things that are

16

offered in superpremium products.

17

matters greatly as measured by the relative prices

18

consumers are willing to.

19

The difference

As I said, again, those prices of three times

20

premium ice cream prevailed for several years prior to

21

the advent of Higbee's.

22

credulity to suggest that if that 5 percent premium

23

disappeared because Higbee's disappeared as an

24

independent entity, all of a sudden, the gates would be

25

opened, and premium forces would march in and rapidly

It seems to me to stretch
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take up Higbee's 16 percent share.

2

Now, I happily acknowledge that it may be that

3

over time, firms will fill in from the premium space up

4

to the superpremium space.

5

the record evidence about a firm that, at a slight

6

premium to other premium vendors is offering an,

7

arguably, higher quality product, some improvement in

8

the inclusions, in butterfat content, and such.

9
10

JUDGE WOOD:

There is, for example, in

You are speaking of Alfred's Coffee

Beans?

11

MR. BLOOM:

12

JUDGE WOOD:

I am, Your Honor, I am.
Okay.

I wanted to ask you, since

13

you're talking about that, you're making an assumption

14

here that when the -- post-merger, in fact, it would be

15

profitable for the post-merger firm to raise prices,

16

and, of course, the expert testimony from Dr. Pangloss

17

is to the contrary.

18

increase or a 5 percent increase would be unprofitable

19

if unit sales were to drop by these various amounts.

20

He thinks that either a 3 percent

I am concerned about that, since if you don't

21

want us to worry about market definition, you want us to

22

look at more direct measures of competitive effects,

23

this critical loss analysis is one way that economists

24

are trying to do that now.

25

MR. BLOOM:

Let me address the critical loss
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1

analysis, as such, that was performed by Dr. Pangloss,

2

and let me observe that it seems to be offered as a

3

rebuttal to the empirical econometric work done by the

4

Government's testifying expert, to which I will turn

5

after discussing Dr. Pangloss' critical loss analysis.

6

I would suggest that this critical loss analysis

7

is offered to show that the combined Tressel/Higbee

8

would not be able to raise prices, but it shows no such

9

thing.

Dr. Pangloss states that, given the prevailing

10

operating margin of superpremium ice cream

11

manufacturers, a 3 percent price increase for Higbee

12

superpremium ice cream would be defeated if Higbee's

13

unit sales dropped 5.7 percent -- and he makes a similar

14

finding for a different scenario, for a 5 percent

15

scenario -- but that is correct if and only if none of

16

the customers that switch ice creams to avoid the price

17

increase switch to other products controlled by the

18

combined Tressel/Higbee.

19

It is, as this court said in Swedish Match, if

20

one is to correctly apply critical loss analysis, two

21

factors are of particular concern:

22

margin and the diversion ratio, meaning the percentage

23

of switched sales that are captured somewhere else,

24

anywhere else, within the combined firm.

25

JUDGE GINSBURG:

The price-cost

Mr. Bloom, the account you are

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

137
1

giving, Pangloss points out, was derived from retail

2

scanner data, correct?

3

MR. BLOOM:

4

from retail scanner sales.

5

Dr. Cassandra's data was derived

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Right.

And then Dr. Pangloss

6

points that out and says that's not the market in which

7

this transaction was taking place, that you should have

8

been looking at sales to the retail channel.

9

MR. BLOOM:

Had there been an equivalent data

10

source available for sales to the retail channel, that

11

undoubtedly would have been the starting point of the

12

analysis.

13

JUDGE GINSBURG:

So, are you like the drunk

14

who's looking for his keys under the light because

15

that's where the light is?

16

MR. BLOOM:

Absolutely not, Your Honor.

This is

17

a situation in which we have a near-perfect proxy for

18

the cross-elasticity of demand at the retail channel

19

level.

20

cream products in every single category is derived from

21

consumer demand for ice cream in those categories.

22

The reason for that is retailers' demand for ice

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Well, I understand that, but

23

you are making pretty fine calculations, so that if

24

there is any difference between the consumer and retail

25

demand at all, it could, seemingly, overcome the fine
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1

discriminations that you are making.

2
3

MR. BLOOM:

I would suggest that the

discriminations, while --

4

JUDGE GINSBURG:

For instance, not every price

5

change to the retailer is flowed through to the

6

consumer.

7

MR. BLOOM:

8

JUDGE GINSBURG:

9

MR. BLOOM:

10

So, therein lies the problem.

And that is why I did not say they

are perfect proxies.

11
12

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Would you have any data on how

imperfect they are?

13

MR. BLOOM:

I do not, Your Honor, but I can tell

14

Your Honor that the data is consistent with the

15

testimony of people who strive for profit within the

16

retail trade and strive for profit within the producer

17

of ice cream trade.

18
19

JUDGE GINSBURG:
firms?

20

MR. BLOOM:

21

JUDGE GINSBURG:

22
23

You mean competitors of these

The competitors and purchasers.
Well, they are not

disinterested parties either.
MR. BLOOM:

They are not disinterested parties.

24

In fact, they are interested in the competitive

25

mechanism producing a price in the case of the
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1
2

supermarkets that gives them an advantage, and the -JUDGE GINSBURG:

In the case of the competitors,

3

though, they would just as soon see a price umbrella

4

over their heads, wouldn't they?

5

MR. BLOOM:

I think that is generally true of

6

competitors, that they would prefer to see a price

7

umbrella over their heads.

8

testimony in this trial, but at other pronouncements in

9

documents of the parties, it seems pretty clear that the

But when we look not only at

10

principal competitive interactions are within

11

superpremium, if they are superpremium producers --

12
13
14

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Right, but not without some

effect on the next tier, on premium.
JUDGE WOOD:

And I just wanted to say, I am not

15

clear which competitors you're talking about, because

16

you have told us that Incline Corporation is the only

17

other seller of superpremium.

18

various companies at the premium level and presumably

19

others at the value level.

20

you're talking about?

21

MR. BLOOM:

Then there are these

So, who are the competitors

In this instance, the record that I

22

have before me does not identify the specific firms;

23

however, it is clear that they include customers who are

24

looking for the best prices and who are making estimates

25

of their ability to purchase --
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JUDGE GINSBURG:

2

MR. BLOOM:

3

JUDGE GINSBURG:

4

MR. BLOOM:

Customers at which level?

At the supermarket level.
Consumers or supermarkets?

Retailers of products.

And these

5

are people whose interest is in the competitive market

6

producing the lowest price for them.

7

think, for that reason some special credibility when

8

they say that they don't think that the price to them is

9

sensitive to changes in price across segments.

10

JUDGE GINSBURG:

On the contrary.

11

have a special credibility.

12

statement.

13

MR. BLOOM:

They have, I

They don't

That's a self-interested

Well, their self-interest is

14

consistent with that of consumers and presumably with

15

that of the market.

16

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Perhaps, but there is no

17

special credibility there.

18

have you do exactly what you are doing.

19

MR. BLOOM:

They would clearly like to

Well, the reason I say that, Your

20

Honor, is Your Honor correctly observes that competitors

21

have an interest in a price umbrella being over their

22

head, but --

23
24
25

JUDGE GINSBURG:

But you are talking about

supermarkets now, right?
MR. BLOOM:

Yes, I am.

Yes, I am.
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2

JUDGE GINSBURG:

And they want the lowest price

possible.

3

MR. BLOOM:

They want the lowest price, and I

4

believe that the market, unfettered by an

5

anticompetitive acquisition, has produced the lowest

6

prices.

7

JUDGE GINSBURG:

So, even if they don't know

8

anything, they're inclined to say it's different from

9

the premium market, right, that this merger will be

10
11

three to two and disastrous.
MR. BLOOM:

Well, I think if their statements

12

were solely those prepared for litigation -- and they

13

are not, they are supported by documents and other

14

materials -- and if there were not empirical evidence

15

that is consistent with those statements -- and I want

16

to talk a moment about what Dr. Pangloss did -- you

17

might raise that point, but I think the consistency of a

18

variety of sorts of evidence about relevant market,

19

ranging from a look at the practical indicia suggested

20

by the Supreme Court and regularly applied since Brown

21

Shoe, through the testimony of others and into the

22

empirical work, all tells a consistent story.

23

JUDGE WOOD:

Another thing that Dr. Pangloss

24

challenged, though, was your assumption that the market

25

is differentiated along these very clean lines.

He
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1

notes this Alfred's Coffee-Beans-in-Cream is a premium

2

brand, and the premiums are edging up toward the

3

superpremiums with their inclusions, and maybe the

4

Higbee superpremium had been 5 percent lower, and he, I

5

think, has offered evidence that there is, in fact, more

6

pricing and consumption interdependance among these

7

levels than you have asserted.

8
9

MR. BLOOM:

If you take a look at the spread

between a 5 percent upcharge over premium, as being

10

captured by Alfred's, and a 5 percent reduction in price

11

in the market leaders in the superpremium segment, you

12

are left still with about three times the price of one

13

for the other.

14

filling-in.

15

and beanier," and at some point down the road, you may

16

have an "even better and still beanier," and so on.

17

I am reminded of the statement of John Maynard Keynes:

18

"In the long term, we are all dead."

19

take before consumers are rescued from the loss of that

20

price increase that we believe inevitably will follow

21

the acquisition, pushing Higbee's prices back up to the

22

prevailing price, and I think that is the question for

23

this court ultimately.

You know, there may be some progressive

You may -- you know, now you have a "better

But

How long will it

24

Unless there are further questions, Your Honors?

25

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Thank you, Mr. Bloom.

We may
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1

want to hear from you again, though, after we have heard

2

from other counsel.

3
4
5

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

If I could invite Rick to

speak for the merging parties.
MR. LIEBESKIND:

Thank you, Your Honors, and

6

good afternoon.

7

points that I'll come back and cover so that I can give

8

you a preview a little bit of where I'd like to go.

9

I'd like to make -- tick off five

First of all, I would like to talk a little bit

10

about precedent, which except for one cite to Brown Shoe

11

we didn't hear from Mr. Bloom on.

12

a little bit about the fact that we are talking about a

13

manufacturer merger, not a retailer merger, as Judge

14

Ginsburg mentioned.

15

I would like to talk

I'd like to talk a little bit about the theory

16

of differentiated products mergers so that we understand

17

why it does not meet the requirement that a merger may

18

substantially lessen competition, which is the statutory

19

standard.

20

I'd like to talk about the evidence of

21

constraint from other people.

22

little bit, very little bit, about critical loss.

23

those are the --

24
25

JUDGE WOOD:

And I'd like to talk a
So,

And I do think, Mr. Liebeskind, the

elephant in the room for you is this enormous price
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1

difference between the superpremium level and even the

2

premium level, as shown by the record.

3

MR. LIEBESKIND:

There is certainly a large

4

price difference between them, but the question, of

5

course, Your Honor, is whether as a result of this

6

merger somebody will be able to exercise market power

7

and raise price and widen that gap.

8
9

JUDGE WOOD:

I understand that, and it seems to

me that Higbee was almost what we maybe once had thought

10

of as a maverick.

There it was, you know, pricing 5

11

percent below the other premium people --

12

MR. LIEBESKIND:

13

JUDGE WOOD:

And still is.

-- in the post -- in the

14

post-merger world; though with Tressel and Higbee

15

combined into one company, that gives you a certain

16

amount of room to get rid of that 5 percent distinction.

17

MR. LIEBESKIND:

Well, what we know, Your Honor,

18

from the actual documents and the actual evidence in

19

this case is that Incline, the market leader in

20

Mr. Bloom's purported superpremium market, prices itself

21

at roughly 3 percent -- three times that of premiums;

22

that Tressel prices itself at parity; and that Higbee

23

prices itself at 5 percent below Tressel and Incline.

24

And therefore, the question is, will the constraint on

25

Tressel go away or be loosened as a result of this
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2

merger?
Today -- this is not the Staples case.

This is

3

not a matter of Staples and Office Depot looking at each

4

other and looking at the third player.

5

player who looks at the other two, but we have the two

6

larger players in the market not looking at the other

7

two, according to the evidence in this record, but

8

looking at the premium competitors.

9

JUDGE WOOD:

We have one

Well, they are looking -- I am not

10

sure that the record shows that, because the record

11

suggests that Tressel feels comfortable pricing at

12

parity with Incline; Higbee, the newcomer, comes in at 5

13

percent lower.

14

transaction will lead to anticompetitive unilateral

15

effects, and with Tressel and Higbee becoming one

16

company, why do we think that Higbee's strategy of

17

pricing below Incline will survive and not Tressel's of

18

matching?

19
20

We are talking here about whether this

MR. LIEBESKIND:

But presumably Higbee has to

price below Tressel to survive at all.

21

JUDGE WOOD:

22

that assumption post-merger?

23

post-merger.

24
25

But not -- but why are you making

MR. LIEBESKIND:

They are all one company

Your assumption post-merger,

Your Honor, I suppose would be that once Tressel owns
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1

Higbee, Tressel can raise the price of Higbee, but not

2

of its own -- not its own price.

3
4
5
6

JUDGE WOOD:

Well, because its own price is

already up at parity, and so it brings Higbee's up.
MR. LIEBESKIND:
constrained.

JUDGE WOOD:

8

MR. LIEBESKIND:

10
11
12
13

And is

Tressel's price is constrained.

7

9

And is constrained.

Well -If Higbee can raise -- If

Tressel acquires Higbee and raises the price of Tressel,
that is the unilateral -JUDGE GINSBURG:
question.

That was not the Judge's

It raises the price of Higbee.

MR. LIEBESKIND:

I misspoke, Your Honor.

I beg

14

your pardon.

15

price of Higbee's, will the price of Higbee's goes up?

16

That is obviously implicit in the question.

17

deny that that is going to happen.

18

If Tressel acquires Higbee and raises the

JUDGE WOOD:

I cannot

Right, and why is not that an

19

anticompetitive unilateral effect?

20

independent company, there is at least one participant

21

in the superpremium market that is trying to compete to

22

a certain degree on the basis of price.

23

MR. LIEBESKIND:

With Higbee as an

Well, as Mr. Bloom noted in

24

response to your questioning, Your Honor, Higbee is

25

itself a recent entrant into this market.

Higbee moved
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1

from the premium to the superpremium level.

2

trying to do so as well.

3

made that leap from premium, as outside of Mr. Bloom's

4

market to inside of Mr. Bloom's market, suggests to me

5

that others could also do so.

6

Alfred's is

The fact that Higbee itself

This, you may remember, Your Honor, was exactly

7

the facts of Baker Hughes, that Secoma, in Baker Hughes,

8

had made that leap, and what the court pointed to in

9

Baker Hughes was that Secoma itself had entered and

10

demonstrated that entry was possible into this market.

11

Here we are not even talking about entry.

12

talking about --

13
14

JUDGE GINSBURG:

We are just

Well, even courts learn, too,

you know.

15

MR. LIEBESKIND:

Beg your pardon?

16

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Courts learn, too.

17

MR. LIEBESKIND:

I hope they have -- I hope they

18

have not forgotten the lesson of the Baker Hughes case,

19

Your Honor.

20

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Counsel, is it correct, as

21

Mr. Bloom said, that your critical loss analysis depends

22

on the assumption that none of the parties switching

23

away from your higher-priced brand switch within the

24

family of brands?

25

MR. LIEBESKIND:

This is -- I am glad you asked
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1

that question, Your Honor, and this is a quibble.

2

is -- what Mr. Bloom's analysis --

3
4

This

JUDGE GINSBURG:

In other words, it is true,

MR. LIEBESKIND:

It is true, and it is worth

yes.

5
6

less than 1 percent, because what Mr. Bloom's analysis

7

and what Dr. Cassandra's analysis shows is that the

8

diversion effect is basically 9 percent of the diversion

9

sales, and if you multiply the critical loss times the

10

diversion, that is 0.81 percent.

11

saying --

12
13

JUDGE GINSBURG:

So, all we are really

You are already doing more math

than the court can do.

14

MR. LIEBESKIND:

I assure you, it's taxing my

15

own limits, but the basic point, and I hope -- in round

16

numbers -- as we move the critical loss from 9 percent

17

to 10 percent, and I am glad you asked me that question,

18

Your Honor --

19

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Did I ask a question?

20

MR. LIEBESKIND:

You did, but I am using it as a

21

segue.

22

I want to speak a little bit about critical

23

loss, because that has been asked, what the role of

24

critical loss is in this analysis.

25

is a benchmark for telling us what is the amount of lost

Critical loss simply
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sales that a hypothetical monopolist or two merged firms

2

or whatever you are looking at needs to lose for a price

3

increase to be unprofitable.

4

Dr. Scheffman and Mr. Simons have said in their papers,

5

it is mere arithmetic.

6

analysis; it is not a statistical analysis.

7

merely a benchmark.

8

JUDGE WOOD:

9

that way, though.

It is not itself -- as

It is not itself an econometric
It is

I am not sure I would phrase it

I think it really is more -- it is

10

not like somebody sits down and plans, "I am going to

11

lose so many sales.

12

making money."

13

end of the telescope maybe, you know, at what point does

14

this effort to exercise unilateral market power after a

15

merger become unprofitable, so people are going to

16

experiment?

17

point.

18

freebie somehow, all within that critical loss range.

19

You know, I am still going to be

It is a way of capturing, from another

They'll nudge, you know, maybe up to that

But it doesn't mean, I think, that this is a

MR. LIEBESKIND:

I completely agree with you,

20

Your Honor.

This is a methodological estimate of

21

markets at equilibrium, and, in fact, what goes on all

22

the time is people are, as you say, testing how much

23

they can raise price.

24

again, that the supermarket's testing of how much it can

25

raise price is different from the wholesaler's testing

It is worth mentioning here,
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of how much it can raise price.

2

is not a one-to-one correspondence.

3

the record, these people have to compete for shelf space

4

or facings in the supermarket.

5

for those facings.

6

JUDGE GINSBURG:

To the retailer, there
As is indicated in

They have to give money

Do the retail -- well, this

7

goes back to the question of the adequacy of the proxy

8

that is being used here by the Government, right?

9

MR. LIEBESKIND:

Yes.

10

JUDGE GINSBURG:

So, I gather from what you were

11

just saying that even if the retail sales data -- pardon

12

me, the sales -- yes, the retail sales data were a

13

perfect proxy for the sales to retailers, all right, for

14

the market that you have said they should have been

15

looking at, even that would not adequately capture the

16

fact that you have to pay for shelf space.

17
18
19

MR. LIEBESKIND:

I think that is the same thing

as saying it's not a perfect proxy, Your Honor.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

Well, it could be simply that

20

those prices per unit don't flow through exactly.

21

is what I had in mind earlier.

That

22

MR. LIEBESKIND:

Well, that's correct.

23

JUDGE GINSBURG:

But no, I am not talking about

24

marginal price.

25

shelf space.

I am saying you have got to pay for

That is not a marginal price, all right,
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but it is part of whether a price is sustainable for

2

you.

3

MR. LIEBESKIND:

It surely is, and we can debate

4

whether or not it is marginal pricing.

5

is better than mine if my math is better than yours.

6

JUDGE WOOD:

Your accounting

And also, that payment for shelf

7

space has a lot to do with the quantity that you expect

8

you are going to be distributing.

9
10

MR. LIEBESKIND:
JUDGE WOOD:

Absolutely.

If you would rather take your

11

profits in high prices and lower quantities, you might

12

not need to get very much extra shelf space.

13

MR. LIEBESKIND:

Well, if you are in a market

14

where there are large and powerful supermarkets and the

15

only way you can get to consumers is by getting in

16

there, you may not have that option.

17

to get in there.

18

JUDGE GINSBURG:

You may just need

Counsel, I think you said among

19

your five points was that the -- if I got it

20

correctly -- that the whole unilateral effects approach

21

does not meet the statutory standard, or maybe it's as

22

applied here.

23

MR. LIEBESKIND:

Well, I think it's as applied

24

not only here but to differentiated products in the

25

retail space, and the point there, as I am sure Your
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1

Honors are familiar with, is that this analysis that's

2

being applied here, this unilateral effects diversion

3

analysis, to yield a post-merger price increase as a

4

result of a merger simulation exercise, that predicts a

5

price increase in any merger of any two people in a

6

differentiated product space -- now, it might be bigger,

7

it might be smaller -- but in any given merger, it is

8

going to predict a price increase if you ignore or don't

9

have efficiencies, repositioning, entry, all the other

10

things that the Merger Guidelines put out by the

11

Government tell us we should look at.

12

JUDGE WOOD:

So, am I understanding you

13

correctly that you can never, in your view, use

14

unilateral effects analysis if it is a differentiated

15

consumer products market?

16

MR. LIEBESKIND:

Use it -- use it to prove a

17

market, if I may finish your question, Your Honor, and

18

that is the point I want to use.

19

JUDGE WOOD:

Well, are they using it to prove a

20

market or are they trying more directly, which the case

21

law has certainly been moving toward in recent years --

22

actually, for some time now -- are they trying just to

23

prove anticompetitive effects?

24

market if you have shown anticompetitive effects?

25

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Who cares about the

There must be a market out
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2
3
4
5
6

there somewhere.
MR. LIEBESKIND:

There surely is a market for

ice cream, and perhaps -JUDGE GINSBURG:

But if there are these effects,

then there must be a market out there.
MR. LIEBESKIND:

Well, that gets back to the

7

question of whether the effects are substantial and

8

whether the effects are large enough to really be worthy

9

of noticing whether you are noticing anything worth

10

noticing, because when you have a -- when you start with

11

a model that -- we don't have actual evidence of effects

12

in the sense that it historically happened here, if we

13

are talking about the econometrics.

14

about is a prediction, based on a mathematical formula,

15

that says every merger will lead to an effect --

What we are talking

16

JUDGE GINSBURG:

The effects are --

17

MR. LIEBESKIND:

-- no matter how small.

18

JUDGE GINSBURG:

-- historically the effect we

19

have is that Higbee enters at a lower price than the two

20

incumbents, and then the predictive question is what

21

happens if Higbee essentially exits by becoming a part

22

of one of them.

23

MR. LIEBESKIND:

Right.

And if you say we are

24

going to put on blinders and we are going to assume that

25

there will be no entry, there will be no repositioning
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despite the evidence of repositioning that we have seen,

2

there will be no entry despite the fact -- despite what

3

Higbee, in fact, did, and there will be no efficiencies,

4

then the theory -- I am not disputing the theory of the

5

mathematical calculation.

6

disputing that you are going to have a price increase --

7

if you use this model, if you ignore everything else,

8

you will have a price increase in any merger of any two

9

companies.

10
11

What I am saying -- I am not

That is exactly my point.

JUDGE WOOD:

But it all gets back to the record,

though --

12

MR. LIEBESKIND:

13

JUDGE WOOD:

That can't be the law.

Well, these are very fact-specific

14

situations.

Obviously there are some cases in which

15

courts have found anticompetitive problems, and I am

16

thinking of the Staples case, for example, based on

17

similar kinds of data; others not.

18

I don't see Dr. Pangloss, your expert,

19

emphasizing, "Here are the companies that are poised to

20

enter to defeat the market power."

21

quite a unilateral effects argument, but nonetheless,

22

you have, I think, strayed a bit beyond that, so I was

23

going to, also.

24
25

MR. LIEBESKIND:

I realize that's not

Well, Your Honor, I think

whether or not Dr. Pangloss said it, it's in the
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1

evidence before you, and my suggestion to Your Honors is

2

that it is your right to look at the entire record and

3

see that evidence, see the evidence of what Higbee

4

actually did, see the evidence of what Alfred's actually

5

did, and draw your own conclusions for it.

6

need an expert to get there.

7

JUDGE WOOD:

You don't

What about Mr. Bloom's response on

8

Alfred's, that their price is still so far below --

9

maybe it is 2.6 times -- yes.

10
11

MR. LIEBESKIND:

So, consumers were getting a

bargain.

12

JUDGE WOOD:

Maybe.

13

MR. LIEBESKIND:

I mean, in fact, Higbee's

14

responded.

15

chocolate-covered their beans or they added another

16

flavor.

17

Alfred's.

18

firm that is purportedly not in the market.

19

you --

20
21

They put in more beans or they

They did what they did.

They responded to

So, there was a competitive response to this

JUDGE GINSBURG:

That tells

Well, it was tiptoeing into the

market with that product.

22

MR. LIEBESKIND:

And my point exactly, Your

23

Honor.

There's room to enter this market.

The market's

24

been defined as butterfat above 14 percent, whereas

25

butterfat of 13 percent is in the other market.

So, you
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have to increase your butterfat by 1 percent and

2

increase your price by 300 percent, and you are in the

3

market.

4

keep your -- that you can't raise your price.

5

It can't be an entry barrier that you have to

JUDGE WOOD:

Well, apparently there is much more

6

to it than that.

That's why I commented to your

7

opponent that in some ways these facts indicate to me

8

that there aren't huge differences, and yet I could say

9

the same thing about all sorts of consumer markets.

You

10

know, what is the difference between a Calvin Klein polo

11

shirt and the sort of thing I'd go buy at Target?

12

are both made of cloth; somebody sewed them.

13

they are -- maybe they are all in the same market; maybe

14

they are not.

15

difference, I assure you.

16

They

I mean,

There is the same kind of price

MR. LIEBESKIND:

If I could invent that -- if I

17

could invent facts, I will invent a true fact, which is

18

across the street from a supermarket in my neighborhood,

19

there is a place where a guy makes his own ice cream,

20

and that is not in this market either.

21

of whether or not you have access to the shelf space,

22

which brings us back to that point.

23
24
25

JUDGE GINSBURG:

It is a matter

Counsel, on repositioning, is

the experience of Alfred's the only record evidence?
MR. LIEBESKIND:

Other than Higbee itself.
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1

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Other than Higbee itself.

2

MR. LIEBESKIND:

So, I've got two.

3

JUDGE GINSBURG:

And that's your burden, isn't

MR. LIEBESKIND:

My burden to show entry?

4
5
6
7
8
9

it?
I

don't think so, Your Honor.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

No, to show that repositioning

mitigates any concern that the Government's raised.
MR. LIEBESKIND:

Not under the Baker Hughes

10

framework, not as I understand it, Your Honor.

11

understanding is it is the defense's burden to come

12

forward with evidence.

13

on the Government in all time frames.

14

statement in Baker Hughes.

15

my burden other than to come forward with the evidence.

The burden of persuasion remains
That is the

So, I would say that is not

16

JUDGE GINSBURG:

17

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

18

My

Anything else?
Would the Court like to

hear from Mr. Bloom again?

19

JUDGE GINSBURG:

20

MR. BLOOM:

21

JUDGE GINSBURG:

22

Mr. Bloom, could you pick up where your brother

23
24
25

Sure, yes, please.

Sure.
This is too much fun.

left off with respect to the burden on repositioning?
MR. BLOOM:

Yes.

The issue is one in which I

believe the burden of coming forward has switched to the

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

158
1

defendants in this action.

They need to come forward

2

with enough evidence to put that issue fairly back in

3

play.

I suggest to you that they --

4

JUDGE WOOD:

I notice you're saying very

5

carefully to come forward.

6

the burden of persuasion throughout, as he said.

7

MR. BLOOM:

You concede that you have

Ultimately, on the question of

8

competitive harm, the Government has the burden of proof

9

throughout this matter, yes, Your Honor.

10

But let's, again, go back to this question of

11

entry.

What has the defendant produced?

12

that the defendant has produced is the fact that

13

Higbee's was the sole firm -- despite the existence of a

14

highly profitable duopoly -- to successfully invade this

15

market space over a protracted period of time.

16
17

JUDGE GINSBURG:

MR. BLOOM:

22

No.

There are other efforts

suggested in the record of failure, I believe.

20
21

Well, it's the only one that

tried, isn't it?

18
19

The only fact

JUDGE GINSBURG:

I didn't pick that up.

Where

is that?
MR. BLOOM:

But if I may, Your Honor, even if I

23

am wrong on that, the fact of the matter is the

24

contention of the defendant is that if Higbee's prices

25

go up 5 percent, this is going to invite entry.

That
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begs the question of why, then, there were not other

2

entry attempts in the prior -- in the period prior to

3

Higbee's entry where the market presented precisely the

4

same situation as it will with a post-acquisition price

5

increase.

6

JUDGE WOOD:

So, we have evidence for about a

7

five-year period in this particular record?

8

trying to think how far back it goes, because it is a

9

little truncated.

10
11
12

JUDGE GINSBURG:

I am just

I think we have three years

since Higbee entered.
MR. BLOOM:

Yes, and, Your Honor, I believe the

13

record is not perfectly clear on the time at which

14

Tressel and Incline themselves became the pioneers in

15

this market.

16

to the --

17

It seems to be at least a few years prior

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Well, it says that they

18

introduced superpremiums --

19

JUDGE WOOD:

20

JUDGE GINSBURG:

21

MR. BLOOM:

22

The number -- what -- it's important to

2003.
-- in 2003, yes.

2003.

23

understand that the standard for repositioning is not

24

could someone.

25

"would someone".

It's not an abstract question.

It's a

And we have empirical evidence in the
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absence of entry prior to Higbee, the absence of perhaps

2

entry efforts.

3

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Well, the superpremiums come

4

along in late 2003 and 2004.

5

ago.

6

maybe early 2005.

7

and they took it, and I am not sure why you are saying

8

that if the opportunity is restored, in the event the

9

merger goes through and the price goes up, someone else

10

Higbee entered three years

So, that's, when this record was compiled, 2004 or
So, there was an opportunity there,

couldn't take that opportunity.

11

MR. BLOOM:

Well, Your Honor, let's take a look

12

at what has to happen.

First of all, the repositioning

13

has to be sufficient to replace the loss of Higbee.

14

Higbee is, as are the other superpremium firms, a

15

national operator.

16

that the relevant geographic market is national.

It's been stipulated in this matter

17

A firm, in order to enter that market from the

18

premium space, would have to establish a collection of

19

recipes; would have to develop facilities to produce

20

those tasty and exciting arrays of superpremium ice

21

creams.

22

distribution system --

23

They would have to build a direct-to-retailer

JUDGE WOOD:

Could I just maybe, since I think

24

our time is getting short, summarize this?

If I

25

understand your position, it's really just that if
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there's this gigantic price gap between the premiums and

2

the superpremiums, and since 2003, when Higbee starts

3

introducing its brand, to the present, nobody else has

4

tried to come in, the question is, why should we think

5

there are people out there who are walking away from

6

these profits?

7

MR. BLOOM:

That, Your Honor, and the utter

8

absence in the record of any evidence that any person is

9

planning entry, is contemplating entry, is putting

10

together the distribution system necessary to effectuate

11

that entry.

12

JUDGE GINSBURG:

The last question I have on the

13

critical loss analysis is this:

14

expert's position, that if more than 5.7 percent of the

15

unit sales lost as a result of a 3 percent price

16

increase for Higbee's superpremium were captured as

17

Tressel's superpremium sales, then the price increase

18

would be profitable, right?

19

MR. BLOOM:

20

JUDGE GINSBURG:

I think this is your

That's correct, Your Honor.
Okay.

And is there more to

21

tell us that that would, in fact, happen, more than 5

22

percent -- 5.7 percent of the unit sales would be

23

captured by Tressel's?

24
25

MR. BLOOM:
human experience.

I think there is, and it rests in
The group that we are focused --
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2

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Is that part of this

econometric analysis?

3

MR. BLOOM:

It is not part of the econometric

4

analysis except insofar as this chart's cross-elasticity

5

of demands and explains the lack of price sensitivity --

6

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Okay, now, if Higbee's price

7

gets to where it's the same as Tressel's, why would

8

anyone switch from Higbee's to Tressel's?

9

being priced out by the increase, they can go to

10

premium.

11

If they are

Why would they go to Tressel's superpremium?
MR. BLOOM:

Let's address that question in this

12

way:

13

differentiated products market unilateral action case

14

are those consumers here who have a preference for

15

superpremium ice cream.

16

purchasing notwithstanding the great price disparity.

17

The consumers about whom we are concerned in a

18

JUDGE WOOD:

That is what they are

That's these young, trendy people

who don't care about their weight?

19

MR. BLOOM:

And apparently a few others, Your

20

Honor.

The question that I would pose to Your Honor is,

21

if those consumers are willing to pay three times

22

premium prices, and some of them have to sustain a 5

23

percent price increase to remain in the premium -- in

24

the superpremium segment.

25

notwithstanding their willingness to pay three times

Is it reasonable to expect,
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premium prices, that they will not choose, in large

2

part -- and we only need, I think we said, 5.7

3

percent --

4

JUDGE GINSBURG:

5

MR. BLOOM:

Yes.

-- that a significant number of

6

them, far more than that, will choose to remain in the

7

superpremium segment?

8
9

There are --

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Okay, first of all, they are

not paying the same three times because of the 5 percent

10

price differential, right?

11

MR. BLOOM:

12

JUDGE GINSBURG:

13

They are paying --

Correct.
-- less than the two market

leaders' prices.

14

MR. BLOOM:

That's correct.

15

JUDGE GINSBURG:

So, their willingness to buy

16

superpremium is fragile.

17

where it's the same for all three.

18

now say, "I am not only willing to pay the higher price,

19

but I am willing to pay it for a different product that

20

I wasn't willing to pay it for yesterday?"

21

MR. BLOOM:

Now, the price goes up to
Why would someone

There is no question but that the

22

revealed preference of those who purchase Higbee's

23

today, the superpremium, at 5 percent less than the

24

market leaders, have a preference for that product at

25

that price.

But it seems to me that when you are asking
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about a 5 percent price change, it is highly implausible

2

to think that fewer than 5.7 percent will divert to

3

Tressel in the event of the loss of an independent

4

competitor.

5
6

JUDGE GINSBURG:
correct?

7

MR. BLOOM:

8

JUDGE GINSBURG:

9

But that is just intuitive,

I would say that it -So, if we don't share your

intuition, we have a problem.

10

MR. BLOOM:

I am sorry, Your Honor?

11

JUDGE GINSBURG:

If the court does not share

12

your intuition, then what?

13

MR. BLOOM:

I think if the court doesn't share

14

my intuition, the court ought to look at the empirical

15

evidence of Dr. Pangloss, which -- excuse me, of

16

Dr. Cassandra, which looks at thousands upon thousands

17

of transactions and calculates cross-elasticities to

18

determine that there is a relevant market here and that

19

consumers will be injured in that relevant market.

20

Consistency of that information and the testimony of --

21

JUDGE GINSBURG:

The sustainability of a price

22

increase and of re-entry depends upon something for

23

which there are no data.

24

MR. BLOOM:

If you are referring to --

25

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Namely, what will happen -- no,
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what will happen to the customers who now find a 5

2

percent increase for Higbee?

3

MR. BLOOM:

I beg to differ, Your Honor.

The

4

analysis of cross-elasticity of demand conducted by

5

Dr. Cassandra empirically answers the question of

6

whether critical loss will or will not be exceeded by

7

actual loss.

8

testifying expert did not do, finding --

9
10
11
12

It does the thing that the defendants'

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Well, both of the critical

sentences begin with the word "if."
MR. BLOOM:

Well, that's the calculation of the

diversion ratio.

13

JUDGE GINSBURG:

14

MR. BLOOM:

Okay.

But if you look at the initial

15

empirical work, the econometric survey, that study tells

16

you that a price increase will be profitable, and

17

absolutely --

18

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Well, that work is, I guess,

19

summed up in the sentence that says, from your expert,

20

"that the analysis of retail scanner data implicitly

21

indicates that the combined firm would employ pricing

22

strategies under which actual loss would not exceed

23

critical loss."

24

MR. BLOOM:

That is correct.

25

JUDGE GINSBURG:

But that is also a tautology,
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is not it?

2

pricing strategy in which actual loss exceeded critical

3

loss.

4

In other words, no firm would pursue a

MR. BLOOM:

It is certainly not intended as a

5

tautology, and the testimony is clear on this point.

6

What Dr. Cassandra is saying is that her econometric

7

study says that there will be a post-acquisition price

8

increase in a superpremium ice cream market.

9

that the actual loss will be less than the critical

That means

10

loss.

11

critical loss analysis done by defendants' economist

12

through the econometric study involving testing of

13

supply -- excuse me, of price-demand elasticities over

14

thousands and thousands of products, looking each

15

transaction against each other.

16

JUDGE GINSBURG:

17

MR. BLOOM:

18

She has answered the unanswered question in the

misspoke.

Thousands of products?

Thousands of transactions.

Forgive me.

19

JUDGE GINSBURG:

20

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

21
22
23

I

Thank you.
Would the panel like to

hear at all further from Mr. Liebeskind?
JUDGE GINSBURG:

I don't think he wants to take

that chance.

24

MR. LIEBESKIND:

No.

25

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Thank you, Counsel.
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Thanks to Michael and Rick for very helpfully going

2

through the hypothetical with the panel.

3

spend the few minutes we have left posing a couple of

4

questions about the methodological issues that lie

5

behind the exercise.

6

I'd like to

I suspect at the time that all of us, and

7

certainly our two judges, began teaching competition law

8

and teaching the evaluation and assessment of market

9

power, the starting point in the traditional framework

10

was to use the circumstantial approach of defining a

11

relevant market and using market shares as a basis for

12

inferring market power.

13

but perhaps even earlier from Indiana Federation of

14

Dentists, comes the suggestion that that is, perhaps, a

15

second-best approach to dealing with the underlying

16

question of market power.

17

From the '92 Guidelines onward,

I was wondering if you were going back to the

18

classroom and teaching again, how would you reconcile or

19

at least think about these two streams of analysis; that

20

is, the traditional approach that relied on market

21

shares, and to what extent has the alternative, direct

22

approach come to complement or perhaps even would it

23

displace in some instance the traditional framework?

24
25

JUDGE WOOD:

Well, I will say a word about that.

Maybe it's because I taught too long at the University
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of Chicago, but it seems to me that it has been

2

recognized for a very long time that the market share

3

approach was a means to an end and not something that

4

was independently interesting, and people would wring

5

their hands about different ways in which you might get

6

it wrong with markets; you might define the market too

7

broadly and miss a transaction that was going to create

8

market power or vice versa.

9

And there was a thought abroad, for a long time,

10

that it was really just too hard to ask the question

11

that you really wanted the answer to, the direct

12

economic question, whether it is about own elasticities

13

of demand or whether it is about actual anticompetitive

14

effects in the market, and as you say, beginning with

15

the dentists case, the Supreme Court and, of course, the

16

agencies, that was an FTC case, and others began to say,

17

"Well, maybe it is not impossible to do this.

18

can think better about how to do this."

19

Maybe we

Then if you fast-forward to the FTC's Staples

20

case, which, of course, was one where, again, the

21

challenge to the transaction prevailed, there is a lot

22

of data out there these days that was not around when,

23

you know, the decade of -- or the century, really, the

24

20th Century was unfolding when the old approach was

25

developed.
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So, I think today, if you were teaching it, you

2

would say, "Here is the ultimate question:

There are a

3

number of different means to that end.

4

probably still going to be defining a market, but there

5

are others that are probably better."

6

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

7

JUDGE GINSBURG:

One of them is

Doug?

Well, I haven't gone back and

8

looked at it with this question in mind for today, but

9

it seems to me that we kind of got over it in Polygram.

10

That was -- for the D.C. Circuit, anyway, that was a

11

pretty big step in the direction that we are talking

12

about today.

13

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Yes.

Yes, indeed.

14

In the discussion that you had with Michael and

15

Rick about the use of quantitative methods, am I right

16

in sensing that a fundamental question for advocates for

17

agencies is -- and maybe it goes to the questions that

18

both of you posed -- is, in using these techniques to

19

have in mind the sensitivity of the analysis to small

20

adjustments in assumptions; that is, that a panel will

21

want to know how rugged the technique is in the face of

22

possible adjustments about data or assumptions.

23

When you look at quantitative data of this kind,

24

am I right to think that that's a question that you or

25

your colleagues, the typical trial judge, might want to
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be attentive to?

2

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Well, yes, but it has to be

3

made accessible.

4

example of making it accessible when he used the car

5

models.

6

suggested, to the kind of cars judges are familiar with,

7

Camrys and Kias and things like that.

8

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

9
10
11

I thought Professor Willig gave a good

I think you would want to scale it down, as he

TR4s, Porsche 918s,

little cars, yes, yes.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

Right.

So, I think that was

very useful.

12

Similarly, I think that presenting -- this whole

13

metaphor of space can be usefully presented graphically.

14

It's easier to grasp if it's literally portrayed.

15

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

16

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Yes.

I am sure if you think back, no

17

one in this room took an antitrust course in which

18

transactions and relationships were not diagrammed in

19

virtually every case on the blackboard, and yet it never

20

appears in the brief and rarely in expert testimony, and

21

yet it was the obvious way, at least for some people a

22

more efficient way, of absorbing material.

23

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

24

JUDGE GINSBURG:

25

Yes.

And as well as the homey

example that Professor Willig gave.
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JUDGE WOOD:

Yes, I think that the first thing

2

Doug said is really important.

It's got to be

3

accessible, and I know, for myself, when I am looking at

4

these kinds of things and when I read opinions from

5

other judges who we would all agree are excellent in

6

this area, making clear the chain of reasoning and

7

making clear what set of assumptions are being made to

8

begin with and then what tests were run, what studies

9

were done to test those assumptions, is absolutely

10

vital, because the judge has a responsibility under

11

Evidence Rule 702, under Daubert, if you want to think

12

of it that way, although purists will say this is a 702

13

question at this point.

14

You have to evaluate the soundness of that

15

methodology, and you will see a judge saying, "Well, you

16

have made an assumption here," just as Judge Ginsburg

17

was saying during our argument, "and it's too big.

18

puts too much of what we really need to pull out and

19

test into that assumption."

20

paper for the judge, that won't come out, and obviously

21

one side or the other is going to have an incentive to

22

do that vis-a-vis the kinds of studies that have been

23

made.

24
25

But if that's not put on

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:
of graphical presentations.

It

I am thinking of the use

I am thinking about a case
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that features prominently in one of Judge Wood's

2

opinions, known well to this audience, Toys "R" Us.

3

am wondering if anyone has ever taught Interstate

4

Circuit without attempting to construct the hub and

5

spoke on the blackboard with the relevant parties and

6

how that presentation of evidence might be a useful

7

guide for how to make the presentation accessible.

8
9

I

As one of the comments on the earlier panels
mentioned, Judge Hogan's subsequent reflections on

10

Staples said that what really caught his attention were

11

the documentary records.

12

interesting, but that did not really cause him to turn

13

his head.

14

JUDGE GINSBURG:

The econometrics were

But you have to prepare for the

15

case where you do not have the documents, where what you

16

have got is the econometric evidence.

17

that -- that is the challenge, to present that case

18

without taking things out of the mouths of the parties.

19

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

That is the one

Is there a methodology,

20

just in general terms, that is likely to be more

21

effective; that is, in thinking how to frame and present

22

the case where that's what you have?

23

JUDGE WOOD:

Well, it always seems to me that a

24

person ought to be able to explain why these were the

25

right questions to ask.

Why should I think this
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econometric test is going to tell me anything about

2

that?

3

the company, concern.

4

Ph.D. economist.

5

got to be able to say to people, "This is what we are

6

grappling with," and if you can say it to the CEO, you

7

ought to be able to say it to a judge as well.

8
9

I envision, you know, maybe somewhere, even in
There is somebody who's not a

Maybe it's the CEO.

JUDGE GINSBURG:

I mean, you have

Ronald Coase, with whom I

studied, was then editor of the Journal of Law and

10

Economics, and he said he wouldn't publish an article

11

that had any nontrivial econometrics in it, because it

12

was his view that if the author couldn't explain himself

13

in English, he probably didn't know what he was talking

14

about.

15

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

16

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Yes.

That's a useful guide, because

17

your audience of a judge, of three judges, may not be

18

able to follow that as readily.

19

it in English; you want to -- the underlying econometric

20

evidence, and you want to have a homey example.

21
22

If I can get 40 seconds to illustrate the last
point?

23

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

24

JUDGE GINSBURG:

25

So, you want to present

Absolutely, yes.

What was it -- was it Monsanto

in which the Government or the Department, were going to
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file a brief on our PI and the Congress stopped us?

2

JUDGE WOOD:

Yes, an appropriations rider.

3

JUDGE GINSBURG:

It was an appropriations rider.

4

Before the argument in which -- remember, Bill Baxter,

5

Professor Baxter, couldn't answer one of the questions

6

because of the appropriations rider.

7

that brief, he was called to the White House, to the

8

Oval Office, to answer the President's question of why

9

are we doing this?

Before we filed

What is -- somebody had gotten to

10

the President, maybe it was Charlton Heston or

11

something, and said, "This is a bad idea," and the

12

President didn't say, "I will stop it."

13

will look into it."

14

what you are up to."

15

is what he did.

He said, "I

So, he called up and said, "Tell me
So, Bill went over there, and this

This is 1983, maybe '82?

16

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

17

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Yes, 1983.

He said, "Mr. President,

18

imagine that you have a record store across the street

19

from K-Mart."

20

remember record stores?

21

to your record store and listen to records in the

22

listening booths, and if they like them, they go across

23

and buy them, not for 99 cents from you, but for 79

24

cents from K-Mart, which does not have any listening

25

booths."

Now, you all remember K-Mart, and you
He said, "And customers come in

Now, this was brilliant advocacy.

There
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hadn't been any listening booths for more than 20 years,

2

but the President could understand that, and it was not

3

the least bit disingenuous.

4

correctly.

5

It made the point

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

When I think of those who

6

have had perhaps the most formative role in integrating

7

economic concepts into the development of legal

8

principles in this area, I think of people like Judge

9

Posner, I think of Bill Baxter, I think of Ernie

10

Gellhorn, Phil Areeda, and Betty Bock, who as a group

11

had such a facility for telling a narrative that

12

brought, by use of examples, by use of logic, made the

13

reasoning accessible.

14

classroom and elsewhere, the challenge for the modern

15

narrators is to do the same with high-powered

16

quantitative techniques, especially for an audience that

17

has been running away from mathematics since junior high

18

school.

19

I sense for myself in the

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Well, judges, at least as much

20

as lawyers in general, tend to be not well educated in

21

mathematics, let alone economics.

22

overwhelmingly liberal arts majors who studied history

23

and political science, English literature, and so on,

24

and have never -- they had to take some requisite,

25

limited amount of math, perhaps in college, maybe not --

They are
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2

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:
college transcript here?

3

JUDGE GINSBURG:

4

to it since or had occasion to.

5

Did I leave a copy of my

-- and they haven't gone back

Now, I mean, there is a -- I could give you an

6

oral brief for having generalist judges, but it does

7

create a challenge for a specialized body of knowledge.

8
9

JUDGE WOOD:

And it really creates -- it puts a

huge responsibility on you, the bar, to deal with us

10

generalized judges, and as Ronald Coase put it, to boil

11

it down to something that we will understand.

12

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

I want to thank our

13

panelists, to thank Michael and Rick for being good

14

sports and going through the example so skillfully, and

15

especially to thank our two judges, who here were trial

16

judges, but I assure you they passed the trial.

17

you for just a wonderful presentation and for making

18

this the kind of afternoon that I think many of us will

19

remember for a long time.

20

Thank you.

21

(Applause.)

22

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Thank

I'd like to invite my

23

colleague Tom Rosch with his collection of stellar

24

panelists, Bill Baer, Susan Creighton, Dick Rapp, and

25

Connie Robinson.
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(Pause in the proceedings.)

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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PANEL 4:

2

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES RELATED

3

TO PROVING UNILATERAL EFFECTS

4
5

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Good afternoon, everybody.

6

I think it's probably a good thing if we get started,

7

because we have got a lot of ground to cover in a very

8

short period of time.

9

Let me first introduce the panelists.

It is a

10

very distinguished group of people, and I think it will

11

help frame the discussion if you know a little bit about

12

their backgrounds.

13

On my immediate right is Susan Creighton, who is

14

Co-Chair of the Antitrust Practice at Wilson Sonsini.

15

Susan originally hailed from my part of the country,

16

which is Northern California, but has ended up back

17

here, and she is obviously well-versed in this subject,

18

having served as director of the Bureau of Competition

19

at the FTC.

20

clerked for both Pam Rymer in the Ninth Circuit and also

21

for Justice Sandra Day O'Connor at the Supreme Court.

22

I will only mention beyond that that she

Second, I'd like to introduce Connie Robinson,

23

who in a previous life was the career deputy at the

24

Justice Department, a very distinguished antitrust

25

practitioner.

I am very grateful to her for coming out

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

179
1

to California every year to participate in the

2

Practicing Law Institute panel out there and deliver

3

remarks with respect to merger analysis.

4

Kilpatrick Stockton, and she's Deputy Chair of their

5

Complex Business Litigation Team.

6

She's now at

Third is Dick Rapp, an old friend who was

7

formerly the President and Chairman of NERA, and he's

8

testified in innumerable antitrust cases of all stripes,

9

including a number, frankly, I think, Dick, where I was

10

lucky enough to be on the defense side, and I had the

11

benefit of his services.

12

our resident economist, on this panel.

13

So, he will be our economist,

And finally, we have the sage or the old sage

14

who's going to be the resident litigator, and obviously

15

you all know him.

16

Porter, and he heads their Antitrust Group.

17

say that he has a little bit of a conservative stripe in

18

him that I didn't realize, because he went to the

19

Stanford Law School.

20

That is Bill Baer from Arnold &
I should

Now, let me just tell you what we plan to do

21

today, because it is going to be a little bit different

22

from what the other panels have been like.

23

to discuss evidentiary issues relating to proving

24

unilateral effects, and basically what we are going to

25

be talking about is what the second panel this morning

We are going
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talked about, which is how do you prove your case in a

2

merger case, and more specifically, in a unilateral

3

effects case?

4

We will begin with a discussion of general

5

principles.

6

econometric and noneconometric economic evidence, a

7

subject that was covered today.

8

the role of noneconomic evidence.

9

to trial strategy.

10
11

We will then move to the role of

We will then move on to
And then we will move

And then we will conclude with a

discussion of weighing the different kinds of evidence.
And what we are going to do to cover those

12

subjects is to ask a panelist or two to address the

13

subject first and then throw the floor open so that the

14

other panelists can comment on what has just been said

15

or elaborate on it.

16

principles, and on that subject, there are two folks who

17

are going to be kicking us off here.

18

So, let us begin with the general

One of them is Dick Rapp from an economic

19

standpoint, and the other is going to be Sue Creighton

20

with respect to the legal standpoint, and we are going

21

to follow, segue, from what was discussed earlier this

22

afternoon, which is the framework for analysis that is

23

available today, what is the proper framework, from an

24

economist's standpoint, from a legal standpoint, and

25

what does that have to teach us about how one should
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present their case?

2

So, do you want to start, then, Dick, please?

3

MR. RAPP:

Sure.

And I wonder -- it's up to

4

you, but others this morning spoke from the podium.

5

Since your intention is to make this largely a panel

6

discussion and to keep these fairly short, I am just

7

happy to do it from here if that's the way you would --

8

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

9

MR. RAPP:

10

That is fine.

Okay, if that's all right with

everybody.

11

It seems to me that stage-setting on general

12

principles after what we have just heard and after this

13

morning's excellent panel is almost unnecessary, so I

14

will just add a few glosses of my own to what people

15

already know.

16

and we have been discussing -- we have already delved

17

deeply.

18

This is an expert audience to begin with,

Let me just start from the Merger Guidelines.

19

Observe, as has been done this morning, that there is a

20

part of unilateral effects that we are not going to be

21

talking about much; that is, the most elementary form of

22

market power, the unilateral ability of a firm to

23

control enough output to raise price all by itself.

24

comes, notably, at the end of the unilateral section,

25

and the majority of Section 2 of the Merger Guidelines
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is about differentiated products.

2

Much has been said about that, and all that I

3

will add, for those who happen to be beginners in the

4

room, is that one way of conceptualizing it, the way

5

that I do, is to think about products as nothing more

6

than collections of product characteristics and then to

7

locate them in some kind of astronomical space that

8

represents the widest of all possible markets.

9

Cars, if you are talking about BMWs and Kias and

10

what have you.

11

Raisin Bran and Special K are somewhere down here; Count

12

Chocula and Lucky Charms are out there; maybe those

13

granolas that they sell at Whole Foods, along the price

14

dimension, are out there somewhere, neither up, down,

15

but in the middle and out in front; then somewhere

16

behind me is Albertson's white box corn flakes.

17

So, if it's not cars but cereals, then

Bobby Willig's story of generalized versus local

18

competition is not one that is immediately consistent

19

with this point of view, and I am not sure that I share

20

it.

21

notion of gerrymandering markets, which we heard this

22

morning, or submarkets doesn't really come into it very

23

much.

24

proximity, where product characteristics include price

25

as well as other things that consumers care about.

One thing about this point of view is that the

It is purely an issue of product characteristic
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To tie that, as background, to the subject of

2

the panel, let me just rehearse for you, again, things

3

that have been mentioned at length today but never

4

listed, and that is the types of economic evidence that

5

go along with this.

6

elasticity, which have been in the antitrust and merger

7

literature since before Brown Shoe; diversion ratios;

8

critical loss analysis.

9

critical loss analysis, that it involves profit margins,

They are own price and cross-price

And I will mention about

10

and that profits and profit margins, even gross profit

11

margins, where what we are trying to seek is only the

12

incremental margin, is itself problematical.

13

think that has been mentioned, but we might dive into

14

that at some point.

15

I don't

I will add merger simulation without further

16

mention of it, and I want to add to this list natural

17

experiments and distinguish natural experiments that

18

improve our intuition in native form and natural

19

experiments controlled by econometrics, an important

20

distinction, I think.

21

stage pretty well.

22

And I think that that sets the

The key points are, first of all, I went through

23

that whole story without once using the term "relevant

24

market," so you know which party I am a member of, and

25

second, the importance of econometrics is sure to come
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up in this conversation, not only in its technical

2

guise, but in the form of control over the things that

3

tend to inform, informally, people's intuitions.

4

for a start.

That's

5

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

6

Susan?

7

MS. CREIGHTON:

8

So, I wanted to kick off the lawyerly part of

9

Sure.

Thank you, Dick.

Thank you, Commissioner.

our discussion by focusing on the way Commissioner Rosch

10

posed the question to us.

11

the Guidelines articulate a framework that is defining a

12

market first and then moving to competitive effects

13

second for assessing unilateral effects that is

14

workable?

15

because I couldn't possibly match the academics and

16

economists and judges who have been speaking.

17

The first question was, do

And I wanted to focus on the "workable" part,

So, at the risk of being contradicted by at

18

least half the room, who share the same experience that

19

I do, let me hypothesize, and then you can rebut after

20

the end of this panel, but at least during the time that

21

I was at the Commission, between 2001 and 2005, it was

22

my observation that whether or not that sort of

23

sequential framework is a workable one or could have

24

been a workable one, in practice, it was not what we did

25

do, which is to say that I thought staff, in preparing

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

185
1

their memos, you know, would be following the

2

Guidelines, and there would be a first section on

3

antitrust, sort of on market definition, but at least at

4

the front office level, we'd be in discussions with

5

staff from long before we saw any memos discussing the

6

merits of the case, and during all those discussions, I

7

can't really recall, in the back and forth, very much,

8

if any, discussion in deciding is this a good case or

9

not, any real discussion about market definition.

10

Rather, we were focused on whether we could show

11

competitive effects; what were going to be sort of the

12

effects of entry, repositioning, so forth.

13

really only very late in the game, at least as best I

14

can recall, when we were getting the memos ready for the

15

Commissioners, that we would start to seriously say,

16

"Okay, so, what are we saying is going to be the product

17

market?

18

And it was

And what is going to be the geographic market?"
So, let me -- just to crystallize that, let me

19

give one concrete example where I can recall this

20

occurred.

21

one where we had data very much like that which the

22

Commission relied upon in Staples, only it was even more

23

robust, reflecting the fact that data kept by companies

24

has gotten better in the future, since then.

25

result of this data, which involved the combination of

Some of you may recall the case, but it was

As a
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some retail stores, it looked like we had some very

2

clear and direct data showing that when the two merging

3

parties had stores right next to each other, there was a

4

very strong discounting effect, and when they were a

5

little further away, there was less discounting, and

6

then when they were even further away, there was less,

7

and so on.

8

Now, the parties had been arguing that there was

9

an online supplier that should be considered as part of

10

the market, but, you know, I have to say, as part of our

11

analysis, we were thinking, who cares, because they are

12

universally there sort of throughout the country, and

13

it's not making this geographic effect go away.

14

Similarly, the parties had pointed to some other less

15

close competitors in the space, and the data seemed to

16

show that while those competitors acted as some kind of

17

constraint on price, the clear price effect persisted,

18

again, depending on how close competitors had in terms

19

of how close their stores were.

20

So, we thought at that point that we had a great

21

competitive effects case, but then when it came to the

22

point of actually sending up the memos, we said, "Okay,

23

so, now, is this online supplier in the market or not?

24

Are these other retail competitors in the market?"

25

depending on how you defined it, if you included those
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other retail competitors, the HHIs basically dropped

2

through the floor, and you had no case at all.

3

Commissioners' offices were saying, "Are you seriously

4

proposing a market that excludes those people?

5

sounds totally gerrymandered."

But the

That

6

So, we were facing the question of if we were

7

going to go to court, might we never even get to that

8

competitive effects data?

9

out the gate with a market that sounded too contrived to

10
11

Might we lose really right

the court?
So, I remember raising this issue with the

12

Department of Justice at the time that we were starting

13

to work on the commentary to the Guidelines that

14

eventually came out in 2006 and suggesting that perhaps

15

the agencies needed to be doing more to be educating the

16

courts on this issue before rather than during the time

17

that we were trying to litigate a case like this.

18

interestingly, it did not seem to resonate with them

19

that there was a problem.

20

approach was pretty pragmatic, which is we have the

21

Guidelines, we have the courts, and that is basically

22

our environment, and we need to match our analysis to

23

what the law is.

24
25

And

You know, I think their

So, one way of resolving this issue would be to
be changing the way we analyze cases internally at the
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Commission, even if that means trying to persuade courts

2

to accept markets like "glasswares sold to the food

3

service industry" in Libbey or -- pardon me, Rick -- or

4

"consumable office products" sold in office super stores

5

in Staples, or a "geographic triangle of three

6

hospitals" in Evanston.

7

panelists, that's alternative one.

8
9

So, I would pose to our

Alternative two would be to try to change the
Guidelines, but that is awfully tough to do if the

10

Department of Justice doesn't really perceive a need for

11

that.

12

And then third I guess I'd throw out is the

13

possibility of the Commission using its own

14

decision-making in Part 3 to begin to teach on this

15

subject.

16

posed potential opportunities for the Commission to

17

provide some insights in that regard.

18

Commissioner Rosch's concurring opinion and the majority

19

decision in Evanston, there is the beginning of that

20

kind of dialogue, and I guess I'd throw out for the

21

panelists whether that is a profitable avenue for the

22

Commission to continue to pursue.

23

In my view, Chicago Bridge & Iron and Evanston

I think between

So, to recap, I'd throw it out to everyone,

24

first, are we better off sort of from the get-go trying

25

to follow a more rigid guidelines approach as opposed to
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finding ourselves trying to litigate a case which is not

2

really the one that we investigated; or are we better

3

off trying, again, to persuade for the need for a formal

4

change in the Guidelines; or should the Commission be

5

pursuing alternatives, such as Part 3 proceedings or

6

maybe expressly advocating, as the staff did in

7

Evanston, but in the district court, that it's

8

sufficient to have direct evidence of competitive

9

effects?

10
11

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Well, that is a very rich

discussion, Susan.

12

Let me throw it open now to both Connie and to

13

Bill.

When I do, however, let me just ask you three

14

questions that are going on in my mind as I listen to

15

you and as I listened to the judges this afternoon.

16

The first is, isn't it critical to know the

17

answers to the questions that have been posed -- that is

18

to say, what is the legal framework -- before you try

19

and put on your case?

20

determine the kind of case you are going to be putting

21

on and how you are going to be trying to prove it?

22

that is question number one.

23

Doesn't that pretty much

So,

Question number two is, I think I heard two

24

judges, appellate judges, say that they thought that the

25

law had evolved to the point where you could analyze a
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merger without up-front market definition, and I think I

2

heard you say, Susan, that you think that that's the

3

case, and I think I heard Dick say that he doesn't even

4

think in terms of market definition when he's using the

5

tools of the trade in that regard.

6

Then the third question is, do you agree with

7

Dan Wall's observation this morning that the Government

8

is always going to lose these cases or at least is going

9

to be at great risk of losing them without up-front

10

market definition so long as the Merger Guidelines

11

remain unchanged, as they are now?

12

Do you want to take a whack at that, Connie, or

13

do you want to, Bill?

14

MS. ROBINSON:

15

I mean, using the legal standard is the way, as

Sure, I'll take a first try.

16

I hear you, Susan, that you are deciding on bringing a

17

case:

18

competition?

19

Merger Guidelines, I think that's the right way to begin

20

looking at a merger, because I don't think you will

21

persuade anybody that you have a problem unless you are

22

convinced there is a cognizable theory of harm that you

23

can explain to a judge why the loss of this competitor

24

will really hurt somebody somehow.

25

is the merger substantially likely to lessen
While that is not the first step of the

Having said that, Judge Ginsburg and Judge Wood
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are unusual judges.

2

that most judges do not.

3

old-fashioned and think that you still have to go to

4

court and prove a relevant market even if you back into

5

it, which I think you can do.

6

to march along to the Guidelines and do the analysis,

7

strictly in the order of the Guidelines.

8
9

They know antitrust law in a way
I am a little more

I do not think you have

You can put on your case, showing the harm, and
having shown the harm, I think judges, if they are

10

persuaded of the harm, will give you a little leeway in

11

the product market.

12

stock case, where, quite frankly, I was very worried

13

that the Government could not prove a relevant product

14

market, but there was really strong evidence of

15

anticompetitive harm.

16

persuade a judge of harm, and the product market gets

17

fudged somewhat because it is less important.

18
19
20
21
22

That was the case in the label

If you've got that, you can

So, I think it's problematic to change the
Guidelines, Commissioner Rosch.
COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

It's Tom.

For everybody on

the panel.
MS. ROBINSON:

But I think it is problematic to

23

change the Guidelines if you are the Government.

24

think it's helpful for those of us in private practice

25

if there are the changes, because it looks like the
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Guidelines are changing, so what really should apply?

2

It makes it easier for us to have other arguments

3

against the Government.

4

I'd do that.

5

construct, and I think merger cases are just inherently

6

difficult, but I don't think changing the Guidelines

7

would help that.

So, I'd tread carefully before

I think the Guidelines are a workable

8

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

9

MR. BAER:

10
11

Bill?

I will be brief, because I know you

have got a lot else that the panel needs to get on to.
You cannot go in to court and not prove relevant

12

market unless, you know, Tom Rosch and Dan Wall on

13

behalf of Oracle will stipulate that relevant market is

14

irrelevant.

15

adversary there who's going to be exploiting every

16

weakness.

17

prove relevant market.

18

It's -- you don't -- you've got an

So, today, you have to assume you have to

Does that mean that you wouldn't attempt to

19

persuade a trier of fact that the sorts of analysis that

20

went into Indiana Federation of Dentists and Toys "R"

21

Us, where proof of anticompetitive effects allows you to

22

short-circuit the need to prove antitrust market?

23

course, you try and do that, and your long-term

24

strategy, it seems to me -- and this may involve an

25

amendment to the Merger Guidelines -- is an attempt to
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get the agency's articulation of enforcement principles

2

consistent with the analytics they are doing, but you

3

cannot simply decide you are going to do that and expect

4

the courts and your adversary to go along.

5

And one final lesson from me is, you look back

6

to the effort, the time -- and Connie will remember

7

this -- that the agencies had to take to get the courts

8

to consider the Merger Guidelines back in '82 and --

9

what, '82, '84, '92, these are just advisory; they don't

10

mean anything.

11

there is a body of case law where these things are taken

12

seriously, and so if, in fact, looking more to evidence

13

of effects, particularly in unilateral effects

14

situations, is where you want to go, and you want the

15

courts to go along with you, I think you have got to get

16

the process going of changing the way the -- the

17

analytics the agency uses and the articulation of the

18

analytics.

19

But you look at it now, the courts --

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Okay.

Well, let's move on,

20

then, to the role of econometric and noneconometric

21

economic evidence, and I think Dick Rapp is particularly

22

well qualified to kick that one off.

23
24
25

Dick, three questions:

First, how should expert

testimony be used in unilateral effects challenges?
Second, what is the probative value of
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simulation studies in the courtroom?
And third, what is the probative value of
critical loss analysis in the courtroom?

4

I think we just saw a demonstration that

5

sometimes it doesn't work very well for court of appeals

6

judges, but what do you think about the courtroom?

7
8
9

MR. RAPP:

Well, let me see if I can group those

together and add a point of my own to them.
I think -- and you have to apply the Mandy

10

Rice-Davies test to what I am about to say.

11

remember Mandy Rice-Davies?

12

cross examined with the question, "Well, isn't it true

13

that Judge Astor testified that he never slept with

14

you?", the Profumo affair, to which her reply was,

15

"Well, he would say that, wouldn't he?"

16

Rice-Davies test, even though it's old, is worth

17

remembering.

18

Anybody

She was the one who was

So, the Mandy

Economic and econometric testimony should be

19

used to the fullest, and the fact that it's central in

20

all of the cases that we have discussed is obvious.

21

Simulation studies are somewhat more problematic in that

22

there is a degree of artificiality.

23

sometimes calibration of the parameters, which seems

24

like making up the data.

25

depends upon their ability to predict, to back-cast

They require

Their validity and power
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successfully, but there are excellent, powerful examples

2

of all of these techniques.

3

I am thinking of Greg Werden in the

4

Interstate -- the bread-baking case.

5

whether that -- he actually served as a witness in that,

6

but somewhere on the DOJ web site is a set of slides

7

where he describes what he would have said had he

8

testified or perhaps did, and it is effective, potent

9

stuff.

10

I don't remember

The thing to remember about both simulation and

11

econometric studies is that it is actually not hard to

12

present.

13

it is not hard to present in the simplest form.

14

other words, what needs to be shown is the model.

15

needs to be testimony to the robustness of the model and

16

the fact that it is scientific testimony that passes the

17

requirements of social science hypothesis testing, and

18

past the point, if somebody wants to ask you whether you

19

did the right sort of reset test, well, that's a problem

20

for them more than it is for you.

21

It is terribly difficult to cross examine, but
In
There

So, the point that I wish to make to start this

22

conversation off is, first, that these are apt and

23

powerful techniques; that they can be presented

24

successfully.

25

other thing that I ought to say, although it is not

And I guess, in addition to that, the one
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directly in response to your question, is that the

2

econometrics and economic studies generally that we read

3

about in unilateral effects decisions are of the very

4

best of breed.

5

and interesting, well-informed models.

6

It is excellent econometrics that we see

Those of us who live partly in the world of

7

mergers and partly in the world of private action, class

8

action, Section 1 antitrust case, feel a strong sense of

9

contrast, at least I do, to the kind of things that we

10

see in these merger cases and the sort of economics that

11

sometimes confronts us in class action antitrust.

12

So, I already declared at the outset what party

13

I am for.

14

econometrics either on intellectual or tactical grounds.

15
16
17

I see no reason to restrict the use of

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Connie, what's your

reaction?
MS. ROBINSON:

I think economic evidence is one

18

type of evidence.

I don't think it is the only type.

19

think it can be a useful aid to help -- in particular,

20

to show some quantification of effects and to get you

21

out of the world of antidotes, but it is only one form

22

of evidence, and it is extremely difficult -- I will

23

disagree with Dick -- it is extremely difficult to

24

articulate econometrics simply so that a court

25

understands it.

That is why some courts are choosing
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independent experts to advise them about what it all

2

means.

3

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

4

MS. CREIGHTON:

Sue?

I certainly agree with Connie's

5

last point, because I think it is particularly difficult

6

for judges to unpack all of the powerful assumptions

7

that really can help drive the analysis, and so maybe

8

when Dick said that it is difficult to cross examine, I

9

think it is probably difficult for a judge to evaluate

10
11

it for that reason as well.
One kind of economic evidence, Tom, that you

12

didn't mention but I always found particularly powerful,

13

and maybe because I wasn't smart enough to be

14

understanding some of the more sophisticated stuff, but

15

natural experiments seemed to me to be much more

16

effective with me, and I guess by extrapolation, I'd

17

propose with judges.

18

there that that may be an underutilized tool and one

19

that should be given more heavy emphasis.

So, I guess I would throw out

20

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

21

MR. BAER:

Bill?

Just I agree with more Connie and

22

Susan's view on this.

In part it is.

I think most of

23

us who do antitrust and particularly people who have

24

been at the FTC or at the Antitrust Division are more

25

familiar with the tools, more used to analyzing the
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information, and it may come easier to some of us.

2

certainly doesn't come easy to me, but I am generalizing

3

here.

4

It

And one needs to be cautious, I think, about

5

assuming that the trial judge, especially in a

6

compressed trial time, is going to have that same

7

facility with the testimony and with its significance

8

that we might have.

9

but you certainly don't put principal reliance on that

So, all that means is you do do it,

10

form of testimony.

11

have developed a whole litigation picture, because, once

12

again, in the presence of a skillful adversary, points

13

that may seem simple and clean when we were talking

14

about them inside the agency, about whether to bring the

15

case, can get pretty confused pretty quickly.

16

You really need to make sure you

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Yeah.

The only thing I

17

would say is that I was kind of impressed with the prior

18

judicial panel in a couple of respects.

19

thought that the most salient point that Michael Bloom

20

made was that there was a variety of evidence that

21

supported his position, and the economic evidence was

22

just one part of it, and I think that probably goes to

23

the point you were trying to make there, Susan.

24
25

Number one, I

The other thing that I thought was interesting
was that even these judges, who were pretty high-powered
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judges, I think were having some trouble with the

2

economics in this case, and I was a little bit surprised

3

by that, because I have always felt that the appellate

4

court is a different audience from what the federal

5

district court is, a general federal district court, but

6

I will just throw out, did anybody have different

7

reactions than I did to that panel?

8
9

MR. RAPP:

No, but I have the urge to reply to

my fellow panelists.

10

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

11

MR. RAPP:

I thought you might.

Obviously, I wasn't proposing that

12

economics and econometrics should be used to the

13

exclusion of everything else.

14

observation that whichever side they come out on, the

15

cases that we have been quoting all day long, Oracle,

16

Staples, SunGard, and on and on, have processed that

17

information, the economic information, quite well, and

18

it is not an accident that it has been as prominent as

19

it has in the actual decision-making; that is to say,

20

the decision-making by the judges, however difficult it

21

may have been.

22

successfully, unless you think that all of the

23

unilateral cases are just wrong-headed and

24

uncomprehending, which I do not think anybody does.

25

Let me just make the

So, somebody's been consuming it

The -- well, I guess I'll stop there for now.
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COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

The only thing I'll say

2

about that, Dick, is that -- and I am not sure that he's

3

right about this -- but Bill Kovacic suggested that

4

Judge Hogan had written in a memoir of some kind that

5

while there had been econometric studies that had been

6

presented in Staples, that they were way beyond him, and

7

that at the end of the day, he just kind of threw up his

8

hands about it.

9

not, because I have not read that memoir, but that's

10

what Bill says.

11
12

I don't know whether that's true or

MR. RAPP:

I have strong opinions about natural

experiments, but I will wait until the question comes.

13

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Okay, all righty.

14

Let's move on, then, to the role of noneconomic

15

evidence, and specifically, I guess, that breaks down

16

into noneconomic evidence from the parties, noneconomic

17

evidence from industry participants, including customers

18

and competitors, industry experts, and trade press and

19

reports.

20

Susan, do you want to kick this one off?

21

MS. CREIGHTON:

22

So, let me start right from the outset by

Sure.

Thank you, Commissioner.

23

showing my own bias, which is maybe the opposite of

24

Dick's, which is that it strikes me as very strange to

25

suggest that an economist or for that matter a judge is
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in a better position than industry participants to gauge

2

the likely effects of a merger.

3

add that not all industry participants are well-placed

4

to assess the likely impacts of a merger, and obviously

5

speculative opinions by customers, competitors of the

6

parties, are not very useful.

7

Now, let me hasten to

But to take an extreme hypothetical, if you

8

suppose that the executive team at the acquiring company

9

pitched the deal to the board on the basis that they

10

would be able to raise price afterwards, I wouldn't take

11

very much consolation from the party's economist telling

12

me that they were wrong.

13

about Whole Foods, for example, is that it seems to me

14

that the judge comes pretty close to doing just that.

And part of what is troubling

15

Now, in the same way, customers aren't in a good

16

position to opine on what other customers may find to be

17

acceptable substitutes, which is really the question

18

about market definition, but at the same time,

19

knowledgeable and sophisticated customers are the

20

ultimate experts on the question of whether they could

21

switch to other alternatives if confronted with a

22

post-merger price increase by the merging parties.

23

Judge Walker in Oracle brushed off such testimony as

24

speculation in the absence of an elaborate cost-benefit

25

analysis by the customers, but this seems to me clearly
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to give too little weight to the customers' experience

2

and knowledge, even if it can't be quantified.

3

Now, part of the problem, I think, is that

4

agencies have -- we haven't always done a good job of

5

explaining the underlying market and the competitive

6

dynamics in a way that helps the judge put the

7

information into proper context.

8

go to Dick one more time and say that I think that

9

natural experiments are probably a tool that we should

In that regard, I will

10

be using more, as judges probably do understand them

11

better, and that might help to sort of put the dynamics

12

of the market and the documents at their hands that the

13

judges are reading in context.

14

At the same time, it is my personal view that

15

what the judicial panelists from the last panel said in

16

terms of reflecting their understanding of unilateral

17

effects analysis is much more sophisticated than the

18

average district court, and hence, that it's still a

19

very important duty and still-to-be-overcome task by the

20

agencies to help judges understand how to get past a

21

focus on market definition when there is direct evidence

22

of competitive effects.

23

So, just to give one example, I agree with Mark

24

Schildkraut -- who I don't think I have seen here

25

today -- that it appears that in Oracle, for example,
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that the Division did provide economic evidence that

2

supported the customers' testimony that Judge Walker had

3

said I'd give it more weight if there was economic

4

evidence to support it, and as you all know, the

5

Division did introduce evidence showing that when

6

PeopleSoft competed in bidding against Oracle, the

7

customers received an additional 10 percent or greater

8

discount.

9

would have been direct evidence of competitive effects,

10

which is regardless of whether SAP was in the market, it

11

didn't actually act as a sufficient constraint on

12

Oracle.

13

What this evidence was probative towards

Now, it might have helped if the Division had

14

also offered evidence, as Judge Walker pointed out they

15

did not, showing lower discounts when Oracle was bidding

16

against SAP or others.

17

more clearly, and my understanding is that such evidence

18

might have been available.

19

in my view, Judge Walker was so focused on market

20

definition, perhaps because of the way the Division had

21

presented the case, that the evidence of competitive

22

effects got lost, which is an important sort of flag for

23

the importance of explication and explanation.

It would have made the point

More fundamentally, though,

24

Let me conclude by suggesting that at least in

25

the abstract, in my view, the most important evidence,
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notwithstanding recent judicial decisions, is the

2

testimony of knowledgeable customers; next is the

3

evidence of the merging parties themselves; and finally,

4

on discrete issues, such as the ability to enter or

5

expand, the competitors themselves.

6

I think as you indicated, Commissioner, and

7

perhaps Connie said, in my view, the economic evidence

8

is just a quantitative tool for presenting evidence from

9

the very same sources.

So, we are just talking about

10

data from the customers; data from the merging parties;

11

data from the competitors.

12

of evidence; it's just a different way of analyzing the

13

evidence.

That is not a different type

14

Now, when that evidence points in different

15

directions, I think the economic evidence can be an

16

important check, calling for kicking the tires on the

17

rigor and sufficiency of the noneconomic data, but I

18

would submit that if the noneconomic evidence flares up

19

under further examination, it would lead me next to ask,

20

"What is going on with the economic presentation?"

21

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

22

Dick, you said you wanted to say something about

23
24
25

Okay, thank you, Susan.

natural experiments, and you have your chance now.
MR. RAPP:

It's good of you to let me.

Two

quick points:
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Not all evidence has to be scientific evidence,

2

we recognize that, but the trouble with customer

3

testimony and other testimony of that sort -- again, not

4

proposing that it should be done away with or anything

5

like that -- is cherry-picking.

6

imperfection of the sampling process in an advocacy --

7

in a setting of advocacy; selection of documents or

8

selection of customers produces outcomes based upon the

9

nature of the choice, and that is different from the

In other words, the

10

kind of methods that are subject to the Daubert

11

discipline.

12

testimony should be allowed; it's just meant to say bear

13

in mind that each of these things has their relative

14

merits and demerits.

15

So, that is not meant to say no customer

On natural experiments, all I wish to say is

16

that natural experiments, without controls, are

17

dangerous and misleading precisely because they appeal

18

to intuition.

19

hypothetical natural experiment on store openings that

20

stands by itself and says, "Here is a selection of store

21

openings.

22

prices of merging firm A's respond to that."

23

experiment that ought to be part of an equation that has

24

a WalMart dummy in it; that has other con -- that takes

25

account of other considerations that might realistically

The difference between a -- let us use a

When merging firm B opens a store premerger,
That is an
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affect the outcome; and that might make the intuition

2

that comes out of the simple experiment intuitive and,

3

at the same time, wrong.

4

rigor and care in the selection process when dealing

5

with the kind of evidence that, like Susan, in agreement

6

with Susan, I regard as necessary and essential to one

7

of these cases but that ought to be subject to the kind

8

of discipline I have described.

9

It is just an argument for

Thanks.

10

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Okay.

11

Connie, let me ask you just boldly here, was

12

Judge Ginsburg just playing with Michael Bloom when he

13

expressed his dissatisfaction with both customer

14

testimony and competitor testimony?

15

came as a bolt out of the blue to me.

16

Michael was darned if he did and darned if he didn't.

17

Who else is he going to put up there in terms -- if you

18

are going to be using anything other than econometric or

19

economic testimony, who else are you going to be relying

20

on?

21

MS. ROBINSON:

Because that one
It seemed like

Well, I guess I have a slight

22

difference with Susan on the issue of customer

23

testimony.

24

evil, but I think it is -- I always hated to be in trial

25

and watch my customer be cross examined, because you

I think customer testimony is a necessary
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never know what comes out, and it's often bad, because

2

they are not antitrust lawyers, and you haven't had much

3

time to work with them, and they don't -- you know, they

4

have a different motivation.

5

But their testimony can be very valuable to the

6

extent they are really talking about objective facts, to

7

the extent they have had a natural experiment in their

8

life.

9

players?

Did they have a time when there were fewer
What happened?

Or before this company entered

10

into the superpremium business, what was it like?

So,

11

they have a value, but I think you can't -- you have to

12

understand that they have some costs with them as well.

13

I mean, my preference is for, if you have them,

14

company documents.

I think they are often one of the

15

strongest pieces of evidence that you might have.

16

in terms of the testimony, you need competitors, but you

17

value them for their objective statements, the factual

18

things that they can discuss, not their predictions

19

about the merger.

But

20

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Okay.

21

Bill, I'd like your views on a number of things.

22

First of all, what do you think about industry experts?

23

And secondly, what do you think about customer

24

testimony?

25

documents and statements?

And what do you think about the parties' own
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MR. BAER:

I think, in telling a story in a

2

trial, if you have a knowledgeable industry expert that

3

can provide some perspective, that can be of value, but

4

it is of value in sort of outlining the nature of the

5

competitive interaction that goes on.

6

day, in order to persuade a trier of fact, I think you

7

need both quantitative and nonquantitative evidence.

8
9

At the end of the

You know, we distinguish between economic and
noneconomic.

That may not be the right terminology

10

given that a lot of what some of us think of as

11

noneconomic evidence really involves evidence of pricing

12

behavior and pricing decisions, but it is just not an

13

econometric study, a critical loss study, that sort of

14

stuff.

15

So, I think at the end of the day, all of us on

16

the panel agree that you need to look at all kinds of

17

evidence, but I do agree with Connie and Susan that

18

understanding how the parties have behaved; how they've

19

viewed their market; how they've set prices; who they've

20

reacted to and who they haven't reacted to.

21

Going back a couple years, Dick Rapp in a phone

22

call where we were talking about this made the point,

23

which I think is right, you know, you have got to

24

distinguish between different kinds of noneconomic

25

evidence.

I mean, some of it, the opinion of a customer
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or the opinion of a business executive is perhaps

2

considerably less probative than looking at business

3

behavior, what people thought was driving profit and

4

what wasn't.

5

parties and to competitors to see how they behaved and

6

what seems to drive them as particularly important

7

evidence.

8
9

So, I would look both to the merging

I do think customer evidence can be of value.
It's subject to the limitations that Connie pointed out.

10

It's subject to the arms race of affidavits that is

11

often characterized in mergers, where numbers matter

12

more than substance, seemingly, based on the

13

presentations, and where both the staff and merging

14

parties are able to, by presenting the issues their way,

15

get a sympathetic affidavit, which at the end of the day

16

doesn't withstand critical examination, because it was

17

not an informed decision.

18

So, customer testimony, it seems to me, is

19

relevant.

20

quickly in the Oracle case.

21

its own limitations.

22

I thought Judge Walker dismissed it much too

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

At the same time, it has

Well, Bill was out there

23

during the Oracle case, too.

24

and personal, what was happening there.

25

MS. CREIGHTON:

So I think he saw up front

But just on behalf of customer
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testimony, I wasn't meaning also to suggest that it's

2

always -- just to take it at face value, but, you know,

3

I think in SunGard, for example, Bill, you know, when

4

you were talking about sort of the accumulation of

5

affidavits, I think that listening carefully to what the

6

customers are saying might have caused the Division

7

to -- and maybe in retrospect, they have -- think

8

differently about either whether that case was a good

9

one to bring or whether or not they should have been

10

sort of maybe recasting their decisions somewhat.

11

My understanding is if you go back and look at

12

the declarations, you can actually sort of draw a line

13

between the big customers could self-supply and the

14

little customers couldn't, and then that would raise the

15

question, was there a price discrimination market

16

possibly there?

17

customers can be very helpful in terms of figuring out

18

what exactly is going on, as well as how you would

19

present your case.

20

So, you know, I think listening to the

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Okay, let me just throw --

21

before we leave this subject, let me throw three

22

questions on the table and see if anybody has any views

23

about them:

24
25

First of all, I really would like views about
the paid industry expert, because in my experience,
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that's the least probative witness.

2

Second, who are the customers?

I was a little

3

bit surprised in this trial or this appellate argument

4

that we listened to before this panel to have some of

5

the questions that were asked.

6

Heinz-Baby Food, the agencies basically won the argument

7

that the retailers constituted a separate set of

8

customers from the end users, and so I would have

9

thought that the testimony of those retailers would have

It seemed to me that in

10

been quite probative with respect to what they expected

11

in terms of this transaction.

12

And then the third observation I would make --

13

and I will just throw this out in the form of a

14

question -- is, are the agencies relying too much on

15

customer testimony when those customers are not end

16

users?

17

customers who are wholesalers and they ask them what

18

their views are with respect to the transaction, and

19

those customers can pass on any price increases that

20

they may experience, of what value is the fact that they

21

are not opposing the transaction?

22

particularly if they are pricing at keystone, they'd be

23

all for an anticompetitive merger.

24
25

More specifically, when the agencies go to

One can argue that

Connie, do you have any views at all on any of
those subjects?
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MS. ROBINSON:

I want to address the industry

2

expert.

3

didn't tend to use the industry expert.

4

case that I saw, there was an industry expert on the

5

other side, and as you know, oftentimes, the Government

6

loses its merger cases.

7

industry experts which said to me that judges like to

8

hear facts from people who know the industry.

9

experts, if they are well qualified, may do that and may

10
11

When I tried cases with the Government, we
In almost every

So, I took away a lesson from

Industry

provide some context.
It also seemed to me it fulfilled the important

12

lesson of repetition, you know, like when you teach a

13

child how to play the violin, they practice the same

14

thing over and over and over, and the more they play it,

15

the more they learn to like it.

16

something more than once, it may resonate, and you don't

17

forget it as much.

18

watching industry experts on an adversarial basis, that

19

they added value to the case.

20
21
22

So, if a judge hears

So, I found, you know, when I was

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Anybody else have any

observations to make?
MS. CREIGHTON:

Well, I guess I would agree with

23

Connie, actually, that I do think there is a lop-sided

24

dynamic going on where the parties have industry experts

25

at hand, whether it's a paid expert or their own -- the
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merging parties, and trying -- and when you are the

2

plaintiff and you have to go first, it's a difficult

3

question how to introduce the judge to the industry and

4

the dynamics in a way that you want.

5

I guess at the same time, Commissioner, it is

6

hard to find that good industry expert.

7

more a sort of hypothetical than real.

8
9

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

MR. BAER:

11

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

13

Bill, did you have

anything?

10

12

So, it may be

No.
Okay.

Well, you are up

next on trial strategy.
MR. BAER:

Well, thanks.

You know, I was here

14

at the FTC when the FTC won a bunch of cases, although I

15

was not the trial lawyer, but I thought maybe it would

16

be helpful to spend just a couple minutes talking about

17

what problems we confronted when I came to the agency 13

18

years ago -- six-two and with hair on my chin and my

19

head -- that, you know, both the FTC and the Antitrust

20

Division had had a string of not winning merger cases.

21

There were a couple of exceptions, but we actually sat

22

down, a number of us, including Jon Baker, who's in the

23

audience, who was Director of the Bureau of Economics,

24

and talked through what we needed to do better, and a

25

lot of it really was before we got to trial.
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A lot of it was case selection, to make sure we

2

had identified cases that were appropriate, that we

3

staffed them up with a team that would be thinking about

4

going to trial earlier than in some cases the agency had

5

done, integrating both the Bureau of Economics'

6

economists as well as early retention of outside

7

experts.

8

of these things are not being done today or haven't been

9

done since.

And I don't mean to say, by the way, that any

I am aware that they are, but we tried to

10

figure out where we looked as though we were being

11

deficient.

12

And a third area, candidly, was we didn't have

13

people who had quite the experience both at trying cases

14

but also managing huge litigation teams.

15

fourth area that we thought was problematic was we

16

hadn't quite yet convinced -- this goes to a point I

17

made earlier -- the courts about the applicability of

18

certain key legal principles using the Merger

19

Guidelines.

20

against the Department of Justice the Baker Hughes case,

21

which resulted in a court of appeals decision that

22

seemed to put the agencies to a huge burden in terms of

23

disproving likelihood of entry, and we worked in terms

24

of all the cases we brought on trying to take the parts

25

of the Baker Hughes decision that seemed consistent with

And then a

I had litigated outside the Government
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the "timely, likely, sufficient" aspects of the Merger

2

Guidelines, as articulated in '92, to try and bring the

3

courts along.

4

And then we looked at, you know, how we were

5

approaching the trials, and some of the issues that we

6

focused on have already been covered in terms of making

7

sure we had dealt with this tension between market

8

definition and the approach the agencies would take

9

internally in terms of figuring out whether things were

10

problematic.

We talked about how to tell the story, not

11

just during the week or two or three in which there

12

would be litigation, but in the briefing.

13

I was, in listening to the panel at lunch,

14

reminded that in the opening brief we filed in the

15

Staples/Office Depot case, which I was -- George Cary

16

said I wasn't the best associate he ever had but that I

17

was the oldest -- I wrote large portions of that brief,

18

and the thing that occurred to me on day one was that we

19

had some economic evidence of pricing differentials

20

between markets where Staples or Office Depot was by

21

itself and markets where they -- and we wanted to get

22

that evidence before the court.

23

If you look back at that brief, we put a pie

24

chart on page 2, a graphic that showed pricing

25

differentials, and the notion was find a way to take
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that which we understood on a very detailed and

2

complicated level, make it simple, make it clear, grab

3

the trier of fact as early as you can, well before there

4

is an opening statement.

5

We tended to favor -- and I still do, and I

6

think Susan may have mentioned had -- multiple

7

story-tellers.

8

this notion of explaining what is problematic about a

9

particular transaction, not just through the lawyers and

It may have been Connie's point, but

10

through briefing, but if you have an industry expert,

11

that can help.

12

presenter of the econometric analyses he did, but, you

13

know, he's always shown me to be somebody who is

14

articulate and thoughtful, speaks in layman terms.

15

could get him to integrate the rest of the evidence that

16

he reviewed that formed part of his expert opinion about

17

why this is problematic, that's just a way of

18

reinforcing for the court that there is a lot here.

19

so I would do that.

20

If I had Dick Rapp to be not just the

If I

And

There are many cases where the witnesses

21

available to the Government are limited.

In a

22

consumer-facing transaction, you know, you can't get in,

23

you know, Harry and Steve and Diane to -- oh, Diane's

24

back, probably the wrong term, she would be good -- but

25

to offer credible testimony.

You know, it just doesn't
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work.

2

what you can't do, but I think that notion of not just

3

showing the judge how to get to the decision the agency

4

believes is appropriate, but making him or her feel that

5

this is a problematic transaction in sort of the key,

6

big-picture way of looking at going into court.

7

So, you need to be mindful of what you can do and

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Okay, Connie, we are

8

running a little bit short of time here.

9

elaborate on that and also describe how you weigh

10

Can you

evidence?

11

MS. ROBINSON:

Okay.

Well, weighing the

12

evidence is almost a summing up of what we have been

13

talking about.

14

of trial strategy is you have to look at the totality of

15

the evidence, and it is all the types, altogether, and I

16

think Susan used the term, in what direction does it all

17

point?

18

direction, you have a much better case.

19

I mean, what Bill has just said in terms

If it is all pointing roughly in the same

We all admire what happened in the Staples case,

20

and there you had economic evidence that pointed to the

21

price effect; you had company documents that talked

22

about noncompetitive markets where they got higher

23

prices compared to competitive markets; and you had some

24

wonderful real-life pictures of baskets of supplies from

25

markets where you had one superstore and another where
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you had three superstores and the individual items were

2

priced higher where there was only one superstore.

3

Wonderful visuals, wonderful evidence pointing in one

4

direction:

5

merger.

there is going to be a price rise after this

6

So, you have to look at the totality of what you

7

have, and you have to look at what the negative side is.

8

Is your economic evidence pointing in a different

9

direction from the documentary evidence?

If it is, you

10

have to ask yourself, long and hard, should I be

11

bringing this case?

12

say?

13

provocative name, like "Project Goldmine," which some

14

documents in Whole Foods case did, but, you know,

15

unfortunately, when you read the judge's opinion, he

16

read further than the name, and he found information in

17

there that showed that if they closed one of the Wild

18

Oats stores, two-thirds of the customers would go to

19

other supermarkets.

20

necessarily get you anywhere if the underlying document

21

does not point in the same direction.

22

What do those company documents

Perhaps they have, you know, a wonderfully

So, the provocative name doesn't

Customer testimony, I have already told you my

23

bias about that, but particularly if there is a natural

24

experiment, that can be very helpful.

25

evidence in company documents for me is sort of the

I think pricing
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single best thing if you can find it.

2

evidence to the court of what would happen after the

3

fact.

4

quite frankly, it would be interesting to look back at

5

Staples to see what the other side argued the documents

6

meant to see how strong that case was.

7

were some warts in the case that don't come up in the

8

opinion so much, but good for them.

9

It's powerful

I don't think it exists in very many cases, and

I suspect there

It is that combination of documents; testimony;

10

and even declarations if they are not cookie-cutter

11

declarations, if they make points that underline a key

12

point of your case, and if the declarants are not

13

biased.

14

declarations on the basis of bias.

15

basically how I weigh evidence.

16

It seems like a lot of judges are kicking out

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

And so that is

Well, let me tee up four or

17

five specific questions now and ask the reaction of the

18

panel.

19
20
21

First of all, live testimony versus
declarations, what's your view?
Second, what's the role of pundits?

In the

22

Oracle case, Dan Wall used to walk out of the courtroom

23

every day, stroll out to the Hanna Room, and there was

24

just a huge press mob assembled, and he'd hold forth,

25

usually in a very homey way, and that was thought not
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only by the client but by Dan to be very, very

2

important.

3

received during a trial?

4

Third, what's your view about a plant or a store

5

visit?

6

well.

7

What's your view about the press that is

I know that occurred in Staples/Office Depot as

Fourth, what do you think about cross

8

examination?

9

in the Oracle case where he took the PeopleSoft

10

executive vice president in charge of sales and

11

marketing, who we knew was going to be a very hostile

12

witness, and he didn't even -- he really didn't care

13

what that witness said on cross examination.

14

about flashing -- he was using this witness as a set

15

piece for being able to flash PeopleSoft documents up on

16

the screen, and regardless of what this guy said about

17

them, he looked foolish, because the documents were very

18

powerful indeed.

19

a very effective tool even if you're not getting a lot

20

of really nuggets out of the witness.

21
22

Dan did something very effective I thought

So, sometimes cross examination can be

Do you have any views about any of these
subjects or anything else just to close up?

23

Susan?

24

MS. CREIGHTON:

25

It was all

Yes.

I think that the -- you

know, I have increasingly thought that the use of cross,
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calling hostile witnesses, is something maybe that the

2

agency should think about doing more.

3

pretty effective in Evanston, I think it was effective

4

in Oracle, and I think it is one way to sort of get out

5

all those good company documents that can otherwise kind

6

of -- the judge does not really hear or see.

7

think that is something -- I mean, it's risky,

8

particularly if the executive is really good, you know,

9

you're opening yourself up to cross where he then sort

I think it was

So, I

10

of has a chance to tell his whole story, but it might be

11

worth the risk.

12

that, Bill.

13

But I'd be curious what you think of

And I guess I have also thought that for the

14

same reason in terms of telling the story,

15

notwithstanding the fact that the last time I think the

16

Commission won in a district court was Libbey, where it

17

was basically all on declarations, I think telling the

18

story really is an important thing that the plaintiff

19

has to do, and so I'd be inclined towards more live

20

testimony and less declarations.

21

MR. BAER:

I agree with Susan.

I think I said

22

earlier that I tend to be biased in favor of telling the

23

story, telling the story live, and part of it is, you

24

know, the Government has the burden, and you're going

25

first, and while the opening helps, having somebody up
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there who's got some credibility independent of the

2

advocate helps.

3

On the pundits thing, you know, the honest truth

4

is I think what Dan Wall did was brilliant, that you

5

have to be mindful of the environment you are in.

6

know, you could overdo it.

7

courtroom, but to make sure one is explaining to the

8

people who are covering a trial what's at stake is, I

9

think, part of the Government's obligation.

You

The real action is in the

I mean,

10

there is a public interest determination, a reason to

11

believe determination that has been made and what the

12

hell is it?

13

not necessarily even with the courtroom advocate, to

14

make sure the press understands why the agency has taken

15

this time, invested these resources, seems to me very

16

important.

17

And so, you know, finding a way quietly,

I think Sue has it exactly right about -- and

18

Tom -- about cross examination.

19

different, but looking for what you can and need to do

20

to get your best evidence before the court, sometimes

21

cross examination can be a very effective way of doing

22

that.

23

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

24

MS. ROBINSON:

25

You know, each trial is

Connie?

I like live testimony.

I have

concern, especially when some of the judges are now

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

223
1

requiring canned economic reports, that the first time

2

you see your expert witness is when he or she is

3

testifying on cross examination, which is not the way I

4

think the Government wants to start its case.

5

I agree with Bill.

I think that you need to

6

explain what you are doing to the pundits.

I know that

7

at some of the trials I was at, we actually had a press

8

person who had that role, who would every day capsulize

9

what the testimony was and what the key points the

10

Government was making.

11

too, but we thought it was essential to equalize that

12

effort.

13

The other side was doing it,

Plant visits I think can be very effective.

14

Clearly the judge learned something when he looked at

15

different stores and thought that the superstores were a

16

different kind of animal from a WalMart, and so I

17

thought that that if it can be helpful to your case,

18

it's a good idea to suggest it.

19

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

20

MR. RAPP:

21

Live testimony, well, you know where I stand.

22

Dick?

Thank you.

He would say that, wouldn't he?

23

As far as what should come out of the mouth of

24

an economic expert, I think as long as it falls within

25

the broad rubric of discussing how markets work and how
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this market works, it is in bounds.

There is a danger

2

of overstepping that, and overstepping it, being out of

3

bounds, is something that you wouldn't want your expert

4

to -- a situation your expert would be in.

5

Just a last thought, under your "Other"

6

category, I think -- I have never understood the phrase

7

"gerrymandering markets," because we all start from the

8

Merger Guidelines proposition that markets can be very

9

narrow.

It seems to me that there is insufficient

10

attention paid in these unilateral effects cases to the

11

time and cost of supply response and that perhaps some

12

of the skepticism of judges to markets that have more

13

than seven or eight words in their name arises from

14

their saying, "Well, you know, how long is it going to

15

take for Safeway to get into the organic foods business,

16

retailing business," and so on and so forth?

17

think that may be a missing element in the proof of

18

complaint counsel that markets that are small and

19

tightly defined are genuine antitrust relevant markets.

20

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

So, I

You know, I am going to

21

spring this on you, Dick, as sort of a last question.

22

He doesn't know this is coming.

23

Would you please tell us what you think was the

24

most effective cross examination that you have ever

25

undergone as an expert?

Can you kind of sum up for us
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what the salient points were of that cross examination?

2

MR. RAPP:

The most effective cross examination

3

was cross exam -- this is going to be an uneducational

4

reply.

5

time I came onto the witness stand in federal court, and

6

I withheld cross examination very well, but I was

7

unexpected -- I was unprepared for a question that just

8

appealed to the -- this was not a judge, but a jury

9

trial -- to their instincts.

I have to answer truthfully.

It was the first

It was not a merger case.

10

I was asked at the very end, "Well, you wouldn't want

11

some" -- basically, without going into the facts, "You

12

wouldn't want -- if you were a member of what was then a

13

small firm, you wouldn't want somebody to do that to

14

you."

15

wouldn't want that to happen."

16

very effective cross examination, and I hasten to add it

17

was a very long time ago.

18

a more educational answer, but that's the truth.

19
20
21
22

And I didn't know better than to say, "No, I
And that undid a lot of

I'm sorry I couldn't give you

COMMISSIONER ROSCH:

Well, sometimes those pithy

questions are the best ones.
With that, I'd like to thank all the panelists,
and thank you for your attention.

23

(Applause.)

24

(A brief recess was taken.)

25
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PANEL 5:

2

VIRTUES AND LIMITATIONS OF

3

ECONOMETRIC VERSUS OTHER APPROACHES

4

FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIC EVIDENCE

5
6

PROFESSOR BAYE:

7

panel of today.

8

session.

9

excellent.

10

Welcome to the fifth and final

It has been an absolutely great

I think this last panel will also be

As you know, this panel is on virtues and

11

limitations of econometric versus other approaches for

12

developing economic evidence, and that seems to imply

13

that there are more types of economic evidence than just

14

econometric evidence.

15

listen to some people talk, they tend to use

16

"econometric evidence" and "economic evidence" as

17

synonyms.

18

appropriate and to what extent there are some virtues

19

and limitations of different types of analysis.

20

I think oftentimes, when you

So, we will find out whether or not that is

Before we begin, I'd just like to briefly

21

introduce the panel.

To my immediate left is Dennis

22

Carlton.

23

Consulting after serving as Deputy Assistant Attorney

24

General For Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Division

25

of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Dennis rejoined Compass Lexecon Economic

It was really sad to
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see him leave, because I spent the first two months of

2

my job working with him on one of our gas price

3

investigations.

4

Industrial Organization, a leading text in the field, as

5

well as numerous articles on a variety of topics in

6

microeconomics and industrial organization.

7

holds the position of Professor of Economics At the

8

Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago

9

and is a co-editor of the Journal and Law and Economics.

Dennis is the co-author of Modern

He also

10

In addition to his academic credentials, Dennis served

11

as the sole economist on the recent Antitrust

12

Modernization Commission, which also had 11 attorneys on

13

there.

14

attorneys.

15

Antitrust Division's work on the 1992 Horizontal Merger

16

Guidelines, and I am very happy to have him here today.

17

I guess that was a fair fight, one Dennis and 11
Dennis also was a consultant on the

Sitting to my far right is Carl Shapiro.

Carl

18

is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at

19

the Haas School of Business at the University of

20

California Berkeley.

21

Institute Business and Economic Research and a Professor

22

of Economics in the Department of Economics at UC

23

Berkeley.

24

International, where he also serves on the board of

25

directors.

He's also the Director of the

Carl is also a senior consultant at CRA

He has published extensively in areas of
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industrial organization, competition policy, the

2

economics of innovation and competitive strategy.

3

served as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for

4

Economics in the Antitrust Division of the U.S.

5

Department of Justice during 1995 and 1996.

6

consulted extensively for a wide range of private

7

clients, as well as the U.S. Department of Justice and

8

the Federal Trade Commission, and testifies, on

9

occasion, as an expert witness in the areas of antitrust

Carl

He's

10

economics, including intellectual property and patents.

11

Probably most relevant for our panel today is the recent

12

work that he's done with Joe Farrell that got some

13

positive advertising, I suspect, or we will get what

14

Carl's spin on that is.

15

giving him an opportunity maybe to respond in some ways

16

to some things that might have been said about his work.

So, we are looking forward to

17

Orley Ashenfelter is at the far left.

Orley has

18

had a distinguished career and is the Director of the

19

Industrial Relations Section at Princeton University and

20

has been Director of the Office of Evaluation of the

21

U.S. Department of Labor.

22

and a Benjamin Meeker Visiting Professor at the

23

University of Bristol.

24

Prize in Labor Economics; the Mincer Award for Lifetime

25

Achievement of the Society of Labor Economists; a Fellow

He's been a Guggenheim Fellow

He's a recipient of the IZA
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of the Econometric Society; the Academy of Arts and

2

Sciences; the Society for Labor Economics; and a

3

Corresponding Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh;

4

and a bunch more stuff that I am not going to read

5

because we would not finish the panel.

6

an extensive amount of academic research, editing the

7

Handbook of Labor Economics, and he's currently

8

co-editor of the American Law and Economics Review, and

9

a previous editor of the American Economic Review for

He's also done

10

about six years.

Many of you probably know Orley from

11

the work that he did for the FTC as an expert on

12

econometric issues in the Staples/Office Depot

13

litigation, and he's also published several articles

14

related to that research, but what you may not know is

15

that Orley is also President of the American Association

16

of Wine Economists and serves no wine until its time.

17

To my immediate right is Joe Simons.

Joe Simons

18

is Co-Chair of Paul Weiss' Antitrust Group.

He joined

19

the firm after serving as Director of the Bureau of

20

Competition of the Federal Trade Commission.

21

history with the FTC's Bureau of Competition started in

22

the late 1980s when he served as the Associate Director

23

for Mergers and the Assistant Director for Evaluation.

24

Joe's published a wide range of articles on

25

antitrust-related topics.

His

Together with Economist Barry
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Harris, Joe co-authored the paper that actually

2

introduced critical loss analysis to much of the

3

conversation that we are having today.

4

MR. SIMONS:

I take the blame.

5

PROFESSOR BAYE:

6

His recognitions included Crain's New York

You take the blame, excellent.

7

Business "40 Under 40" and Chambers USA:

8

Leading Business Lawyers.

9

America's

So, without further ado, I think we will begin

10

the panel.

It will be similar to the sessions that we

11

had this morning, and I will ask each of the panelists

12

to speak somewhere between three to five minutes,

13

starting with Dennis.

14

PROFESSOR CARLTON:

Okay, thank you.

15

Let me start out by saying that the distinction

16

between unilateral and coordinated behavior that we hear

17

about so often is really not the sharp one that you

18

might think from reading the legal commentary and even

19

some of the economic commentary or commentary by

20

economists.

21

economic point of view.

22

It is not the sharp distinction from an

As practiced, unilateral effects is really a

23

shorthand for saying that there is a differentiated

24

product, or sometimes it is a homogenous product, with

25

an estimated demand system usually.

I postulate some
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usually static game of competition, Cournot, Bertrand,

2

make some assumption about the game, and then I do a

3

merger simulation.

4

Coordinated behavior, in contrast, is usually

5

thought of as something more complicated, people are

6

coordinating, but in economic terms, in game theoretic

7

terms, that means it is more of a dynamic game.

8

both are using the economic theory of oligopoly and game

9

theory, and to think there is a sharp distinction could

10
11

But

easily lead you down the wrong path.
Regardless of what type of effects you are

12

projecting or postulating for a merger, the relevant

13

question is, how does competition change when you have

14

one less player?

15

following way:

16

rivalry is existing amongst the players in the way they

17

compete against each other, if we have one fewer person,

18

what happens?

19

on which they interact that will change?

20

information become available in a way that is not

21

occurring now if a merger occurs?

22

different questions, but they are relevant.

23

relevant.

24
25

You can think about that in the
You can say, holding however much

Or you can ask, is there some mechanism
Will more

Those are two
Both can be

So, with that introduction, let me now turn to
what I am supposed to do, which is give you an overview
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of empirical tools to use to evaluate unilateral

2

effects.

3

First, I will start out by reiterating something

4

that Tom Rosch was saying earlier, that empirical -- and

5

that Mike just said -- which is that empirical tools are

6

a complement, not a substitute, to other economic

7

evidence and analysis.

8

approaches econometrically to analyze, let's say, a

9

merger.

There are two main empirical

One is what economists called a reduced form,

10

which you are really not asking the mechanism by which

11

the price is affected.

12

affected when you have one fewer player?

13

You are just asking, is price

This is a -- no longer a very popular approach

14

among new graduate students writing their Ph.D. theses.

15

It is not as interesting as structural estimation, but

16

it does ask the precise question that you want answered;

17

namely, what happens if you have one fewer competitor or

18

what happens as concentration goes up in an industry?

19

The difficulty from an econometric point of view is in

20

answering that question whether you are observing in the

21

data an experiment that allows you to answer the

22

question in a way that avoids a particular problem

23

called endogeneity, but to lay people, really another

24

way of saying it is, can you really determine cause and

25

effect from your data?
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And the real difficulty, I will just illustrate

2

it, is that if the number of firms is determined by

3

something other than the price, then you can see the

4

number of firms changing, and you can then observe what

5

happens to price.

6

that causes the change in the number of firms is price

7

changes, then it is going to be hard to sort out what's

8

causing what, okay?

9

On the other hand, if the only thing

Well, it turns out there are ways to deal with

10

that problem.

11

have a natural experiment in which you have entry, that

12

will occur in one part of the country, for example, and

13

not another, that occurs for reasons wholly independent

14

of current prices, and, therefore, you can observe what

15

is going on.

16

way to do things.

17

There are plenty of instances in which we

Well, that is a reduced form.

That is one

The second way to do things is structural

18

estimation.

19

the name suggests, the underlying structure, and you try

20

and piece together what is going on.

21

demand system, and then you postulate some competitive

22

interaction, and you do a merger simulation.

23

In structural estimation, you estimate, as

You estimate a

Now, the estimate of the demand side uses

24

typically sophisticated econometrics, and I think that

25

that is a real gain for the profession.

We have learned
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a lot about how to estimate demand systems.

2

simulation really tells you how to interpret your demand

3

estimates.

4

The merger

Now, the difficulty with doing merger simulation

5

is it requires lots of assumptions.

6

what particular competitive rivalry is occurring.

7

always a static game, because we are not that good yet

8

as doing dynamic games econometrically.

9

game?

Is it Bertrand?

You have to assume
It is

Is it a Cournot

What do you assume about retail

10

competition?

11

it competition at retail, or are they passing on and

12

earning a margin?

13

that matters?

14

of the product?

15

can often be hard to present such an analysis in court.

16

Is it retail competition?

Is it not?

Is

Are there dimensions other than price

Advertising?

Repositioning the quality

Because of all these assumptions, it

One advantage of structural estimation in merger

17

simulation is it allows you to do lots of robustness

18

checks and to figure out why certain things are

19

happening in the model.

20

price going up?

21

elasticity were different?

22

assume more rivalry than I am assuming?

23

you to answer deeper questions than a reduced form, but

24

it is more complicated.

25

If there is a merger, why is

Would price go up if the demand
Would price go up if I
So, it allows

I will just end by mentioning two other areas.
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Consumer surveys, we heard a little bit about that in

2

the previous panel.

3

the consumer?

4

think about a merger, the retail store may not care very

5

much if all the retail store is doing is renting shelf

6

space.

7

it will rent it to some other product, and as long as it

8

has plenty of opportunity, it may be indifferent to

9

mergers.

10

consumer?

11

One thing you should ask is, who is

If you ask a retail store, what do you

If it doesn't rent shelf space to this product,

So, you have to ask, is that the relevant

If you ask the final consumer, you should recall

12

that economists, have a long history of being skeptical

13

of what consumers say?

14

consumers have done.

15

They prefer to rely on what

I will mention critical loss just briefly.

My

16

own view of critical loss is that it's a shorthand, a

17

useful shorthand, but a shorthand that simply restates

18

everything about a demand elasticity -- everything about

19

a demand elasticity simply in terms of the amount lost.

20

It does not add anything theoretically to our bag of

21

tricks, although expositionally, I think it can

22

sometimes be very helpful if done correctly.

23

think you should just view it as an alternative way to

24

express your findings.

25

further -- not Joe, by the way -- and I think make

And I

Sometimes people take it
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2

errors in how it is used.
So, I will just summarize, these empirical

3

methods are complements, not substitutes to other types

4

of economic analysis.

5

estimation, each have strengths and weaknesses, and both

6

are really powerful and more powerful analytic tools, I

7

think, than either surveys or critical loss.

A reduced form and structural

8

Okay, thank you.

9

PROFESSOR BAYE:

Okay, thanks, Dennis.

10

Carl?

11

PROFESSOR SHAPIRO:

I have a few slides, that's

12

is why I thought I'd stand up here to present them, and

13

I am going to talk about this paper with Joe Farrell

14

that has been mentioned before, but it is a bit broader

15

than just a question of econometrics versus other

16

economic evidence, but it really goes to the question

17

about what sort of evidence are we likely to really be

18

able to get in most mergers and believe in and have

19

judges understand, okay?

20

three requirements is pretty small, but it is something

21

that I think is very useful.

22

The intersection between those

I think what my broader theme is is the whole --

23

the Guidelines now, with the whole market definition/

24

concentration approach, really distracts us from what we

25

want to be looking at in unilateral effects cases, and

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

237
1

it is very interesting to me that earlier today, we have

2

heard people who do this, and the agencies say, "Well,

3

of course, we don't really do that, following the

4

Guidelines, because that's all screwy.

5

competition between the merged firms, we figure out

6

whether there are effects, and then we find a way to

7

back into a market."

8
9

We look at the

Well, that is telling us, first off, it is bad
if your Guidelines don't reflect actually the way the

10

agencies do the analysis, and it's causing problems in

11

court, because it is a very convoluted way to go about

12

things.

13

coordinated effects cases where you are looking at a set

14

of firms that would find it profitable to collude, but

15

does not work well for unilateral effects cases.

16

be misleading, uninformative, very circuitous, and

17

introduces all these arbitrary parameters:

18

the SSNIP; the 35 percent; where do these HHI thresholds

19

come from; some complicated apparatus that distracts;

20

and I think judges will frankly say, "What's going on?"

21

Plus it's suggestive if something is not in the market,

22

it doesn't compete at all, and that's wrong.

23

really causing problems for the agencies.

24
25

Market definition actually works very well for

It can

The size of

So, it is

There is a much more direct approach to take,
and this is in terms of will a merger create upward
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pricing pressure?

2

heard today is how unilateral effects is extremely

3

intuitive.

4

competing beforehand for customers.

5

will be lost.

6

And one of the other things we have

Actually, it is, look, the companies were
That competition

How significant is that, okay?

Well, we actually have a way to measure those

7

things, and this is the test that I am suggesting.

8

let's talk about Whole Foods and Wild Oats, since

9

that's, you know, the recent case of considerable

10

interest.

11

when Whole Foods goes out and tries to contract

12

customers, some of those customers will come at the

13

expense of Wild Oats.

14

rather than captured business after the merger.

15

So,

Before the merger, the unilateral effects,

That will become cannibalization

After the merger, that would be -- we could

16

think of that as an opportunity cost, a very key concept

17

in economics.

18

lost by Wild Oats, which is owned by the same owners,

19

the same company, that will be a cannibalization and a

20

cost.

21

is a higher cost in making sales, the price will tend to

22

go up.

23

efficiencies which will push the price down.

24
25

If Whole Foods gets business, if it's

So, that will tend -- that cost tends -- since it

On the other hand, there will be some

Overall, will there be net pressure up or down
for the price?

Well, this is the formula Dan Wall was
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making fun of earlier, because it actually has two or

2

three variables in it.

3

course, he scurried from the room, I suspect not wanting

4

to stick around to hear the response --

5
6

I might point out to him -- of

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

There is no Greek in there

either, I notice.

7

PROFESSOR SHAPIRO:

8

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

9

There is no Greek in there

either.

10
11

What?

PROFESSOR SHAPIRO:

No, there is no Greek.

I

could put Greek in.

12

The Herfindahl has many -- is a much more

13

complicated formula, which is far less directly relevant

14

anyhow, so, I mean, the notion that -- I cannot accept

15

the notion that the agencies are incapable of going to a

16

judge and saying we have to multiply two or three things

17

together and subtract something, that that's the test,

18

okay?

19

okay?

20

So, if that's where we're at, it's very sad,

So, basically, it would take a little longer to

21

explain this, but the amount of -- the fraction of the

22

sales coming at the expense of Wild Oats, that would be

23

the diversion ratio, D.

24

sale at Wild Oats, that is the P minus C term.

25

that is bigger than the efficiencies, we have upward

The profit margin on each unit
And if
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2

pricing pressure, okay?
This is extremely robust.

It doesn't matter

3

what type of oligopoly conduct is going on.

We don't

4

need to know the shape of the demand system.

5

need to estimate a structural model.

6

use econometrics.

7

variables.

8

documents, this is something that is doable.

This is

9

very practical, to measure prices and costs.

Margins

I don't

I don't need to

I need to be able to measure a few

And I would say, looking at company

10

are already measured in merger analysis.

11

critical loss, you have to measure the margin.

12

one of the few things you have to measure to do that.

13

In order to do
That's

You do have to measure the diversion ratio.

14

Well, that's what we really care about.

15

these firms competing, okay?

16

other firms that are competing equally or -- you know,

17

then the diversion ratio will be low, and this will

18

result -- this diagnostic test will say we should not

19

worry about the merger.

20

from Einstein:

21

possible but no simpler."

22

besides the margin, prices and costs, to measure the

23

extent to which customers are switching between the two

24

firms, okay?

25

How closely are

And if there are many

So, you know the famous quote

"Everything should be made as simple as
Well, that is the one thing,

Go right at it in my view, and I think you see
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that often in the documents.

2

here.

3

of merger simulation is that it's not robust, that it's

4

hard to understand, don't apply, okay?

5

simple and transparent, extremely well rooted in

6

economics, based on the general principle if costs go

7

up, prices will go up, okay?

8
9

There is no simulation.

There is no black box
A lot of the criticisms

So, this is very

Samuelson had a theorem in 1943 that was
extremely general.

As I said, you only need to measure

10

a few variables.

11

totally focuses on the change due to the merger.

12

are going to estimate a structural model, for example,

13

in econometrics, you need -- you are trying to explain

14

basically a master theory of how prices are set in this

15

industry, okay?

16

And the reason it works so well is it

I don't have such a vision, okay?

If you

I just want

17

to know in which direction is this merger going to tend

18

to push prices from their current levels?

19

entirely on the change, which is the internalization of

20

what had been competition and becomes cannibalization.

21

There is no arbitrary parameters here; no artificial

22

boundaries.

You don't have to say other firms are not

23

competing.

You don't run into the traps that Dan Wall

24

has been setting for us at all, okay?

25

firms compete.

So, focus

Yes, the other

Mergers with them might also raise
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price.

You know, we will talk about that if they

2

propose one.

3

to explain a broad structural presumption or what it's

4

based on or Herfindahl levels.

No artificial boundaries.

You don't have

5

So, this, it seems to me, could really cut

6

through things substantially, and as I said, it is

7

extremely robust.

8

depend on the form of oligopoly conduct.

9

to estimate the demand system, go ahead and be my guest,

We show in our paper it does not
If you wanted

10

but it won't matter for this test, and we're not trying

11

to predict the magnitude of the price increase; just

12

price pressure.

13

alternative to the market definition/market

14

concentration screen to tell whether mergers are

15

problematic, and then there could be further analysis

16

beyond that.

So, we're proposing this as an

17

And likewise, if this were put in the Guidelines

18

as an alternative, then in court, the agencies could say

19

we did this test, the merger showed that it had a

20

tendency to raise price, and then we did additional

21

analyses to see whether repositioning, entry, additional

22

efficiencies, the back part of the Guidelines, could

23

basically still be used, but we wouldn't get into all

24

these struggles with market definition, market

25

concentration, and getting bollixed up, losing cases,
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because of an inability to define the relevant market.

2

I agree with Dan Wall that -- just so I mention,

3

the second-stage inquiry would be similar to what it is

4

now.

5

need to change the Guidelines to do this, because

6

otherwise, you will have that "gotcha," okay, but it

7

does seem to me that it is somewhat dysfunctional now,

8

does not reflect the actual practice, and this is very

9

strong, solid economics.

So, I agree with Dan Wall that it seems to me you

So, if you have additional

10

evidence so you can do econometrics, that might be very

11

useful at the second stage, but I don't want that -- but

12

you don't -- you often don't have that, and that is not

13

going to ultimately probably convince the judge as part

14

of the story.

15

story of loss of competition, and then we have a way of

16

quantifying that.

The story here is very simple.

17

Thanks.

18

PROFESSOR BAYE:

19

Orley?

20

PROFESSOR ASHENFELTER:

21
22

Thank you.

I have a few slides,

too.
I hope you can hear me while I try to -- can you

23

hear me all right?

24

Carl gave me a cold.

25

It's a

I am losing my voice.

Once again,

We were meeting on the --

PROFESSOR SHAPIRO:

I liked your work.
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PROFESSOR ASHENFELTER:

I am sure you did.

We

2

had a meeting on the weekend of industrial organization

3

economists at the National Bureau, actually, and it was

4

reminiscent in a way of the difference between this

5

meeting and that one, and the difference is that when

6

you are here, we are the economists, mostly.

It is

7

apparent that maybe we are not that welcome.

There was

8

a very -- a very good friend of mine sent me -- there is

9

an underground on the internet, by the way, of economist

10

jokes, and I am reminded of -- by the way, there was an

11

article, if you want to send me an email I will send it

12

to you, an article in the Sentinel Chronicle where the

13

guy went off on the internet and got all these jokes

14

about economist, and I am reminded of one which is the

15

story of the devil taking a man down to hell, and on the

16

way down, they pass a really beautiful woman who's in a

17

heated discussion with an economist, and the man says,

18

"That's no fair.

19

to that beautiful woman?"

20

are you to question the penalty of that woman?"

21

you get the point.

22

really no fun, and it is worse when you talk to

23

econometricians, and that's probably me.

24
25

How come that economist gets to talk
And the devil responds, "Who
I guess

Sitting in a room with economists is

The normal -- the standard joke about them -and this drives lawyers crazy, and it's true -- is about
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the three econometricians out hunting a deer and with

2

their weapons, and they see one, and the first

3

econometrician raises his weapon to his shoulder and

4

fires and misses by a meter to the left.

5

immediately raises his weapon and fires and misses by a

6

meter to the right, at which point the third one leaps

7

up and says, "We got him."

8

basically all day long, because precision, we really

9

don't believe in precision that much.

10

The second one

I have heard those comments

So, let me just make a few comments about the

11

role of econometrics.

12

amongst others, in the Staples case, and I have been

13

involved in several others, including the one that was

14

mentioned here, Swedish Match.

15

to make is to distinguish between -- and this is

16

relevant for Carl's paper, too, which I have read, by

17

the way -- actually, I lost it, did you take it back

18

from me? -- it is a very interesting paper and

19

interesting idea, but the first point is the difference

20

between regulation and trial.

21

I was the econometric guy, one

The first point I'd like

I don't know if you realize, if you are an

22

economist, the undertow this morning.

The regulatory

23

agencies operate really in a different way than when

24

they go to trial, and I guess this meeting is, in part,

25

a result of that.

So that as I sat and listened to Carl
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or I read his paper, actually, I think what he has in

2

mind is very sensible from the point of view of

3

regulation; however, I have testified in a courtroom, as

4

have some of the others, and I am not really sure how it

5

would go over in the courtroom itself.

6

distinction, I think, that has to be made between those

7

two.

8

well -- maybe economists don't understand it so well --

9

about whether you are really thinking about something

So, there is a

I appreciate -- I think lawyers do understand that

10

that will be done on a day-to-day basis, whether you are

11

just thinking about a regulatory environment as opposed

12

to the courtroom.

13

Now, the courtroom, let me tell you my defining

14

story about that.

15

some ways.

16

in -- like Vaughn Walker is a student of mine, not a

17

student like at Princeton, but a student in courses for

18

judges.

19

Ginsburg, too.

20

memory of this started in 1979.

21

1979.

22

Mason and also with the Federal Judicial Center, and in

23

my memory of it, I was struck by the following:

24
25

It actually changed my whole life in

For years and years, I have taught judges

And Diane Wood was a student, and I think Doug
All of them were students.

And my

We did this starting in

I had done it with a private group at George

We were in a lovely place, and a federal judge
at the time, we started talking, and -- very informally,
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and he explained that he was in Princeton a lot, went to

2

Princeton.

3

so much?"

4

trustees."

5

said, "You know, let me ask you a question.

6

been this discussion in the press" -- and this has had a

7

big effect on the way judges can learn some of this

8

material, about how judges are being brainwashed by

9

the -- whoever it may be, the Federal Judicial Center,

I said, "Oh, that's nice.

Why are you there

He said, "Well, I am on the board of
Well, that's pretty big, my boss really.
There has

10

which is actually their own agency, or somebody else.

11

So, I couldn't resist, and I asked him, "What do you

12

think of that, of our brainwashing?"

13

something that I will never forget.

14

due respect, I have been brainwashed by the best, and

15

you're not in that league."

16

I

And he said
"Orley, with all

In other words, the point is we are really rubes

17

as economists when it comes to making arguments, and I

18

took away from that something that I think is very

19

important in litigation but also in my own work, which

20

is the credibility of what you do.

21

of natural experiments, I mean, to some extent, I

22

invented natural experiments.

23

differences, these are all about, to some extent I

24

invented that, too.

25

earliest papers published uses that, something I did in

So, the discussion

Difference in

I mean, probably one of the
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the Labor Department when I was a bureaucrat, and here

2

is how it came about.

3

It came about because I wanted something that

4

was credible and simple.

A difference in differences

5

regression, I will just take a second, is basically a

6

regression with panel data that takes out fixed effects

7

for individuals and time periods, but all of it can be

8

presented as take a mean, subtract another mean, take

9

another mean, subtract that, and then subtract the two.

10

That's actually a monster regression.

11

powerful technical method, a very, very powerful method,

12

but it can be presented in a very straightforward way,

13

and it is now -- I mean, people talk about it every day.

14

It's kind of almost in the ordinary line of business

15

that people have done that, and most people do not

16

realize it was never a method.

17

it's a way to present the regression so that anybody can

18

understand it if they can subtract.

19

everybody can do that, but subtracting is all you need.

20

It's an extremely

It's a regression, but

Now, I admit, not

So, let me give you an example of it, because

21

this is a paper actually -- Carl presented this paper,

22

although it's our paper, done with a guy upstairs, Dan

23

Hosken.

24

the way it looked, a retrospective study of merger

25

effects, and it's actually a difference in differences,

This is a study, I just want to show it to you
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just a simple thing.

2

through.

3

These are mergers that went

You can see up there, they are all from the late

4

nineties.

I bought the data from IRI.

There is, of

5

course, cereals and motor oil and various things,

6

pancake syrup.

7

was implied by them, typically problematic.

8

these because they would generally have been considered

9

"problematic" based on public information, public

You can see the change in the HHI that

10

record.

11

would understand more about this than I do.

12

And then how do we do the analysis?

We picked

I imagine that some people in these agencies

Well, it's

13

just a difference in differences.

We had different

14

control groups, but the simplest one is to take the

15

change in prices for an aggregate -- you can do it

16

product by product if you want, whatever -- and take the

17

change in prices pre- to post-merger for the merging

18

products and subtract the change in price from the same

19

period for private label brands in the same category, of

20

which there are many.

21

brands and others in price is enormous, by the way, as

22

in that case study that was presented earlier.

The gap between the private label

23

Now, I only present this because actually, I

24

could take that first number up there, in front of a

25

judge or a jury or anybody, and I could tell them
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exactly how it's constructed.

2

underlie it.

3

control group pre and post, and I have to subtract all

4

four of those numbers.

5

then once you see that, suddenly, I think anybody can

6

understand how credible that is.

7

There's four numbers that

There's a pre; there's a post; there's a

I could show that to you, and

Now, I mean, what's the problem?

Well, the

8

problem is, of course, I can do this.

9

interested -- these were selected, by the way, to be

10

problematic, and they give you some feeling for what

11

merger effects -- mergers that were at the margin, that

12

we think are the worst case, were that were going

13

through, what's the problem?

14

course, is that in a merger analysis, you can't do this.

15

These are retrospective, after it's all happened.

16

I was

Well, the problem, of

Now, Carl and I probably would agree -- Dennis,

17

too, maybe -- that one of the things the agencies have

18

not done very well -- and this was basically touched on

19

this morning -- is some retrospective analysis of

20

mergers that actually go through.

21

that I think people, as it was commented upon this

22

morning, don't see antitrust problems out there is

23

because no one's telling them that prices are going --

24

relative prices are going up because of mergers.

25

is no evidence on it.

One of the reasons
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Now, admittedly, the worst cases probably are

2

not occurring, but it would be logical to see more of

3

this kind of work going on, and I think it would help to

4

inform, in a more general environment instead of a

5

litigation environment, what we mean.

6

is that you can't do this kind of work going

7

prospectively except in some very, very rare situations.

8
9

But the reality

The rare situation, I fell into it, was the
Staples case, and I want to mention it only because it

10

leads me to a basic point, which is, what makes, from

11

the point of view of litigation, a good case?

12

what makes a good case is one -- it has been said by all

13

the lawyers here -- where you have a good story; where

14

there is disinterested anecdotal evidence, sure, but

15

most anecdotal evidence is not by disinterested parties,

16

so, you know, one of the few legal phrases I know is an

17

admission against interest.

18

but there is not very many of them in courtrooms.

19

those are valuable.

20

I think

Those are very valuable,
So,

A story that hangs together with some credible

21

evidence that anybody can really follow -- and I mean by

22

that anybody -- is what makes for a really good case.

23

The Staples case was strange in the following way:

24

was strange because the anecdotal evidence -- anecdotal

25

here in this particular case were business documents.
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mean, more or less, you know, like a Kellogg MBA would

2

have written them.

3

comes in?

4

to let everybody know to lower prices, and -- so, this

5

was all kind of out there in the public -- well, it was

6

obtained, clearly not something that really is used in

7

the course of business and not something that was ginned

8

up just for the merger.

9

What do you do when a competitor

And, you know, make sure 30 days in advance

And then there was -- there were facts to back

10

it up, I guess Judge Hogan accepted those, and the only

11

reason I got involved is because, really, at some

12

fundamental point, there is a difference about whether

13

cross-section differences are as good as difference in

14

differences, and that was really the source of my

15

initial involvement in it.

16

But I think that the thing held together because

17

it had a good story and it had very credible evidence,

18

but it did not have -- the thing that surprised

19

everybody -- a great example of market definition, which

20

you can see most of us are driven crazy by this, because

21

it's ginned up so that you can construct an HHI.

22

fact, when I put those numbers up right there, people

23

ask me, "Yeah, but for what market are those HHIs

24

calculated?"

25

ones that I have that set of data, just a simple-minded

In

And, of course, the answer is just for the
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idea.

2

So, anyway, the last thing, I think that a case

3

that would make good litigation is not necessarily the

4

same thing from the point of view an economist as well

5

as the point of view of a lawyer, and being able to go

6

forward with credible evidence that has a good story

7

behind it is really critical, I think, from the point of

8

view of the agency winning cases, and we need for them

9

to do that, because that's the one thing that I think

10

operates as the big background factor that other mergers

11

that might be anticompetitive have to operate in the

12

shadow of.

13

shadow out there so that that issue is credible.

So, we need that shadow.

14

PROFESSOR BAYE:

15

Joe?

16

MR. SIMONS:

17

am standing up.

18

back is just stiff.

19

We need to cast a

Thank you, Orley.

So, Mike will probably wonder why I

I have no slides; it's just that my

They pick these panels, you can tell, with a

20

purpose.

So, if you looked at the panel that appeared

21

earlier, you would see there was one economist and four

22

lawyers, and I felt bad for Dick Rapp, the lone

23

economist.

24

that panel was kind of geared toward the more legal

25

stuff, and this panel has four economists and one

Dick was ganged up on a little bit.

So,
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lawyer, and so this panel is geared toward, the

2

importance of economists.

3

recognize that, given my fellow panelists are so

4

self-deprecating.

5

Although you might not

I think one of the things that's really

6

important for the Commission or any prosecutor to do

7

when they go to trial -- and to do it really early -- is

8

to pay attention to the economics and to the economists.

9

I think that is absolutely critical.

These guys sitting

10

here are important, and all the economists in the room

11

here are absolutely critical.

12

One of the reasons that they are so critical is

13

because everyone talks about telling a story; you want

14

to say something that is consistent; you want to have

15

the judge hear the same thing over and over again from

16

various witnesses.

Well, how do you do that?

17

have a construct.

You have an economic theory.

18

your story.

19

what evidence is important and what evidence is not

20

important.

21

Well, you
That's

Your economic theory is going to tell you

So, you can have all the customer affidavits you

22

want, you can have all the hot documents that you want,

23

but if those documents and that testimony doesn't relate

24

to what is relevant, then you have nothing.

25

why these guys are absolutely critical.

So, that's

And I'll echo
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something that the earlier panel said, which is that the

2

trier of fact is invariably a federal judge, has very

3

little economics background, probably maybe a little

4

more antitrust, but maybe not much, and so what is that

5

judge going to do during the trial?

6

to think, reason the way the judge normally thinks, the

7

way most of us in this room normally think, which is

8

based on experience.

9

people tend to do.

10

The judge is going

You extrapolate.

That's what

So, what the judge is going to do to extrapolate

11

based on experience in that courtroom.

What does that

12

judge see?

So, that's why you have to have this overall

13

construct.

You have to tell the judge, "Here's our

14

theory."

15

is relevant, this evidence is not relevant, here's why."

16

And then, "Here's the evidence."

17

hears it, sees it, and knows exactly where to put it in

18

the construct, right?

19

things.

20

economist during your investigation, then you do not

21

have a really good construct in all likelihood.

And you have to tell the judge, "This evidence

And then the judge

That is how people remember

And if you haven't spent time with your

22

One other point I'd like to make about the

23

economists as it relates to the trial is that when

24

you're the prosecutor, at least when I was a prosecutor,

25

the thing I wanted to know really badly, before the
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Commission voted out a complaint, was what is the cross

2

examination of my economic expert going to look like?

3

Because if I don't know that, then I have a chance of

4

getting blind-sided.

5

entire case where I am putting all this evidence in, and

6

the other economist gets up and explains, "Well, that

7

evidence is really not relevant and here's why."

8

then I am really in bad shape.

9

I could have put together an

And

The only way that you actually get to see the

10

cross examination before the complaint gets voted out is

11

you have to show the merging parties what in effect

12

would be your case on direct, and you have to do it

13

early and often.

14

telling them what you are thinking, what your economists

15

are thinking, let them talk to your economists, and make

16

sure there is a real dialogue.

17

discussion go solely through the lawyers, which, can get

18

miscommunicated or lost in translation.

19

absolutely critical, and it's really important that the

20

Commission do that as well.

21

Have a dialogue.

Make sure you are

Don't have this

That, to me, is

And then the third point I want to make is that

22

I agree with Carl, on the first point he made.

I think

23

it's really important.

24

were just a huge development, a huge advance in

25

antitrust jurisprudence, and my own personal view is

The Merger Guidelines in 1982
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they were an advance because it was a complete,

2

integrated whole.

3

evaluating the possibility of mergers causing tacit

4

collusion.

5

They were geared specifically to

The market definition is structured to deal

6

exactly with that goal.

When the Guidelines were

7

amended to include unilateral effects, the market

8

definition was not changed in any meaningful way.

9

the unilateral effects was shoehorned into an

So,

10

pre-existing structure, and the Guidelines lost their

11

cohesive whole.

12

strongly recommend is that the Commission not just run

13

in to court and say, "We don't have to do market

14

definition."

15

Guidelines -- what the analysis should be done, from A

16

to Z, for unilateral effects.

17

approach, just like was done for collusion in the 1982

18

Merger Guidelines.

And so one of the things that I would

Go back and think about what the

Make it a unifying, whole

19

Thanks.

20

PROFESSOR BAYE:

21

To kick things off, I will start out with a

Thanks, Joe.

22

question, and I hope it will keep us on the theme of the

23

virtues and limitations of these alternative sources of

24

economic evidence.

25

Dennis talked about a number of tools that are
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available, and I think he highlighted one of the

2

tensions that exists between many of the new Ph.D.

3

students who are very interested in structural

4

estimation versus kind of where we are in litigation

5

matters.

6

we have available, from reduced form estimation,

7

structural estimation, noneconometric techniques, like

8

critical loss analysis, and so forth, what are the

9

relative limitations of those methodologies or how

So, looking at the entire litany of tools that

10

robust are those alternative technologies for answering

11

unilateral effects questions?

12
13

PROFESSOR CARLTON:
okay.

14

Are you asking me?

Okay,

You were looking at me.
Actually, I thought a bit about this.

There are

15

a lot of techniques out there, and the question is, has

16

anyone evaluated which techniques work better?

17

we can all theorize which techniques are likely to work

18

better.

19

Law and Economics that evaluates the different

20

techniques in the context of an actual merger, and it

21

says which ones do better, and these structural -- these

22

very complicated structural estimations, which are

23

appealing, you know, to the set of new Ph.D.s, turn out,

24

surprisingly, not to do better in predicting price

25

effects than some of these simpler, reduced forms

I mean,

Actually, there is a paper in the Journal of
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analyses, and that's not a big surprise for people who

2

sort of learned macro when I learned macro in graduate

3

school.

4

It was about the time when these giant macro

5

models were losing popularity as predictive tools in

6

contrast to very simple, sort of trend line predictions,

7

so that sometimes simplicity can do a good job of making

8

predictions.

9

different techniques are complements to one another,

So, you know, my own sense is that these

10

reduced form and structural are complements, but there

11

is a great benefit for simplicity.

12

about real simplicity, you don't want to make things so

13

simplistic that they are useless, but market definition

14

is an attempt to make something very simplistic for

15

someone who does not know much about econometric or

16

economic technique, and, therefore, there is a virtue of

17

trying to, if you can, convince a judge that what you

18

are doing is reasonable by saying, "Here's -- you know,

19

I have done this sophisticated analysis, and by the way,

20

another way of thinking about it that might square with

21

your thinking is here's a reasonable market definition,

22

and lo and behold, this is how it emerges," and, you

23

know, from my analysis, that I find a problem, and if

24

you did yours, a more simplistic analysis, which is

25

extremely crude, you get the same answer.

And if you think
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So, I think we have to be a little careful of

2

dumping too much on market definition, because even

3

though we may think it's inferior to a lot of tools we

4

use, it may be something that's much easier for a judge

5

to grasp, and, therefore, he's less likely to make an

6

error.

7

Now, there was something that Joe said that I

8

wanted to follow up on.

I agree with him, that

9

unilateral is kind of stuck in there, and if you really

10

believe in unilateral effects, then -- you know, two

11

firms having an effect on price, well, if two firms are

12

having an effect on price, if all other prices were

13

constant among the products, they alone should be a

14

market, and you get a peculiar situation in which you

15

can get very narrow markets, and I think that makes

16

judges uncomfortable, and that's because, you know,

17

there is just a -- it may be perfectly sensible from an

18

analytic way of interpreting the Guidelines and to an

19

economist, but a judge wants something more heuristic.

20

That's why I don't like this distinction so much

21

between unilateral and coordinated.

I think it is an

22

artificial one, but all I would say is I don't think we

23

should dump too much on market definition, because it is

24

something that can prevent, especially unfamiliar --

25

judges and juries unfamiliar with economics, from
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deviating too much.

2

Having said that, if the other quantitative

3

techniques show that there is an effect, I would say,

4

"Listen, Judge, there's an effect here.

5

think about it is the market exists, but don't, you

6

know, get hung up on sharp dividing lines between what's

7

in and out of a market, and don't let that deter you

8

from understanding the economic forces that my analysis

9

is revealing."

10

PROFESSOR SHAPIRO:

One way to

If I could add a comment on

11

that, too, the question you raised, Michael.

The fact

12

is these mixed structural models are a lot of fun for

13

the econometricians and exciting methodologically, but

14

they're pretty fragile, and I don't think they have a

15

very good record.

16

you are referring to.

I think it is the Peters paper that

17

PROFESSOR CARLTON:

Yeah, Peters.

18

PROFESSOR SHAPIRO:

Which looks at the airline

19

mergers and --

20
21
22

PROFESSOR CARLTON:

He's at the Department of

PROFESSOR SHAPIRO:

Is he?

Justice.
Okay.

But even

23

holding aside and comparing their predictions versus

24

what actually happened, we just know that they are

25

finicky, these models, and as Dennis said before,
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there's already this assumption of static model.

2

where did that come from?

3

assumptions, the functional forms and they require a lot

4

of data, and so I just -- and it seems very -- extremely

5

nontransparent.

6

to ever put much weight on that.

7

we are nowhere near there, and I don't see why they

8

should.

9

Well,

You know, there's all these

I just don't see how judges are going
I don't -- not for --

So, I think the more reduced form approaches are

10

much more promising, and the question is simply, when

11

can you do that?

12

was sort of lucky in that respect.

13

have a case where you could say there was an industry

14

went from five to four players three years ago and we

15

saw the price went up, and so now we really shouldn't

16

let it go from four to three, or you might have

17

different geographic markets or some other way that you

18

could have just a direct test of the question, but

19

that's pretty rare in my experience, and that's -- so, I

20

think, while those are much more straightforward, we

21

can't usually do that, and so that is why I go back to a

22

simple test based on a few observables.

23

PROFESSOR ASHENFELTER:

I mean, as Orley pointed out, Staples
I mean, you could

Let me just comment on

24

one thing, which is that, first of all, I agree with

25

Dennis.

The eval -- I mean, to some extent, the failure
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to evaluate the effect of what actual mergers have

2

accomplished, what effect they have on prices, is

3

related to this problem of evaluating the models.

4

can't really do that unless the merger takes place.

5

there's a sense in which those are related problems, and

6

without having -- and a lot of work.

7

one.

8

evaluation, retrospective, there would be more better --

9

more and better ways to test some of these models.

You
So,

So, that's point

It's really -- if there were more ex post

10

Point two is the big -- many structural

11

models -- the high end, I will say the most elaborate

12

models that economists use that study industrial

13

organization, are actually undergoing quite a lot of

14

change.

15

incredibly disturbing paper where people are using a

16

certain kind of nonlinear estimation procedure, and it's

17

quite unclear whether or not the published literature

18

actually has objective values that have been minimized.

19

At the meeting Carl and I were at, we heard one

This paper actually took two very famous

20

examples and used ten different algorithms.

There are a

21

lot of different ways to solve these very nonlinear

22

problems, like an engineering problem, and with

23

different starting values, many different starting

24

values, and had a quite disturbing record of what was

25

there, and this guy wasn't even trying to reproduce what

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

264
1

was already in the literature, but there was a lot of

2

underground discussion -- nobody wants to talk about it

3

very much -- that a lot of -- some of that work may

4

change.

5

So, the old-timers would say, "Well, maybe it's

6

better, if you are going to use a simulation model, to

7

use something not too complicated," and the grounds for

8

that are at least we know -- you know, better the devil

9

you know than the one you don't.

10
11

On the other hand --

so, let me just say that.
Now, on the other hand, some -- in effect,

12

everybody's using the simulation model when they do a

13

prospective merger analysis, because even Carl here has

14

to get a diversion ratio.

15

fit some kind of demand curve.

16

some econometric analysis that's going to be done for

17

this exercise or at least something that would give us

18

some idea of what that is, and I think demand estimation

19

is a very difficult subject.

20

what cross-elasticities are is not -- that is not a

21

simple project.

22

So, that means he's got to
So, there's got to be

I mean, trying to find out

If you want to do that credibly, even if you

23

have a bunch of economists sitting around -- in other

24

words, we are talking about regulation here rather than

25

going to trial -- even then, it can be tricky as to
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whether or not they'll agree about what they think is

2

the best way to estimate them.

3

further, you get into the courtroom, then, of course,

4

it's a lot more complicated, because you have to try to

5

explain what a cross-elasticity is.

6

better, I agree, but still, you have to have some

7

measurement of it.

8
9

And then, if you go

Diversion sounds

So, the -- I think the answer is that we cannot
really do without them if we are going to do anything

10

that is prospective, and so the only correct answer here

11

is we have to work better to try and figure out how to

12

use these things in a better way, and I think all these

13

suggestions have been good ones.

14

PROFESSOR BAYE:

15
16

Joe, do you have anything to

add?
MR. SIMONS:

The only thing I would add is just

17

to say that I think it is really important that, you

18

know, for the trier of fact, for the judge, that you

19

have a whole range of weapons in your arsenal.

20

could be complicated; some can be really much more

21

simple; and some could be as simple as looking in the

22

company's documents and saying, "Here, they did this

23

survey, this is consistent; there are these lost sales

24

reports, this is consistent; here is this authorization

25

for capital, which explains what this project is going

Some
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to do, and that is consistent."

2

have a full range of economic tools in your testimony.

3
4
5

PROFESSOR CARLTON:

So, I think you want to

Could I just say -- follow

up really on two points Orley raised?
You know, I agree with him that, you know, what

6

Carl is doing, you need cross-elasticity, so it is a

7

kind of simulation, but I think a more fundamental

8

point, even when you use market shares, that is a

9

simulation.

So, when a judge adds these numbers

10

together and says, "Oh, now I am going to use what they

11

say in the Merger Guidelines to estimate, you know, if

12

it is a price change I should be worried about," that's

13

a simple simulation model.

14

whether you are going to have a simulation or a

15

predictive model.

16

you want it.

17

and then you can get increasingly sophisticated.

18

You do.

So, the question isn't

It is only how simplistic

And the market share is real simplistic,

The second point is really perhaps not so much

19

aimed at the attorneys in the room as at the economists

20

in the room, and that has to do with what do economists

21

know about mergers after they've occurred?

22

was on the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Hew Pate

23

asked a very good question.

24

are doing a good job?"

25

question.

And when I

He says, "How do we know we

And we chose not to study that

But this summer, when I was at the -- you
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know, in the Department of Justice, I decided I'd write

2

a memo, a one-page memo, to Tom Barnett about how to

3

answer that question, and my instinct was to use

4

retrospective mergers, much like Orley was saying.

5

It turns out that one-page note turned into

6

about a 20-page paper, in the Department of Justice

7

Economic Analysis Group, a web series, because it is a

8

much more complicated question, because the mergers that

9

you see that have gone through are mergers that we have

10

allowed to go through at the Department of Justice, and

11

unless you take that into account, you are going to get

12

a biased answer as to the effect of mergers, because if

13

it is a really bad merger, we don't let it go through.

14

So, you are only seeing the mergers go through that we

15

think won't create a problem.

16

So, if you look at mergers and you see that most

17

don't create a problem, that is just what you should

18

expect, okay?

19

you let a merger go through, what happens.

20

what it turns out:

21

are doing something right in antitrust policy just

22

looking at retrospective mergers.

23

going to find they are not going to cause too much

24

trouble.

25

that we are prescreening.

So, it is not telling you, in general, if
So, here is

It is very hard to determine if we

In general, we are

You have to make a correction for the fact
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But it is even more than that, and this is where

2

the burden comes on economists at both the Department of

3

Justice and Federal Trade Commission.

4

want to determine if you are doing a good job, what you

5

need is at the time you either decide up or down on a

6

merger, you should write down what your predictions are

7

about prices, about entry, about, you know, product

8

quality, and then what you do retrospectively is not

9

just see what happened in the marketplace, but see what

10

happened in the marketplace relative to our models that

11

you are using to predict, and statistically, that turns

12

out to be a much more powerful way of making a

13

determination as to whether the FTC and DOJ are doing a

14

good job.

If you really

15

And until we gather that data, the most critical

16

piece being what it is you think your models are telling

17

you at the time you are making a decision, I think we

18

are going to really remain in the dark as to whether we

19

are doing a good job or a bad job at the federal

20

agencies regarding antitrust policy.

21

the economists, one, to read the paper I have, and two,

22

to gather the data that intuitively you must have when

23

you are making a decision, and do not be afraid to write

24

it down, data about your predictions.

25

PROFESSOR ASHENFELTER:

So, I encourage

Let me just -- I don't

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

269
1

really agree with you on that.

2

point about, yes, in fact, basically, anybody who fits a

3

simulated model, and then that can be done in the

4

agency, and then you can look later at what happens, it

5

is a good idea.

6

all that is a great idea.

7

The -- I agree with the

I completely agree with that.

Doing

But I don't agree with the notion that doing a

8

retrospective merger analysis doesn't tell us a lot

9

about the agency.

The reason is because, for example,

10

the design of that paper I was showing you, the design

11

of that is to take the ones that are the most

12

problematic that went through.

13

Now, if those were big price effects --

14

actually, a lot of people would have thought they would

15

be negative.

16

there is some mergers going through that have, in that

17

period, small positive price effects, but that does tell

18

you that there is a lot worse ones that didn't get

19

through, but by getting a upper bound on how bad they

20

are, you are getting -- that's what the agency is

21

supposed to do, right?

22

They weren't.

They were positive.

So,

I mean, the alternative is not that we abolish

23

the whole procedure.

If that were the alternative, we

24

could say, "Well, sure, many mergers are probably

25

cost-helping."

We are only in -- the business is just
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to try to get rid of the ones that are going to be

2

anticompetitive.

3

And the -- I think the best test for is that bound.

4

Now, if, for example, the data we have for the nineties,

5

if, for example, that bound has slipped upward in the

6

retrospective, if I were I were to do this again and the

7

bound has slipped upward, yeah, I'd say we are not doing

8

as well as we used to in terms of finding

9

anticompetitive things and stopping them.

10

There is lots of others that are not.

Now, I don't know if that is true, but the point

11

is, in a way, you could almost have a third party -- by

12

the way, you should never ask the agency to evaluate

13

itself.

14

much a long time ago.

15

third party that does that.

16

appropriate -- it is not fair even to ask the FTC to

17

evaluate how it is doing.

18

That is like completely crazy.

I learned that

So, there has to almost be some
I mean, it is just not

Somebody else has to do that.

So, to some extent, you could say it should be

19

academics, but, of course, they don't have any interest

20

in doing it either.

21

here.

22

it or something, right, somebody who's at a higher

23

level.

So, it is kind of a difficulty

It should be an agency -- like the GAO should do

24

PROFESSOR CARLTON:

25

MR. SIMONS:

I don't care who does it --

You said that with a smile, right?
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PROFESSOR CARLTON:

-- but the point I was

2

making is the information you get from retrospective

3

merger studies would be greatly improved if you could

4

compare it to the predictions at the time.

5
6

PROFESSOR ASHENFELTER:
that.

I completely agree with

That would be fabulous.

7

PROFESSOR CARLTON:

The other point is that if

8

you are finding positive effects for some of these

9

mergers, they are actually even more positive than you

10

might otherwise think because of the self-selection

11

problem.

12

PROFESSOR ASHENFELTER:

13

whether I selected right.

14

the ones -- you know --

In other words, if I picked

15

PROFESSOR CARLTON:

16

PROFESSOR ASHENFELTER:

17
18

Well, depending on

Right.
-- there could be worse

ones, you are right.
MR. SIMONS:

And also you want to look at the

19

efficiencies if you are going to do that, because some

20

of these might have involved relatively small parts of a

21

transaction or relatively small markets.

22

PROFESSOR ASHENFELTER:

Well, there are a lot of

23

issues about doing retrospective things, right, because

24

you would like to have longer periods.

25

do it -- I think if you were positioned well, as Dennis

I mean, how to
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was describing, I think you could do a pretty good job.

2

I think it would be very informative.

3

PROFESSOR BAYE:

Another question I wanted to

4

ask, I think Dennis touched on this a bit in his opening

5

remarks, but I want you to talk a little bit about the

6

relationship between econometric evidence, proving

7

competitive effects, and market definition.

8
9

What are your views on whether or not
econometric evidence alone ought to be enough to prove a

10

case?

11

would be a substitute?

12

econometric evidence of competitive effects, is it

13

necessary to do what some of the earlier panelists

14

suggested and go back then and construct a relevant

15

market around those competitive effects?

16

And if not, what other evidence is useful or
And once one has established

PROFESSOR SHAPIRO:

Well, I think I have stated

17

pretty clearly it would be much better if we did not

18

need to do the market definition exercise.

19

really getting us the answer.

20

I mean, really, what you -- if you have reason to

21

believe there are effects -- and I don't care what

22

method you are using for this argument, whether it's a

23

simple test that I proposed, whether it's a reduced

24

form, whether it's a big structural model, if that's

25

what convinces the agency, let's say, that the merger is

It is not

It is very round-about.
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causing a problem, to then go back and do a quite

2

different exercise about market definition, measure

3

shares, in order to use that as a surrogate for effects

4

seems rather retarded, actually.

5

And I think the only reason we do it is for

6

historical reasons, and I guess -- I mean, according to

7

some people, fine, we have to do it because that's what

8

the case law is, okay?

9

telling -- if that is what the lawyers are telling me,

10

then I will say, "Okay, we will do it since we have to

11

do it, but shouldn't we look for a route to a more

12

coherent approach by changing the Guidelines and

13

eventually bringing the courts along in what is a more

14

direct approach?"

15

So, if that's what you are

So, I think it would be very nice to have an

16

alternative track that didn't go with market definition,

17

not to take away that track as a way for the Government

18

to make its case.

19

MR. SIMONS:

I was going to say, I think, just

20

chiming in for the lawyers here, the statute does say

21

tends to substantially lessen competition in any line of

22

commerce, which means a market.

23
24
25

PROFESSOR SHAPIRO:

Really?

Why does it mean

the market?
MR. SIMONS:

Well, because that is what the
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cases say.

2

PROFESSOR SHAPIRO:

Well, that's different.

3

PROFESSOR CARLTON:

I think you have to ask

4

who's answering the question whether you need a market

5

definition.

6

economists would say, "If I know there are competitive

7

effects, if I can show you that prices go up, and I am

8

convinced of that, that ends the inquiry."

9

precisely the question.

10

I think if economists do a study, most

That is

So, the only issue is the decision-maker, who is

11

not maybe an economist, is going to have to evaluate

12

economic evidence, and if the economic experts don't,

13

you know, for and against the merger do not unanimously

14

agree, yes, there are competitive effects and prices

15

going up from this merger, then the judge -- and

16

obviously that won't be the case -- the judge is going

17

to have to decide, "Who do I believe?

18

says there are no competitive effects; the other one

19

says there are competitive effects."

20

One economist

Now, maybe he can weigh those, but the question

21

is, what else can he look at?

He can look at other

22

evidence, but I think he -- and I think he will be

23

compelled by the cases to ask, is there some market that

24

would -- if I do a market definition, would give me an

25

inkling as to being an additional piece of information
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that might help me?

2

Carl, it is a completely circular exercise for the

3

economist if he knows there are competitive effects, but

4

for someone who doesn't know which economist to believe,

5

this can prevent him in some cases from making errors.

6

Now, in many cases, I agree with

Now, in other cases it could cause him to create

7

errors where none would exist.

So, that seems to me the

8

relevant question for someone who has to decide which

9

economist is telling the truth, is this helpful or

10

harmful?

11

a persuasive economist and you have competitive effects

12

that are clear, you should be able to explain to a judge

13

why that must mean, from an economic point of view, that

14

some relevant market -- and you should, if you can,

15

articulate one as best you can -- that is roughly

16

consistent with your views.

17

And, you know, my own sense is that if you are

But I think you should emphasize that market

18

definition is not this very highly tuned, scientific,

19

analytic exercise that the Guidelines seem to make it

20

out to be.

21

you know, agree with that criticism.

22

That I think is something I would certainly,

MR. SIMONS:

I was going to say this discussion

23

makes me think back to the article by Landes and Posner

24

in which they had that formula, that demonstrated the

25

importance of the demand elasticity is facing the
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"market" that you've defined.

2

then, there are potentially a whole series of markets

3

you could define, one more plausible than the next, and

4

I agree with your point completely.

5

So if you find effects,

You could present it to the judge in a way that

6

says, "Judge, here, this is -- this merger is going to

7

have an effect or this conduct is having an effect.

8

could define the market this way, this way, or this way.

9

In either case, the shares are whatever they are, and

You

10

you will probably be able to define one or several where

11

the shares are reasonably high, and maybe not, 50

12

percent or 75 percent, but, you know, in the range in

13

which courts have found mergers to be unlawful."

14

this would make the judge feel comfortable, which is

15

really important.

And

16

And then the other thing I was going to say is I

17

think the agency really needs to start -- you know, I am

18

repeating myself -- revamp the Guidelines, come up with

19

its own -- its own analysis, just like they did before

20

in 1982, and start to sell that approach in court in a

21

way that is seeped in through the economists.

22

judges then start to buy it, and if nothing else, you

23

still may require a market definition, but you end

24

upcoming into an Indiana Federation of Dentists world

25

where the court does not pay too much attention to

The
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market definition at the end of the day.

2

alternative is, to go to Congress, but who knows what

3

happens there?

4

PROFESSOR BAYE:

And the other

What about the first part of

5

the question?

6

sufficient to prove a case or is there other economic

7

evidence that one would need to present?

8
9

That is, is econometric evidence

MR. SIMONS:

With the most brilliant economist

imaginable with the most fortunate set of data

10

imaginable, it's just hard for me to believe that you

11

could survive with just that, and I think you have

12

really got to have a full picture.

13

PROFESSOR SHAPIRO:

Well, you know, we heard

14

earlier that, you know, eventually you have to tell a

15

story and convince a judge that the effects will be

16

there.

17

is if you do that, then from what the lawyers are

18

telling me, then you would be foolish not to then

19

backfill a market that is consistent with that, which

20

seems to -- I think to the economists to be kind of a

21

pointless exercise, but we are checking off a legal box,

22

and then I think the question is whether Dan Wall and

23

his folks will be able to throw up enough smoke around

24

that and say, "Are you kidding?

25

outside the market.

So, I guess the -- kind of what I am picking up

This stuff that is

You say they don't compete.
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not true."

2

all that junk getting brought in, and I guess you are

3

telling me we can't avoid it.

4

me, but -- and effectively you are leveraging the

5

effects to define the market to try to check that box.

6

He cross examines the witnesses.

You get

It seems like a shame to

PROFESSOR ASHENFELTER:

There is another point

7

I'd like to make, especially after listening this

8

morning to these other discussions.

9

econometric evidence is -- even if we can disagree about

The value of formal

10

its interpretation -- is it's not just my opinion.

11

power of this is very, very important.

12

day in medicine.

13

diabetics, maybe there is someone in the room that's

14

been alarmed by this, that worked hard to get their

15

blood sugar down is killing them.

16

study part way through.

17

It is the gold standard way of doing it.

18

The

You see it every

You may have seen that the study of

They stopped the

These are randomized trials.

There is -- everything in medicine says bringing

19

down your blood sugar is a good thing.

This is a

20

complete shock to everybody.

21

every doctor who would be saying the more you can do to

22

pound that sugar down, the better, and you would have

23

been killing yourself.

24

medicine and even in economics occasionally where some

25

powerful facts that just come about because of an

So, you could have found

We have seen lots of examples in
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accident almost, not an experiment, let us get that new

2

information.

3

I think what always bothers me about, you know,

4

is this in this market or is this in this market or, you

5

know, I think this car is like -- I like this kind of

6

car a lot and it would be a big substitute for that one

7

or I ski in this place and the other ones are not really

8

close to it or something like that, I always want -- you

9

know, we know consumers have heterogenous preferences.

10

There is absolutely no reason to think that that single

11

anecdote tells you anything about anybody else's

12

preferences.

13

And there is a -- I think there is a tendency to

14

appeal to that in some ways sometimes when you are not

15

using any kind of econometric evidence.

16

So, it's certainly not -- I agree that it can never be

17

the only thing, the econometrics, but it's pretty scary

18

when you don't have any.

19

MR. SIMONS:

It bothers me.

Yeah, those anecdotes that you were

20

just telling are actually the genesis of critical loss.

21

I sat in rooms with people and we had discussions about

22

how much substitution is enough?

23

me after a while that some of the people in the room had

24

in their mind that some large percentage of the

25

customers had to view the other product as a substitute,

And it became clear to
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like 75 percent.

2

when you peeled away the layers, it was there.

3

economics helps you get all those assumptions on the

4

table up front.

5

the NAAG Merger Guidelines, they say the same thing.

6

You have to have I think 50 or 75 percent of customers

7

view two products as substitutes for those products to

8

be in the same market.

9

It wasn't being stated expressly, but
The

In fact, if you went back and looked at

PROFESSOR ASHENFELTER:

Carl's diagnosis --

10

method here, by the way, does get around that.

11

you notice how the margin makes a huge difference as to

12

whether -- I mean, that's a simple intuition, right?

13

little bit of diversion with huge margins is worth a

14

lot, but it is kind of hard to explain that without

15

having, as you say, something that can -- I think it can

16

be explained in words to people, and if you can back it

17

up, it's fine, but I only mention it because the

18

anecdote -- I appreciate you're trying to -- you're

19

trying to find a way to explain something to people that

20

they can't otherwise get their hands around, and I

21

appreciate that.

22

PROFESSOR CARLTON:

I mean,

A

You know, there is another

23

issue, and that has to do with what is the proper way to

24

present expert testimony and is our court system geared

25

for that?

It is a slightly different topic, but there
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are other forums in which, when you have opposing

2

experts, what the court tries to do is hone down between

3

the two experts and see what is the consequence for

4

their differences, and when it's just opinion, as Orley

5

was saying, that's hard to distinguish, you know, what

6

is the scientific basis for the difference?

7

When they are using analytic techniques, it's

8

a -- it can be actually refreshing to see a judge or a

9

panel getting the different experts to explain their

10

different assumptions and then for the arbitrators, for

11

example, to say, "Well, why don't we adopt this one?

12

This is the most reasonable one.

13

Now redo" -- so, you narrow the differences between the

14

experts, and, you know, I have had two experiences with

15

that.

16

Now redo your stuff.

One is when you testify in -- I think it was in

17

New Zealand, they put the experts together, and you

18

don't get cross -- give your direct testimony.

19

a presentation, and then the other expert gives his

20

presentation, and you are sitting together, beside each

21

other, and the lawyers can ask any expert a question.

22

So, my lawyer would cross examine Orley, and if he

23

didn't like the answer Orley gave, he would say,

24

"Professor Carlton, what do you think of Professor

25

Ashenfelter, what he just said?

You give

Is that baloney or how
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would you answer that question?"

2

It turns out to be a more -- a very effective

3

technique of reining in what experts can say.

4

probably the most unusual experience or -- positive

5

experience I had along those lines was I was in an

6

arbitration, actually, Orley was in the same

7

arbitration, in which the arbitrator was an

8

econometrician, Dan McFadden.

9

same side, though, representing different clients.

10

But

Orley and I were on the

People got in a room, and they each explained

11

what they did, and then McFadden said, "I think this is

12

the best assumption for that.

13

the best one for that.

14

reasonable way to" -- and there was generally

15

convergence, then, by all of the sides.

16

I think this data set is

I think this is the most

So, these more complicated techniques can be

17

quite useful for narrowing differences.

18

though, that a jury system or a judge system, the way we

19

have in the United States, is the appropriate way to use

20

these sophisticated techniques among different experts

21

to narrow a divergence of opinion, but there may be

22

other settings in which that would be desirable to

23

pursue.

24
25

PROFESSOR BAYE:

I am not sure,

Well, since we have converged,

we have actually converged to 5:00, which means our time
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1
2

has expired.
On behalf of Chairman Majoras and the

3

Commissioners, the Bureau of Competition, and the Bureau

4

of Economics, I'd like to thank you all for

5

participating in this event, and we look forward to

6

working with you all in a positive way in the future.

7

(Applause.)

8

(Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m. the workshop was

9

concluded.)

10
11
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